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Financial and macroeconomic instability endogenously arises from within the system: 
this was the conclusion of Hyman Minsky’s PhD dissertation at Harvard on the 1929 
Great Crash and the dynamics of a capitalist system. In light of the 2008 Great Financial 
Crisis, his financial instability hypothesis seems to be almost prophetical. The goal of 
thesis is to investigate the Euro Area’s macroeconomic instability according to this 
interpretative framework. The objective is twofold. On the one hand, the research aims at 
disentangling the causes leading to the current divergence in growth and unemployment 
rates between Northern and Southern Euro Area countries. On the other hand, it aims at 
assessing the effectiveness of economic-financial reforms implemented in the aftermath 
of the crisis, and provides policy implications to stabilize the European macroeconomic 
system. Chapter I presents and critically discusses Minsky’s business cycle theory and 
frames the context that eased and allowed the Great Financial Crisis to happen. Chapter II 
presents the Euro Area’s imbalances, and through a VAR methodology characterises the 
growth strategy of the Northern and Southern blocks as well as the source of intra-EA 
trade imbalances. Chapter III aims at analysing the sources of growth differentials 
between the Northern and Southern countries focusing on the role investments and 
unemployment play in constraining and reinforcing path-dependency. According to a 
Minsky-Kaleckian SVAR approach, diverging and reinforcing factors are detected and 
discussed. Chapter IV emphasises the importance that financial reforms play in the 
aftermath of a financial crisis to stabilize the macroeconomic system. To this respect, an 
analysis and comparison of the major financial regulations at the European and 
international level is provided. In conclusion, chapter V analyses the impact of the most 
important financial reform at the European Level - the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive - which aims at breaking the two-way feedback process between the default risk 
of banks and sovereigns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The current unstable macroeconomic environment in the Euro Area and European 
Union is undermining the achievement of a stable long-term sustainable growth. The 
growth potential has been weak compare to the stance of the US economy for a long 
period, and although the recovery is gaining pace, not everyone is benefiting equally 
from it. Growth and unemployment differentials are destabilizing the common currency, 
which is currently experiencing a clear divergence process. Northern countries - 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Netherlands - have grown much faster than the 
Mediterranean countries - France, Italy, Portugal and Spain - which still show, eight 
years after the Great Financial Crisis, a high level of unemployment. Moreover, the 
introduction of the common currency made the two core blocks of the Eurozone 
experience opposed growth strategies: the South, domestic-demand driven, while the 
North, foreign-profit led. This transformational change has direct implications for policy 
makers since the way both economies respond to domestic and external shocks is 
remarkably different. To this respect, the principle ‘one-size-fit-all’ policy implemented 
at the European level seems to be not effective and even counterproductive. No counter-
balancing mechanism able to restore convergence was thought before the introduction 
of the common currency, and countries are left alone facing the restoration of the 
equilibrium without having proper tools: an own currency and a central bank. This new 
macroeconomic context requires policy makers understand the existing differences in 
growth strategies and tackle those endogenous mechanisms that tend to reinforce 
divergence. To this respect, Minsky’s business cycle theory and the Kalecky’s five 
determinants of profits have been used as interpretative tool to disentangle the sources 
of the divergence and provide practical policy implications. The thesis is divided into 
five chapters, as follows:  
Chapter I - Retracing The Great Financial Crisis: Policy Lessons from a Minsky-
Kaleckian Approach - presents and discusses the Minsky’s business cycle theory and 
the role of the Kaleckian determinants of profits - private investments, budget deficit, 
balance of payments surplus, and savings out of wages - in light of the macroeconomic 
context that has led to the 2008 crisis. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the long-
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run implications of Minsky’s business cycle theory. This theory is certainly a useful 
roadmap to stabilize the macroeconomic system ex-post, in the aftermath of a financial 
crisis to avoid the ‘Sky-Falling’. Nonetheless, from the accurate description of the 
dynamics of a capitalist system a set of macro guidelines can be defined to stabilize the 
system ex-ante. To this respect, by retracing the links between the deregulation of the 
80s, the rising volume of credit and financial profits, the growing inequalities, the 
structural level of unemployment, and the falling aggregate demand during the run-up 
and the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, long-run policy implications have been 
outlined. Here, the main points of the analysis are useful guidelines for the investigation 
in the following chapters.  
Chapter II - Trade Imbalances within the Euro Area: Two Regions, Two Demand 
Regimes - investigates the Euro Area economic heterogeneity. By dividing the Euro 
Area into two regions, the Northern-surplus region - Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
the Netherlands - and the Southern-deficit region, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the 
paper tests with a VAR methodology the demand regime of each region. To this respect, 
the opposing wage dynamics - negative in the North and positive in the South - seem to 
play a crucial role in determining the intra-EA trade differentials, which are the result of 
opposing growth strategy. The estimates to a wage shock verify that the Southern region 
has a wage-led demand regime, while the Northern region a profit-led demand regime. 
Moreover, the wage restraint policies implemented in the Northern region majorly 
contributed to create trade imbalances vis-à-vis the Southern region. It follows that 
wage coordination is an essential macroeconomic tool but is insufficient to achieve 
trade and economic integration given the current state of divergence. Thus, a trade-
based transfer mechanism is proposed to restore convergence in the Euro Area.  
Chapter III - Euro Area Growth Differentials: Diverging and Reinforcing Factors in 
a Minsky-Kaleckian SVAR Approach - is built upon the results of chapter II, so as to 
investigate further the causes and consequences of divergence in the Euro Area. To this 
end, a SVAR methodology tries to capture the region’s capability to respond to shocks. 
Hence, the empirical evidence disentangles diverging and reinforcing factors. The 
former set summarizes those shocks that produce opposed responses across the two 
blocks, while the latter set refers to those shocks that produce common responses. In 
this way, two clear feedback processes are highlighted as mutually reinforcing 
mechanisms able to impair and constrain growth: 1) the investment - growth feedback 
process, and 2) the unemployment - investment loop. The latter seems to have played an 
	 4	
important role in exacerbating the fall in the investments magnitude in the Southern 
region. On the contrary, the former seems to have contributed decisively to set in 
motion the virtuous mechanism of higher investments, higher exports, faster GDP 
growth in the Northern region. Finally, the analysis emphasizes the need to rethink the 
European macro mechanism and the implementation of a common and shared European 
macro strategy that goes beyond national political interests, and inclusively pursues the 
same objective: convergence.  
Chapter IV - The Emerging Regulatory Landscape: A New Normal - discusses the 
financial and banking reforms implemented in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis at 
the European and global level. According to Minsky’s theory an effective reform of the 
financial system is an essential step to restore a trustful business environment in the 
aftermath of a financial crisis. Hence, the relationship between banks’ and sovereigns’ 
default probabilities, the major source of instability during the post-crisis period, has 
been addressed by European policy makers with the implementation of the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive. In this respect, the paper sheds light upon the 
growth prospects of the banking sector for the incoming years: lower structural profits 
but higher profit sustainability as well as lower probability of default but higher 
privatization of losses, the New Normal. 
Chapter V - End of the Sovereign-Bank Doom Loop in the European Union? The 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive – according to the analysis developed in 
chapter IV assesses the effectiveness of the BRRD in breaking the risk-link between 
sovereigns and the banking system. To this end, by implementing a panel-econometric 
technique, empirical evidence shows that the regulation seems to be effective. Countries 
that have implemented the new resolution and recovery framework saw a strong 
decrease in the risk link between banks and governments. This indicates that market 
participants have assessed the banking system’s loss absorbing capacity and the shift in 
responsibility to be sufficient to avoid state intervention in case of banks’ default, 
thereby making the bail-in mechanism credible and effective. This outcome, in turn 
should have an economically positive impact on the cost of debt refinancing by banks 
and states. Nevertheless, this current change of direction may just be temporary, as it 
was before the Great Financial Crisis, and only an extreme event may definitely test its 
effectiveness.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
Retracing The Great Financial Crisis 
Policy Lessons from a Minsky-Kaleckian Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis and the Kalecki’s five determinants of 
profits are used in the paper as interpretative tools in order to disentangle the sources of 
the system’s instability. Crises endogenously develop in our economic system, and they 
are not the consequence of exogenous shocks but the result of cumulative and structural 
changes happening at critical junctures. To this respect, the paper after having presented 
the Minsky’s theoretical framework, through the collection and the discussion of major 
stylized facts, frames the macroeconomic context that allowed and eased the disaster to 
happen. A clear distinction between the proximate causes of the Great Financial Crisis 
and the underlying remote ones is then provided. In this way, the theoretical framework 
of business cycle fluctuations is integrated into a comprehensive analysis of practical 
interest for policy makers. Within this scope, short-term recovery tools and long-term 
structural policies are combined together so as to bring back the macroeconomic system 
on the path toward a sustainable and inclusive growth, that is, a wage-led full-
employment growth model as alternative solution to the current profit-led system. 
 
 
Keywords: Business Cycle, Financial Instability, Minsky-Kalecki, Structural Change, 
Financial Crisis. 
JEL Classification: E11, E12, E44. 
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In order to examine these issues we need a theory of why our system is 
susceptible to threats of the sky falling and how particular policy 
interventions may be successful at one time and ineffective at 
others. (Hyman Minsky 2008, 75) 
A program of reform that builds an economy oriented toward 
employment rather than toward growth should show benefits 
quickly. The primary aim is a humane economy as a first step 
toward a humane society. (Hyman Minsky 2008, 326)  
1.  Introduction 
The link between capital, investments and economic growth began to work through the 
investment channel in a reliable way in the OECD countries only after the second 
World War, between the 1950s and 1960s (Minsky 1982, 15). Unfortunately nowadays 
this relationship has lost strength and reliability.  
Many factors contributed to this breakdown, leading to the current era of low rate of 
investment and slower growth, which in turn constrains and impairs private and public 
investments, ultimately triggering a vicious mechanism.  
On this line, the paper aims to disentangle the underlying remote causes from the 
proximate ones. It tries to retrace the sources driving the macroeconomic system to the 
current level of fragility. To this respect, the oil shocks of the seventies (the stagflation) 
and afterwards the process of financialization that grew rapidly during the 80s and 90s 
introduced a variety of new contradictions among the different spheres of economic 
activity. As a consequence, financial crises became recursive and the swings of the 
business cycle increasingly wider.  
Many authors such as Galbraith (1954), Kindleberger (1978), and more recently 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have investigated this structural change trying to learn 
lessons from experience. In light of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC), most of 
them started to stress the fact that the financial deregulation of the 1980s triggered the 
instability of the economic system. To shed light upon the overlapping causation forces, 
the Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis (2009) and the Kalecki’s five determinants 
of profits (2010) are used in the paper as an interpretative theoretical framework 
(Leijonhufvud 2009; Wray 2008; Bellofiore and Ferri 2001) capable of explaining the 
sources of the boom and bust cycles, and the subsequent period of stagnation. Retrace 
those factors creating fragility in a capitalism system, which is susceptible for its own 
nature to threats of the ‘sky falling’, is the most important lesson we can learn to 
prevent us from repeating policy-failures such as those leading to the 1929 Great Crash 
and the 2008 GFC.  
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To this respect, the paper synthetizes the Minsky-Kaleckian framework for then applies 
its approach to the most representative stylized facts for the period surrounding the 2008 
GFC. On the one hand, by interpreting the theoretical relationship between investment, 
profits, and finance the paper clarifies the possible causation forces of business cycle 
fluctuations. On the other hand, after having framed the bearings, a nexus between 
theory and empirical findings can be defined.  
As follow, section 2 examined the endogenous instability of a capitalist system in 
relationship with finance and the not neutral role of money. Section 3 covers the 
‘domino effect’ among the different debt-units in the economy, that is, the path 
conducive to instability. Section 4 presents the Kaleckian profit equation and discusses 
the crucial role the five determinants of profits play in avoiding the ‘sky falling’. 
Section 6 discusses the major trends in the post World-War II that allowed the disaster 
to happen, and clarifies the Minsky’s position on current policy issues. Ultimately, the 
final section summarizes the main contributions of the paper.  
2. The Minsky’s Synthesis 
Minsky argues that financial markets entail freedom without equilibrium, making our 
system more fragile. ‘The time path of the economy depends upon the financial structure. 
As a result of cumulative changes financial relations became conducive to instability’ 
(Minsky 1982, 15). Financial relations and financial products weaken and complicate the 
relationship between capital investment and the real economy, thereby creating a dualism 
between tangible (goods and real investments) and intangible richness (financial 
assets)[1]. An increase in the stock of capital does not necessarily pass through the 
previously necessary goods production, which was a central step of the value creation 
process. Capital or money can be invested through financial markets in order to produce 
new capital. Through this mechanism, capital accumulation is endogenous and can be 
generated or destroyed by financial markets.  
The great advantage, which is even more valuable in an uncertain and unstable business 
environment, is the capability of financial markets to easily transform the investment at 
any point in time into liquidity. This is the supreme skill of financial markets. If the 
expected return from real investments is lower or equal than the expected return from 
financial investments, thanks to this feature, financial markets attract the majority of 
disposable capital in the system. Reasonably, banks will prefer to put the excess liquidity 
into financial markets instead of lending it to entrepreneurs who, contrary to banks, have 
a strong preference for investing directly in the real economy, thereby creating new 
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output capacity and employment. This great advantage, the so-called supreme skill turns 
into a real weakness for the investment-growth channel when the creation of new capital 
becomes the ultimate goal of financiers and banks.  
To this respect, Minsky underlines that ‘policies to control and guide the evolution of 
finance are necessary... in particular the maintenance of a robust financial structure is a 
precondition for effective anti-inflation and full employment policies without a need to 
hazard deep depressions’ (Minsky 1982, 92).  
The return from financial markets should mimic the return from real investment 
otherwise, if it is higher, it should be priced with a higher risk. The issue emerging from 
the GFC wasn’t the higher return earned from financial products but the hidden risk 
embodied in those products created by financial innovation. ‘These new financial 
products provided the basis for an illusion of low risk, a misconception that was 
amplified by the inaccurate analyses of the rating agencies’ (Yellen 2009, 2). Financial 
regulation should prevent these price (risk-return) distortions, ensuring that to financial 
returns the true risk is attached so as to let the market participants decide between real 
and financial in a fair way. When the true trade-off between risk and return is lost, wrong 
incentives and expectations bring the economy on an unsustainable path which, thanks to 
the self reinforcing mechanism due to the speculative behaviours intrinsic in a capitalist 
economy, culminate in the burst of the asset bubble, and followed by a deep depression.  
As Keynes as well as Minsky emphasizes, the issue arises when the majority of investors 
in the economy passes from being hedgers to speculative and Ponzi types[2] The 
sustainability of the growth path depends upon the share of investors belonging to these 
three groups. The mix of financial postures determines the overall robustness or fragility 
of an economy’s financial structure, ranging from hedge finance, providing more 
resilience, to Ponzi finance providing more fragility. As Minsky affirms ‘the mix of 
hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance in existence at any time reflects the history of the 
economy and the effect of his particular developments upon the state of long term 
expectations’ (Minsky 1982, 106). It is easy to realize that an increasing number of 
speculative units in a financialized economy is a destabilizing factor for the system. To 
this respect, the first question to be addressed in order to understand why crises are 
recursive is: why, even if the system is experiencing a period of tranquillity, do hedgers 
become speculative units, and speculative units become Ponzi units? This issue was much 
less pivotal in an economy with a powerless and less systemic financial system as it was 
before the process of financialization took place. Given the evolution of finance and its 
 9 
woven destiny with the investment decisions, Minsky suggests as a possible solution the 
simplification of the financial structure in order to achieve greater stability, even if he 
recognizes that ‘the enforcement of simplicity in financial arrangements will be difficult’ 
(Minsky 1982, 113). A possible answer to this question can be found in the role of money 
and the misunderstanding of its functioning. 
Money is not neutral as monetarists believe. Money is not exogenously created. ‘In our 
economy money is created as bankers acquire assets and is destroyed as debtors to banks 
fulfil their obligations’ (Minsky 1982, 17). Money is endogenously created and affects 
both the price level of output as well as, contrary to neoclassical synthesis, the price level 
of capital assets[3]. As Minsky remarks, ‘the latter depends upon current views of future 
profit flows and the current subjective value placed upon the insurance against 
uncertainty embodied in money or quick cash’ - expectations about the long run 
development of the economy - while the former depends upon ‘current views of near 
term demand conditions and current knowledge of money wage rates’ - shorter run 
expectations (Minsky 1982, 94). Therefore a capitalist economy is characterized by two 
sets of relative prices: current output prices and capital asset prices and their alignment 
together with financing conditions determines investments. This is what usually has been 
called the ‘endogenous incoherence’ of a capitalist system (Minsky 2008, 74). When an 
economy is performing well, that is, current profits flows are sufficient to validate past 
debts, then expectations about future stream of profits are self-reinforcing, affecting asset 
values and liability structures. Such fulfilment of debt commitments, in turn, will affect 
the willingness to debt finance by bankers and their customers. In the end the value of 
insurance embodied in money decreases as the economy functions in a tranquil way. But 
as Minsky underlines ‘stability - or tranquillity - in a world with cyclical past and 
capitalist institutions is destabilizing’ (Minsky 1982, 101). Therefore the decrease of the 
value of insurance embodied in money leads to a rise in the price of capital assets and to a 
shift of portfolio preference. At this point, a larger amounts of speculative and Ponzi units 
will be accepted by bankers. This is what happened in the GFC as it was underlined by 
the president of the Federal Reserve of San Francisco at the Annual Minsky Conference: 
‘Investors tried to raise returns by increasing leverage and sacrificing liquidity through 
short-term - sometimes overnight - debt financing. Simultaneously, new and fancy 
methods of financial engineering allowed widespread and complex securitization of many 
types of assets, most famously in subprime lending. In addition, exotic derivatives, such 
as credit default swaps, were thought to dilute risk by spreading it widely.’ (Yellen 2009, 
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2). As we see, preferences changed quickly and remarkably, nobody wanted to lose the 
opportunities offered by financial markets. Moreover financing conditions improved at 
the same time. The financial system endogenously created part of the finance needed for 
the increased investment demand. It follows naturally the rise in capital assets. Higher 
capital asset prices - higher house prices - allowed the banking system and shadow banks 
to enlarge their asset side, making loans to those who thought they were in the hedge 
category while, in reality, they were speculative and Ponzi units. Both lenders and 
borrowers were shocked when they discovered being a speculative unit. Financial 
instability hiding behind the gleaming expectations of a tranquil era prepares the primer 
for the bubble burst. To this respect, the second question that needs to be addressed is: 
what has been the factor triggering its sustainability? 
3.  The Road to The Great Crash 
The likelihood of the burst is directly related to the amount of speculative and Ponzi units 
in the economy. The higher this amount is, the more sensitive the economy becomes to 
interest rate variations. Speculative and Ponzi units’ expected cash flows arrive later than 
the payment commitments on their outstanding debts, therefore higher short-term interest 
rates strain the viability of their financial structure. At high enough short-term interest 
rates, former viable positions require larger cash flows than initially planned. 
Nevertheless the net present value of the investment, which is an inverse function of the 
long-term interest rate, remains positive. Only an increase in the long-term interest rate 
may rule out the positive return from the investment, while an increase in short term 
interest rate will only increase the short-term payment commitments, which will be 
reflected in a higher delivery price of the capital asset. In fact ‘the delivery price of an 
investment good is a positive function of the short-term interest rate’ (Minsky 1982, 107). 
Therefore the use of external finance is needed to comply with the unexpected higher 
payment commitments. If the supply curve of finance is infinitely elastic, then the rising 
demand for finance is always met. The cheap and abundant money on the supply side, 
together with the successful state of the economy and the increasing investment demand 
on the other, pave the way to the increased number of investments in the economy. This 
in turn leads to higher profits and, at a constant interest rate, to higher prices of capital 
assets. This mechanism, as we realize, is self-sustaining. Higher capital assets create 
incentives to new investments, new investments increase current and future profits and 
profits push up capital asset prices. A boom is the result of the normal functioning of our 
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economy, while current cash flows reassure ourselves about our past choices, and 
positive expectations about the current prosperity.  
However a boom may not last forever. Unfortunately it is not a never-ending story. In 
fact the issue triggering the sustainability of this path comes from the availability of 
finance. The former infinitely elastic supply curve, little by little, may become less elastic 
for two main reasons:  
1) The boom in investments boosted by the accommodative stance of the central bank 
leads to an overheating of the economy and therefore to increasing inflationary pressure. 
To this signal central bankers react by increasing short-term interest rates. Thus, the 
access to credit becomes more expensive.  
2) The amount lent by banks to businessmen is proportional to the face value of the 
capital asset. Therefore if the price of capital assets keeps on increasing, the insurance 
embodied in the face value of the asset would allow banks to rollover the debts and 
increase the quantity lent. But when the price of capital assets is close to the bubble’s 
peak-price, the speed of growth of the capital asset price is much lower than when the 
boom started; therefore banks will be more cautious to lend money if the value of their 
insurance is expected to grow more slowly. This implies that the banks’ willingness to 
lend (at the previous rate) decreases as long as the speed of growth of the capital asset 
prices reduces. This makes evaporate at least part of the previously existing easy 
money[4]. As a conclusion the short-term interest rate increases, making the supply price 
of investment output increases. Moreover, given that short-term and long-term interest 
rates co-move, the former pulls the latter[5]. In this way, the downward spiral begins.  
The present value of gross profits after taxes a capital asset is expected to earn falls, 
thereby reducing both supply and demand for investments. A fall in investments reduces 
current and near-term expected profits. Lower profits expectations reduce the price of 
capital assets. According to the liability side, hedgers may become speculative units, and 
some speculative units, Ponzi units. With higher short-term interest rate, the initial short 
run cash flow deficit of Ponzi units becomes permanent, and with the rising long-term 
interest rate also the net present value may become negative.  
Next, as Minsky describes Ponzi units try to sell out their positions in assets to meet 
payments commitments, but unfortunately they discover that ‘their assets cannot be sold 
at a price that even comes near to covering debts. Once the selling out of positions rather 
than refinancing becomes prevalent, asset prices can and do fall below their cost of 
production as an investment good’ (Minsky 1982, 108)[6]. At this stage a full-fledged 
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financial crisis can be avoided only if ponzi and speculative finance received a prompt 
refinancing in order to avoid panics and strong selling pressures. The timing of the lender 
of last resort is crucial for the effectiveness of its actions. The central bank by injecting 
liquidity softens the impact of the financial crisis on the real economy by impeding 
temporarily the complete collapse of the capital asset prices, and therefore of investments 
and profits. Nevertheless the vicious cycle doesn’t end so easily. The risk premia 
associated with new investment projects rise, and businessmen together with bankers 
reduce their liability sides avoiding speculative finance. A larger volume of previously 
positive net present value investments earns back negative returns as long as investments 
keep on falling together with profits. The shortfall of profits relative to the payment 
commitments on inherited debt together with a possible decrease in money wages make 
things even worse. 
According to Minsky the only way to counteract a possible deep depression has to deal 
with the long run expectations of bankers, businessmen and asset holders about the future 
developments of the economy. The unfavourable experience of the financial crisis 
dramatically changes these expectations: ‘profits are the critical link to time in a capitalist 
economy with a past, a present and a future’ (Minsky 1982, 104). In order to avoid that a 
manageable recession becomes a deep depression, gross profits have to be sustained so 
that debt structure and past investments are validated. This, in turn, re-assures the system 
that the existing size and the structure of aggregate demand is enough to sustain present 
investments and financing decisions. Future profits need to validate current investment 
decisions. In order to stop the downward spiral, the lender of last resort must intervene by 
injecting liquidity, while the government has to sustain the decrease of profits by deficit 
spending. The deep depression will be escaped only if profits are sustained for such 
enough time to allow investments to recover to pre-crisis level.  
This is the hard core of what - after the 2007-8 GFC - is definitely known as the ‘Minsky 
moment’. For those who had forgotten, the best empirical description of this moment is 
given by the former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Geithner in his book of memories: 
There was nothing modest about our crisis. It began with a colossal financial shock, a loss of household 
wealth five times worse than the shock that precipitated the Depression. Bond spreads rose about twice as 
sharply in the Lehman panic as in the panic of 1929. Serious investors were buying gold in bulk and talking 
about burying it in their yards. Stock markets dropped to more than 50 percent below their 2007 highs 
(14)... The financial crisis really was a stress test for the men and the women in the middle of it.  We lived 
by moments of terror. We endured seemingly endless stretches when global finance was on the edge of 
collapse, when we had to make monumental decisions in a fog of uncertainty, when our options all looked 
dismal but we still had to choose (2014, 19). 
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In similar circumstances, once again, the timing and the magnitude of government 
interventions are crucial. If it comes late and with not enough strength, not only Ponzi 
units will not succeed in fulfilling their outstanding debt payment commitments, but 
‘even initially hedge financing arrangements will not be forthcoming’ (Minsky 1982, 
108). Therefore an investigation into the determinants of profits is necessary to really 
understand the intrinsic evolution of the business cycles in a capitalist system.  A useful 
tool to investigate these determinants is the Kalecki model.  
4.  The Kalecki’s Five Determinants of Profits  
Rather than the standard approach used in the neo-classical synthesis, where profits are 
determined by technology through the production function, Kalecki tries to address the 
question of how the volume of profits is determined in the economy deriving it from the 
national accounting identities as follow (Kalecki 2010, 49): 𝜋 = 𝐼 + 𝐷𝐹 + 𝐵𝑃𝑆 + 𝐶𝜋 − 𝑆𝑊                                                                                       (1) 
Gross profits net of taxes - the left hand side of the equation - are equal to gross private 
investment (I), plus budget deficit (DF), the balance of payments surplus (BPS), 
consumption out of profits (C𝜋), minus savings out of wages (SW).  
According to Kalecki any change in the investment magnitude unequivocally affects 
actual profits by the same amount, and expected profits the current investment 
magnitude.  
Within this framework, the level of perceived uncertainty and the availability of finance 
play a crucial role in shifting the risk appetite of bankers and entrepreneurs, which in turn 
determine the stance of the economy (Minsky 1975).  
Among the five determinants, investment is the only one that increases the productive 
capacity of the economy, that is, the potential welfare. As we have previously sketched, 
in the aftermath of a financial crisis, both the business confidence and the financing 
conditions sharply deteriorate, so that investments together with profits experience a 
sharp fall. At this stage the business cycle begins its downward path. The only way to 
counteract the fall in investments is by an increase in the other four determinants, among 
which, the budget deficit is the only source of profits which is completely under the 
government’s control, and for this reason it represents the ad-hoc policy instrument for 
controlling the level of profits and in turn the posture of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the budget deficit in the short run requires to be financed, and its outcome 
may depend, not only by the way it is invested, but also upon the combination of the 
financing method employed and the monetary policy strategy implemented. If the budget 
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deficit is financed by the central bank, which maintains an accommodative policy, i.e., 
interest rates do not rise, no place for an adverse effect on the other determinants of 
profits exists[7]. While, if the central bank lends money to the government and at the 
same time increases the interest rate to compensate the enlargement of the money base, 
investments will fall as well as profits because they are interest sensitive. Therefore the 
result will be ambiguous. However another source to finance the budget deficit that is 
commonly used by governments is to borrow from the public. The issue concerning this 
way of financing is twofold. On the one hand, if the government is not reliable and 
moreover it has an already high public debt, the interest rate may be high and increasing 
due to the perceived risk. As Minsky underlines ‘government units are often speculative 
financing units which operate by rolling over short term debt’ (Minsky 1982, 33). High 
enough interest rates can make government units into Ponzi units. This is what took place 
during the European sovereign debt crisis two years after the burst of the subprime 
bubble. Most of the countries in the Eurozone - especially the Mediterranean countries - 
weren’t able to rollover their debts. The increasing perceived risk in the financial markets 
concerning the sustainability of their debt levels pushed up the cost of borrowing and 
only the intervention of the lender of last resort avoided their default. In this way, the 
deficit spending benefits less than proportional profits, and the deleveraging process 
exacerbated the fall in investments in a self-reinforcing mechanism. On the other hand, 
since the sustainability of the government deficit is tied to revenue expectations, as 
Minsky underlines, shortfalls of revenue due to changes in global and local economic 
conditions exacerbate debt problems and may even trigger the domino effect across 
public debt units (Minsky 1986, 253). 
Aside the financing issues, the government deficit affects current profits by the way it is 
used, and this represents a really important insight into the problem of sustaining profits. 
Profits sustained by an increased deficit increase for sure in monetary terms, but to create 
the conditions for a trend reversal, a rise in real values must take place[8]. If the stimulus 
is not sufficient and effective in recovering the investment magnitude, the economy 
would face permanently a lower level of employment and economic activity[9]. The 
hysteresis and path dependency here ground their roots. Given these cumulative forces, 
understanding what are the best usages of government spending to sustain profits is 
crucial[10]. To this respect, is it better to run government deficit by tax reduction or by an 
increase in government spending?  
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Private sector would certainly prefer the tax-cuts, but, if this issue is analysed by the 
perspective of the Kalecki’s identity, government spending would be highly preferred. In 
fact, a lower level of taxes is not equal to a higher level of consumption (out of wages) 
because part of these tax-cuts will be transformed into current savings, which enter 
negatively into the Kalecki’s identity[11].   
As Minsky definites it: ‘big governments virtually ensure that a great depression can not 
happen again’ albeit the continuation of the inflation-recession-inflation scenario is the 
natural consequence (Minsky 1982, xxiv). He clearly underlines that ‘the current policy 
problem of inflation and declining rates of growth of labour productivity are not causally 
related but rather they are the result of a common cause, the generation of profits by 
means of government deficits where the government deficits do not result from spending 
that leads to useful output…Big government is a shield that protects an inefficient 
industrial structure’ (Minsky 1982, 56). This is summarized by Minsky with the 
expression: ‘doctrine of salvation through investment’. Once this idea is ‘deeply 
ingrained into our political and economic system the constraints on foolish investments 
are relaxed…. the inefficiency of the chosen techniques is reflected by the unemployment 
that accompanies inflation: stagflation is a symptom of an underlying inept set of capital 
assets’ (Minsky 1982, 113). 
Nevertheless according to Minsky ‘big governments remain necessary to prevent a 
shortfall of investments from triggering an interactive debt-deflation process, but they can 
be considerably smaller and different’ (Minsky 1982, 201). According to Minsky 
‘government must be at least the same order of magnitude as investments’ (Minsky 1986, 
332). Moreover governments should be different.  
Regarding this point, Minsky advocates that: ‘the emphasis on investment and economic 
growth rather than on employment (through consumption production) as a policy 
objective is a mistake. A full-employment economy is bound to expand, whereas an 
economy that aims at accelerating growth through devices that induce capital-intensive 
private investment not only may not grow, but may be increasingly inequitable in its 
income distribution, inefficient in its choices of techniques, and unstable in its overall 
performance’ (Minsky 1986, 325). Therefore the usages of government spending - as 
they are currently implemented - validate private decisions even if they are detrimental to 
efficiency and equity.  
To this respect, government should engage in the resource creation and development 
belonging to the public domain thereby boosting the efficiency of private investments 
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(Mazzucato and Jacobs 2016). Moreover, government spending should avoid demand 
management through transfer payments because ‘when government transfers income to 
people, there is no direct effect on employment and output…the impact on GDP of a 
dollar spent to hire leaf rakers in the public parks is greater than a dollar given in welfare 
or unemployment benefits’ (Minsky 1986, 25). A two-sided transaction is better than one 
that does not provide inputs into the production process.  
Nevertheless, since private investments can be destabilizing, ‘the policy emphasis should 
shift from the encouragement of growth through investment to the achievement of full 
employment through consumption production’ (Misnky 1982, 113). Within this context, 
to achieve a stable and sustainable growth the focus has to be set upon the intermediate 
horizon of ten to fifteen years (Minsky 1982, 258). This is of great practical interest for 
policy makers, and is the key to understand why Minsky incentivize public investments 
rather than public consumption, while private consumption over private investments. 
The short run and the long run are two different faces of the same coin, and are strongly 
linked. Hysteresis is the principle linking variables’ movement in the long run to a short 
run change. Public investments in those fields providing social benefits and requiring a 
high capital intensity - railroads, energy plants, communications, research and knowledge 
development - are necessary and government should take care of them[12]. As 
Mazzucato recently emphasizes, ‘innovations that would not have come about had we 
waited for the ‘market’ and business to do it alone - or government to simply stand aside 
and provide the basic’ (Mazzucato 2013, 3)[13]. They enhance the aptness of private 
investments and therefore the level of productivity in the economy - the long run trend 
developments. On the other hand, consumption production through lower capital intensity 
activities implies a higher level of employment, which in turn, constraints the downward 
swings of profits in the economy - the short run developments. A higher profits floor 
reduces the instability intrinsic in a capitalist economy. Contrary, pushing private 
investments through government consumption without having created a source of stable 
profits would only overheat the system and increase its fragility[14]. Incentivizing 
consumption by increasing employment in order to sustain profits is a safer policy tool 
than increasing private investments in the short run. It is the quality of private 
investments and not the quantity that roots a stable and sustainable growth path within a 
capitalist system. It is the quality of investments - the real knowledge - that improves 
productivity. According to Misnky, ‘the utilization of knowledge by competitive 
industries guarantees that such knowledge becomes the basis of widespread well-being, 
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not the rent-producing assets of a few’ (Minsky 1986, 366). This is the essence of a 
policy aiming at stabilizing an economic system, which for its own nature is unstable, and 
that at the same time strives for efficiency and equity, i.e., growth and full employment. 
Nevertheless, not only private investments and the government deficit, but also the other 
determinants of profits have a non-negligible impact on the investment rate - although of 
smaller magnitude - and therefore on the stance of the economy. 
To this respect, an increase in the export volumes increases current profits by the same 
amount, if and only if, all the other determinants of profits remain unchanged. For 
example, if an export oriented sector experiences an increase in its export volumes and 
this excess of cash flows is neither invested nor consumed, whereas is sterilized by a 
higher level of savings, current profits will not increase. Contrary, whether these export 
revenues are invested to enlarge the productive capacity or are used to buy consumption 
goods on the domestic market, current profits will increase more than proportionally 
through the positive effect of the multiplier, common to all the variables in the Kalecki’s 
identity. Therefore the profit function has a multiplicative behaviour of degree one or 
higher depending upon the usages to which these export revenues are devoted[15]. 
According to Kalecki ‘the value of an increment in the production of the export sector 
will be accounted for by the increase in profits and wages of that sector. The wages, 
however, will be spent on consumption goods. Thus, production of consumption goods 
for workers will be expanded up to the point where profits out of this production will 
increase by the amount of additional wages in the export sector’ (Kalecki 2010, 51). 
Nevertheless, if the productive capacity of those sectors producing consumption goods 
can’t be expanded, i.e., it is already at its capacity level, the increasing demand will only 
push up prices, leaving the multiplier inoperative. In fact, Kalecki underlines that ‘if the 
production of consumption goods for workers is at capacity level, prices of these goods 
will rise up to a point where profits out of this production will increase by the amount of 
additional wages in the export sector’ (Kalecki 2010, 51). If the productive capacity is 
available to expand, prices may rise as well, and thereby offsetting partially the multiplier 
effect. As long as prices increase, the multiplier tends to converge to 1. On the other 
hand, an excess of imports i.e. a trade deficit, will have a similar opposite effect on the 
multiplier than an equal increase in the trade surplus. Overall, the trade balance represents 
the 'autonomous component of demand', that is, the demand emanating from outside the 
region. To this respect, Kaldor emphasizes that the growth in the autonomous demand-
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factor governs the rate of growth of the economy as a whole, that is, the rate of growth of 
investments and consumption’ (1970, 342). 
Upon this view the mercantilist perception rooted its policy prescriptions in the sixteen 
century. A trade surplus was a prerequisite in order to increase the wealth of a nation. The 
inflows of gold had to exceed the corresponding outflows. It is important to stress that 
this is a zero-sum game, and therefore a persistent trade surplus weakens foreign 
countries by draining out resources. In fact a persistent current account deficit is likely to 
increase private and public indebtedness. Not only current profits, but also expectations 
about future profits are likely to be affected in this way. This, in turn, will decrease the 
amount of available resources in the domestic market, and therefore its level of output 
and employment. For this reason, a mercantilist perspective suggests currency 
devaluation, import tariffs and export subsidies as remedies to counteract a persistent 
trade deficit. Despite the presumable negative effect, and conversely positive effect of a 
persistent trade surplus, the overall success and sustainability of a negative (positive) 
trade balance depends respectively upon the characteristics of the goods imported 
(exported), and their related usages. Moreover, also a country constantly facing a trade 
deficit may be pursuing a sustainable growth path. In fact, if the productive capacity is 
growing at a sufficiently fast pace, the long run sustainability won’t be in any jeopardy. 
According to Minsky, the creation of a trade surplus in the aftermath of a financial crisis 
may prevent the economy to fall into a deep depression. Therefore a trade surplus plays a 
crucial role similarly to government deficit in sustaining profits. This was the reason why 
austerity measures in the Euro Area had remarkably different effects across its members, 
and why some of them recovered the pre-crisis output trend, while others not (Covi 
2017). To the same extent, Kalecki emphasizes that:  
The capitalists of a country which manages to capture foreign markets from other countries are able to 
increase their profits at the expense of the capitalists of the other countries…. The counterpart of the export 
surplus is an increase in the indebted-ness of the foreign countries towards the country considered…. The 
counterpart of the budget deficit is an increase in the indebtedness of the government towards the private 
sector…. The above shows clearly the significance of 'external' markets (including those created by budget 
deficits) for a capitalist economy…. It is the export surplus and the budget deficit which enable the 
capitalists to make profits over and above their own purchases of goods and services (Kalecki 2010, 51).  
Therefore, policies aiming at setting in place a recovery need to feed profits internally 
through government spending, and at the same time promotes exports so as to alleviate 
the internal burden and make it self-sustainable.  
To this respect, also the fourth determinant of profits - savings out of wages - plays its 
key role in time of crises. Given the fact that it enters negatively into the Kalecki’s 
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identity, it may sterilize part of the foreign profit flows. This negative effect on current 
profits is also quite intuitive because a higher saving rate implies a lower level of current 
consumption and investments. Especially, in the aftermath of a financial crisis, when 
current profits are low due to the collapse of investments, a positive shock to the saving 
rate may pull back the economy into recession although contemporaneous massive 
interventions from the government and the central bank. This phenomenon has been 
called the paradox of deleveraging.  
When asset prices start to fall, and the financial crisis starts to erode the value of capital 
assets and real wages, agents start to consume and invest less given the current adverse 
and expected business conditions. As clearly confirmed by Yellen in the aftermath of the 
GFC:  
Consumers are pulling back on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings. Businesses 
are cancelling planned investments and laying-off workers to preserve cash. And, financial institutions are 
shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve their chances of weathering the current storm’ (Yellen 2013, 
3).  
On the positive side of the cycle building up savings is a successful countercyclical 
policy advise, so that, when the ‘black swan’ suddenly arrives, the economy is well 
prepared. While, if these good behaviours take place on the negative side of the cycle, 
they may only contribute to magnify the distress of the economy as a whole. Moreover, a 
reduction of the saving rate may also boost the investments directly or through a higher 
consumption rate, as happened in the GFC, leading to an overheating of the economy. In 
fact, due to the softening of lending standards and the competitive pressure in the banking 
system, especially in the US and UK, the level of indebtedness in the economy sharply 
increased. In turn, this phenomenon transformed the low, but positive, saving rate into a 
positive determinant of profits in the Kalecki’s equation. ‘The personal saving rate, which 
had been falling for over a decade, hovered only slightly above zero from mid-2005 to 
mid-2007. A good deal of this leverage came in the form of mortgage debt’ (Yellen 2013, 
2). To this end, and to smooth the business cycle’s fluctuations Minsky suggests ‘a 
balance sheet conservatism’ and ‘the control of banking - money - and the control of the 
liability structures available to units’ (Minsky 1982, 86).  
Ultimately, the last determinant of profits - consumption out of profits - depends upon the 
corporate sector dividends’ policy. The higher is the amount of dividends distributed to 
shareholders, and the lower is the saving rate on dividends, the higher will be the impact 
on gross profits. The impact of this variable is relatively small, and loses importance as 
long as its economic structure is weakly based on the stock market to invest and 
 20 
refinance. Moreover, firms’ profits are added to the stock of liquidity in the form of 
retained earnings, and therefore they are only partially and occasionally distributed to the 
shareholders. On top of that, households investing in financial products such as stocks 
experience a saving rate higher than an average household with a wage-based 
consumption behaviour. This, in turn, reduces even more the total amount of 
consumption out of profits. According to Minsky, an analysis aiming at going to the 
origins of business cycle needs to take into account all the five determinants. He 
emphasizes that the role of the fifth determinant - consumption out of profits - depends to 
large extent upon interpreting ‘the allocation of profits to salaries, research, advertising, 
and ‘business style’ expenditures…the allocation of profits to consumption follows from 
the building of a bureaucratic business style, which, like inherited debt, may lead to 
current period ‘uncontrolled’ expenditures’ (Minsky 1982, 44).  
As we have emphasized, the business cycle depends upon the swings of investments in 
the economy, which, in turn, are driven by the amount of gross profits and profit 
expectations. All the five determinants impact gross profits in different ways and with 
different magnitudes. They endogenously evolve over time together with the economic 
structures, the ‘animal spirits’, and financial postures. A full understanding of their 
relationships, therefore, is a precondition, if central banks, governments and policy 
makers aim at ‘stabilizing an unstable economy’ and achieve a sustainable growth path. 
5.  The Macroeconomic Context of Great Financial Crisis 
As Minsky sums up his analysis: ‘The causation runs from investments to profits’ (1982, 
103). According to this perspective, uncertainty and volatility of profits are determined 
by the fluctuations of investments, which, in turn, lead to huge swings of the business 
cycle. The financial sector, and especially the banking system play a crucial role in the 
creation of money and the pricing of capital assets, that is, in determining the level of 
investment in the economy. The evolution of financial markets, and therefore of financial 
innovations is the accelerating element to the upward instability. 
To this respect, after having presented the Minsky’s theory, the paper doesn't aim at 
comparing it with the extensive literature on business cycles (Schumpeter 1939; 
Samuelson 1939; Hicks 1950; Fisher 1952), which was the object of a detailed analysis in 
the first two chapters of the Minsky’s thesis Induced Investment and Business Cycles 
(2004).  
Rather closer to our interest it is trying to assess the practical implications of the 
Minsky/Kalecky analysis in light of the GFC of 2007-08. It has been clarified in the last 
 21 
section that given the critical role profits play in keeping the business cycle out of a 
downward spiral, all the government's policy measures should be designed to sustain 
investments by maintaining the volume of gross profits unchanged. But, this is true only 
in the short run in a Minskian framework. It really works as a painkiller, to borrow a 
medical term: a panacea against the rising panic, to avoid a bank-run and the 'sky falling'. 
This kind of measures that use public spending, tax-cuts or monetary operations to 
support the business cycle can prevent the economic 'meltdown’, but do not cure the 
disease. To this respect, the policy so-called Quantitative Easing, adopted promptly in 
December 2008 by the Federal Reserve, can be assessed as the biggest economic stimulus 
in history: a bond-buying program of almost  $ 4.5 trillion (at the end of 2015) holding at 
same time interest rates to zero or near-zero, figure 1. 
Insert About Here Figure 1 
Total Assets: Federal Reserve and European Central Bank 
It’s for sure a very successful story in monetary policy management that brought 
American economy in just two years out of the recession. But the rapidity of the success 
can’t hide the appalling level of fragility showed by the economic system. And cannot 
wipe out, in any case, the enormous costs in term of destruction of millions people’s 
prosperity. In terms of forgone output, the GFC is as costly as wars, as observed by 
Haldane (2012). It is not the aim of the paper to cope with the already enormous literature 
on the causes of the biggest economic depression since 1929.  
The object of the following investigation is to draw a simple distinction: for an event of 
such dimension the proximate causes must be separated from the underlying remote ones. 
The proximate events are the subprime mortgages, the debts accumulated to finance the 
speculative bubble in the housing market, the abnormal growth of the securitization 
process in the financial sector and, at the end, the Lehman Brother bankruptcy. If they are 
easily recognized as cause of the crisis, we cannot ignore that this happen in a 
macroeconomic context that allowed and eased such an economic disaster to happen. In 
this respect, although the Minsky-Kaleckian approach has undoubtedly important policy 
implications in the short-run - to avoid the ‘sky-falling’ - similarly, it has an important 
lesson to be learned regarding the long-term stabilization process of a capitalist system. It 
is on this precise interpretative point that the contribution of this paper stands. The 
illustrated mechanics of business cycle can be so applied to policies aimed at stabilizing 
the system ex-ante, instead of ex-post. This is clear in Minsky’s writings (2008), although 
policy makers clearly prefer the latter option to the former one. By knowing how 
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instability endogenously arises from within the system, the flaws and fragilities of the 
system can be reduced by implementing ad-hoc macro-policy responses. The generalized 
fall into a 'Ponzi' trap is not due to an exogenous shock such as the Leman bankruptcy, it 
is due to the endogenous cumulative forces and the structural fragility of a capitalist 
system. An instability that should have been tackled, through time, with the instruments 
of political economy, financial reforms, and a more sustainable growth-model. From this 
point of view, the GFC is the offspring of a flawed growth-model.  In this respect, the 
investigation of the period and policy-events preceding the GFC sheds light upon which 
policies and reforms allowed and conduced to the 2008 instability. 
To simplify the argument - and following a Keynes/Minsky/Kalecki theoretical 
framework - the patterns of growth can be divided in two types: wage-led and profit-led. 
The importance of the distinction rests on the fact that workers and capitalists have 
different propensity to save so that functional income distribution has important effects 
on aggregate demand and hence on the rate of growth and on the resilience of the 
economic system (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990; Bleker 2002; Hein et al. 2011; Palley 
2012a).  
The influence of long-term brewing factors usually is difficult to be detected and 
admitted. It’s also rather neglected by economists. Nevertheless, the period post World-
War II to the late seventies is referred to as the Golden Age of capitalism in industrial-
advanced economies (Marglin 1990). For thirty years the common growth model was 
wage-led. The high growth rates, for that long period, was attained through rising wages 
in accordance with the productivity increases, and full employment. At the end of the war 
the Keynesian revolution spread its effects in America and in Europe, and the fears of 
governments and ordinary people to return to the calamity of mass unemployment post-
1929 did the rest. The model established a virtuous-circle of growing salaries that 
supported a strong aggregate demand, which in turn stabilize the invest rate, leading to 
the creation of productivity gains that allowed wages to rise in a framework of full 
employment.    
It’s also well known that this growth-model ended in the eighties defeated by the 
counterrevolution of neoliberal economics, and under the blows of the Washington 
Consensus policies (Wlliamson 2004). Many are the new factors and the new players: the 
liberalization of capital movements and of international trade paved the way to offshoring 
and outsourcing of jobs in developing countries where labour costs were a tiny fraction of 
the industrial countries wages. The stable floor of aggregate demand, usually fuelled by a 
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wage bill increasing with productivity, began to shrink and the workforce to take 
back[16]. Assets price inflation and strong increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 
households, corporates and states became the new tools searching for stimulate 
investments and hence directly profits. Full employment disappears as the principal target 
of public policies. Only flexibility of the labour market - wages downward adjusted - is 
admitted to be able to bring the economic system near to full employment; not anymore 
to ‘full employment’, since the introduction of Milton Friedman’s concept of a ‘natural 
rate of unemployment’ was established (1968), and which was made later operational by 
neo-classical economics under the acronym NAIRU - non accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (Gordon 1997; Palley 2012, 40). The historic trend of unemployment 
from post-WW II until today (see Figure 2, based on OECD data) could not be more 
impressive in reporting this paradigm shift.  
Insert About Here Figure 2 
  The trend of unemployment in US and Eurozone (1956-2014) 
In the terms of the new economic setting the abandonment of the employment-targeting 
policy takes place in high-wage economies with long-lasting trends that will be hard to 
change. We highlight here three of the main trends. 
5.1 Wages lag behind  
In the Golden Age, in the period from 1947 to 1973 in the U.S., productivity and median 
wages rose together for more than 100 percent, and labour’s share on GDP rose rapidly 
(Levy and Temin 2007). Although established on technological advantages, the American 
Golden Age was strongly promoted by the institutions built up in the years of the New 
Deal (also before the publication of the Keynes’ General Theory) and consolidated 
during the post-WW II through labour-business arrangements where government played 
strongly pro-labour with the target of bringing the economy back to full employment. It 
sounds quite similar to the words of Minsky in his quote at the beginning of this paper: 
‘an economy oriented toward employment rather than toward growth’[17]. This line of 
policy was fully confirmed at the end of the war. Also if later amended by the Congress, 
under Truman presidency, in January 22nd 1945, the U.S Senate passed the law S.380, 
‘The Full Employment Act’. Its declaration of policy had a symbolic impact that went 
beyond the economic relevance:  
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To establish a national policy and program for assuring continuing full employment in a free competitive 
economy, through the concerted efforts of industry, agriculture, labor, State and local governments, and the 
Federal Government .... all Americans able to work and seeking work have the right to useful, 
remunerative, regular and full-employment and it is the policy  of the United States to assure the existence 
at all times of sufficient employment opportunities to enable all Americans who have finished their 
schooling and do not have full-time housekeeping responsibilities freely to exercise this right (Bailey 1950,  
243).  
We focus on this legislation because it makes clear two important aspects of the policy of 
the Golden Age. The first is that the growth-model that followed is definitely wage-led in 
the i of the Minsky’s priority of employment over the rate of growth. The second, likely 
more important, is that to be successful, a strategy of economic development of this type 
can’t be made-up simply by the same groups of economic advisors of a President, but it’s 
a long-lasting political work of institutions building and making of social norms. Later, in 
the sixties, under the Kennedy administration, the chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors Walter Heller, in 1966, made technically perfect this socio-economic 
architecture inventing a set procedure of price-wages guideposts so as to fix how 
productivity gains should be distributed between profits and wages. With his own words: 
In business, the guideposts have contributed, first, to a growing recognition that rising wages are not 
synonymous with rising costs per unit of output. As long as the pay for an hour’s work does not rise faster 
than the product of an hour’s work, rising wages are consistent with stable or falling unit-labor costs 
(Heller 1967, 44). 
As we have said at the beginning of the paragraph, this reassuring and seemingly stable 
economic landscape begin to collapse during the critical seventies, and under the shocks 
of what Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) call ‘critical junctures’: in this case, the break-
down of the dollar-anchor-to-gold (1973), the first oil shock (1973), the surge of 
stagflation, and the second oil shock (1979)[18]. Since then, the productivity growth was 
disconnected from wages.  
This is a long lasting trend common to nearly all advanced countries, but mostly in U.S. 
Kalecki provides two complementary explanations on what would happen. In a short 
article of 1945, he shows that to reach and maintain full employment by relying only on 
private investment would prove to be a nearly impossible task. On the one hand, the 
ordinary policy stimuli to foster profit-led growth - ‘cheap money’, reduction of income 
tax, subsidies to investing firms - have to be applied not once for all, but cumulatively: 
‘that means that the rate of interest must continuously fall; the income tax must be 
continuously reduced; or the subsidies to investment must continuously rise’ (Kalecki, 
1945, 83). On the other hand, the difficulty to reach and maintain a long time full 
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employment is related to political reasons. As Kalecki writes about what he calls the 
‘economic doctrine of full employment’: 
It should be first stated that although most economists are now agreed that full employment may be 
achieved by Government spending, this was by no means the case even in the recent past… There exists a 
political background in the opposition to the full employment doctrine even though the arguments advanced 
are economic... Every widening of the State activity is looked upon by ‘business’ with suspicion, but the 
creation of employment by the Government spending has a special aspect which makes the opposition 
particularly intense. Under a laissez-faire system the level of employment depends to a great extent on the 
so-called state of confidence. If this deteriorates, private investment declines which results in a fall of 
output and employment. This gives to the capitalists a powerful indirect control over Government policy: 
everything which may shake the state of confidence must be carefully avoided because it would cause an 
economic crisis (1943, 324-325).  
Based on this argument, Kalecki concludes that, in a capitalist regime, there is always the 
threat of a ‘political business cycle’, of the emergence of a block between big business 
and rentiers pressing ‘to return to the orthodox policy’ (1943, 330). In fact, this sounds 
today like an exact prediction of what would have happened next - forty years later - with 
the return of the neoliberal economics era, symbolized by the election of Margaret 
Thatcher (1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980)[19].  
5.2 The growing income inequalities 
If the first effect of the Golden Age collapse was the disconnection of a growth-model 
where productivity and wages were linked together, a second implied effect was the 
explosion of income inequalities. Furthermore, the wages stagnating for a long time 
created problems to the aggregate demand. If you add that the economic recoveries were 
jobless-type, as was in the 1990s, a typical downward spiral - as described by Minsky - 
inevitably begins.  
The increase of inequality from the 1980s, especially in U. S., has been documented by 
many researches (Atkinson 1997; Piketty and Saez 2003; OECD 2008; Fiorentini 2011; 
Stockhammer 2013). It is a real turning point, the ‘Inequality Turn’ as baptized by 
Atkinson (2015, 3). For example, as shown in Figure 3, the top 10% in U.S. received in 
2015 about half of the gross national total income, 15 percentage points more than in 
1980 (Piketty and Saez 2006). 
Insert About Here Figure 3 
The U.S. Top Decile Income Share 
The problem with inequality is not only economic but social, it tends to worsen poverty. 
Alarming is the case of Eurozone. With an unemployment rate of 10% in Q3-2016, more 
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than double of U.S. (see Figure 2), the EA-19 experienced an acceleration of the people 
at-risk-of-poverty. During the period 2008-2014 there have been an increase of 6.7 
million people living in poverty or social exclusion bringing in EU-28 the total people in 
poverty to 124.2 million, nearly 1 to 4 Europeans  (EU 2014, 7).               
One wonders why the public policy has not set-up an objective for the reduction of 
unemployment while the rate of inflation is so precisely targeted at 2% by all central 
banks. It could be because the labour market is something complex, strongly influenced 
by technological innovations and globalization. But why not, in any case, stating the 
‘rate-of-unemployment’ as a public and explicit objective?[20] As with inflation?  
A second big question arises looking at the post-2008 unemployment trend in the U.S in 
comparison with the Eurozone. They are radically ‘unequal’ or, better, opposed if we 
look at the second circle on the right hand side of figure 2. How to explain such a 
different behaviour? And inside Eurozone, what has been wrong with the regional 
‘inequalities’ and the impact of the GFC between core countries (Germany and Northern 
Europe) and Europe’s peripheral countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy) that are 
sinking into chronic unemployment (Storm and Naastepad 2015; Simonazzi, Ginsburg 
and Nocella 2013; Stockhammer et al. 2009)? 
Is it credible that the European heritage is due only to the austerity policy adopted? (Blyth 
2013). Or to a monetary easing-money policy adopted too late by the ECB? It’s tragically 
true that, the Euro-partners came to the decision of starting a program of Quantitative 
Easing too late, in March 2015 (7 years after 2008); while the Fed started its mortgage 
back securities and bond-buying program (QE) already in November 2008. The intensity 
and the endurance of the slump in the Eurozone prompt a deeper investigation of the 
structural causes, in line with the lessons learned through the Minsky/Keleckian 
framework of the previous paragraphs, and before surrendering to a diagnosis of 
‘Japonization’ (Krugman 2014; Ito 2016). There must be a more fundamentally flawed 
growth-model behind the performance of the economies of the Eurozone that is 
worthwhile to investigate. The rationale for policies comes after and accordingly.  
5.3 The Financial Deepening 
After rising unemployment and rising inequality there is a third dimension of the GFC 
and recession that comes up, in a vicious cumulative circle, with the first two. It’s the 
‘financialization’ of the high-income economies. Not in the form of the contingent 
financial instruments that brought the US economy in the verge of the ‘sky falling’ - in 
the words of Minsky - (sub-prime mortgages, toxic bonds and derivatives). But in a more 
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structural meaning: of a growth-model tuned by financiers, i.e., finance-led. We do not 
enter here the recent very extended literature on financialization[21]. But this new latest 
profit-led modality of neo-liberalism raises important questions on its long-run effects on 
wages, full employment and equality. 
After the Golden Age, there is in US not only an income polarization, as shown in figure 
3, but also the income of the top 10% became closely linked to the explosion of the 
financial markets, as figure 4 shows. 
Insert About Here Figure 4 
Income share of the top 10% and value of financial assets as % of GDP in US 
During this historical juncture income inequality sky-rocked pointing out a second 
research indication: the profit-led growth turns into a rent-seeking growth. Here it should 
not seem too imaginary assuming that we went beyond Minsky’s words: ‘the causation 
runs from investments to profit’. Here it seems that the correlation is between financial 
investment and profits: the growth-model became rent-seeker in a system where the first 
rule of the game is that the ‘winner-takes-all’. As observed by Palma (2009, 851): ‘What 
happened to investment during the neo-liberal period challenges all available economic 
theories of investment’.  
But there is a second important issue connected with financialization. We could say a 
double issue. The first refers to the impact of the financial cycles on the real business 
cycles. Recently a growing literature has addressed the link between the two cycles 
(Goodhart and Hoffman 2008; Schularick and Taylor 2009; Borio et al. 2012). Tough 
strictly interrelated, the financial cycle has assumed since the 1980s a distinct trend with a 
length and an amplitude much more marked than usual business cycles.  
Figure 5 is rather worrying because it discloses the fact that the Great Financial Crisis is 
far from finished. The financial crises have medium-term length. If policies do not take 
into account this dimension, and are short sighted, the risk is to incur in larger recessions 
unexpectedly during the recovery process. Is the so-called ‘unfinished recession’ 
phenomenon (Borio et al. 2012, 2). 
Insert About Here Figure 5 
The financial cycle is longer than the business cycle (US example) 
For the Eurozone the economic indicators of the recession, as the rate of growth and the 
rate of unemployment, speak for themselves regarding the fact that the slump is not yet 
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over. But even the US cannot claim victory. For the US - and just because the real 
economy’s indicators turn positive - this financial ‘hidden side’ should be better 
investigated to detect the effects of years of ‘unconventional’ monetary policy, through 
the QE (from 2009 and running until October 2014) and by holding interest rates near 
zero (Stiglitz 2016). In fact, in the on-going lively debate on the topic, not few are the 
critical positions against this policy accused of sowing bubbles and financial instability 
for years to come (Feldstein 2016). Not to speak of the European officials that embraced 
the fiscal austerity and were since the beginning against the shy unconventional ECB’s 
experiment of assets purchases (see figure 1)[22].   
In fact, monetary and state authorities have a daunting task in these circumstances. As 
already enlightened by Minsky: in the short run, to avert the catastrophe ‘big 
governments remain necessary’ on the expenditure side. But it’s clear that, right after, the 
state must radically change its set of primary goals: from an increasing accommodating 
financial regime put in place from the 1980s, it must begin a transition toward a resizing 
of the financial sector, a major overhaul of the rules of the game over the long run to 
avoid macroeconomic disruptions that could happen again. The emergence from the 
financial crisis seems to be, this time, a task much more difficult in the current 
environment, at least in Europe. It is rather disheartening what reminds us the IMF:  
Past financial crises have been resolved to a considerable extent by resumption of strong growth, often 
external, that drove down debt ratios and enabled affected countries to emerge from austerity programs 
before austerity fatigue had set in too heavily. Thus, 1984 was an annus mirabilis as the ‘Reagan boom’ 
and paralleled growth elsewhere started lifting Latin America economies out of their crisis-level 
indebtedness... In addition, the widespread growth spurt of the early years of this century enabled Asian 
countries, which had recently been in deep financial crisis, to growth at rates of 6 percent or more; this 
growth rapidly brought down high debt ratios and enabled the countries to wind down their emergency 
infrastructures and arrangements (Enoch 2014, 465). 
The missing point in this judgment is that, few years later annus mirabilis 1984, there 
was the Black Monday of October 1987 (see Figure 5) when the Dow Jones plunges 508 
points, a drop of 22.6 percent in one day, the biggest in history. The causation should be 
inverted: it is the system through its economic structure and banking/financial 
organization that should have the capacity to promote growth and not vice versa, hoping 
in a ‘providential’ growth to soften up the failures of the financial sector. But, as we 
know from Minsky and Kalecki, capitalism is intrinsically unstable and so the problem is 
to link the system to reforms and policies capable of triggering growth again.  
The finance-growth nexus has been examined by a growing literature demonstrating a 
positive correlation between financial development and economic growth, as admirably 
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synthesized, for example, in King and Levine (1993, that remind us the classic positive 
view of Schumpeter on finance enhancing innovations) and in Levine’s review (1997). 
But the GFC has stimulated a new generation of empirical researches. The new findings 
underscore that the crude rule of thumb ‘more finance, more growth’ should be replaced 
by a range of possibilities in which flawed financial systems can lead to an array of 
negative effects: from depressing savings to rising unemployment and from enhancing 
speculation to underinvestment.  
For example, Cecchetti and Kharrubi (2012) show that a faster growth of the financial 
sector is associated with a slower growth of the other sectors of the economy. This 
happens because, in the competition with others sectors, a booming financial sector 
subtract resources to the others. The explanation is perfectly in line with the crowding-out 
effect played by the ‘natural resource’ sector in the theory of ‘Dutch Disease’ (Corden 
1984), and renewed by Palma (2008; 2009) in the context of financialization. An 
empirical study on 87 developed and developing countries, by using an innovative 
dynamic panel threshold technique, Law and Singh recently confirmed and specified the 
contours of this nexus: 
The relationship between finance and growth is a non-linear one or, more specifically an inverted U-
shaped, where there is a turning-point in the effect of financial development ... For financial development 
below the threshold finance will exert a positive effect on economic growth. This implies that economic 
growth will be increased when financial development improves. On the other hand, if the financial 
development exceeds the threshold, the impact of finance on growth will turn negative suggesting then 
further financial development will not translate into higher economic growth (2014, 36, 43). 
This conclusion is confirmed by Arcand et al. (2012) in a cross-section and panel data 
study on more than 100 developed and developing countries (1960-2010) and clarifies 
that in high-income countries finance turns to have a negative effect on growth.       
5.4 Toward a ‘New Normal’ in the Banking and Financial Sector? 
 Given the above, to make the macroeconomy more stable we would need a structural 
change in the financial system. In this direction, a revised Basel Accord, Basel III, was 
reached in 2010. Though non-statutory, these international accords are usually transposed 
at the national level. In the same year, the most important American response to the crisis 
was the Dodd-Frank act. Similar in substance the EU response that converted Basel III in 
a legislative package was the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD-IV) covering capital 
and leverage requirements, crisis management, new rules for counterparty risk, deposit 
guarantees and other macroprudential standards. It will be fully loaded within 2019. The 
first new resolution and new recovery regime - the so-called Bank Recovery and 
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Resolution Directive (BRRD) was implemented across the European states starting from 
January 2015. A comparison between the US and EU new resolution regimes show that 
they diverge remarkably. Whilst EU directive applies to all credit institutions and 
investment firms, in US the new regulations regard only the big banks, entities with more 
than $ 50 bn. A coordination mechanism has been later set in place to cope with the 
strong negative cross-border externalities of financial institutions. For initiative of G20 
leaders and the Financial Stability Board  (FSB) a new common standard resolution 
regime has been set in place for the so-called Global Systematically Important Financial 
Institutions (G-SIFIs)[23]. For this group of thirty global biggest banks the upward 
constraints - in term of capital and leverage - have been set much higher than the all other 
banks considering the large damages they can potentially cause.   
Is this set of new regulatory requirements sufficient? A kind of  ‘New Normal’ for 
banking and financial industry able to stabilize the economy? The rules of the game, as 
described above, now in place, surely can soften instability setting upward constraints to 
the banking system’s performance so as to achieve a lower but stable profit growth. 
Nevertheless this will not prevent the system from being unstable, from being profit and 
rent seeker, and from escaping the next financial crisis. For a variety of reasons.  
Decades of deregulation, rapid, unrestrained financial innovations and a brakeless moral 
hazard had brought banks’ stock prices at strong heights, likewise happened in 1928-9. 
Five years after the crisis, the price-to-book ratio of these global banks are much less than 
parity - less than 0.5 in the Eurozone - a performance worse than in 1929-1933 (figure 6). 
If this surely can be seen as an healthy correction from the previous ‘exuberance’, we 
can’t know whether it is a positive signal toward a structure of lower but more stable 
level of profits, that is, a lower probability of default coupled with an augmented 
resilience of the sector. There are too many questions let unsolved in this effort to rule a 
‘New Normal’ for the banking/financial sector.  
Insert About Here Figure 6 
Evolution of bank stock price to book ratios, historical and present day (a)(b) 
The first flaw comes out from the fact that despite passing the principle of ‘bail-out’ in 
favour of the new rule of ‘bail-in’, in case of default the losses can be much larger than 
the amount of shareholders and senior/junior debt-holders capital. A principle of 
unlimited (or proportioned) responsibility for the ex-post losses is not provided by the 
new regulations. That means that bank’s incentives toward a profit-seeking business 
 31 
strategy are not changed. This could push someone of the banking/financial sector to 
resume gambling in the markets to recover the loosed profit margins.  
The second flaw comes out from the fact that the new regulatory response has been inside 
the standard logic of reducing the risks inside the system setting new capital requirements 
and new leverage levels. No sign, neither in US nor in EU  (and in Basel), of some 
prohibitions or limitations: of some simple ‘not-to-do’. After the great 1929 financial 
crisis, the way out was found in 1933 with the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated 
commercial banks from investment banks. For 65 years it has prevented the American 
business at least from the damages of many potential interest conflicts. Glass-Steagall Act 
was repealed in November 1999 by the American Congress. The new Dodd-Frank Act of 
July 2010 has been carefully synthetized to avoid the reintroduction of size or type limits 
in the banking operations. Few know that last unpublished paper of Minsky, a year before 
his death in 1996, was just on the Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, for a hearing in a US 
Congress Commission. Here his position in favour of introducing a new limit looking 
forward for the 21st century: 
Given the evolution of institutions over the past decades I would like to suggest that those institutions 
which manage money and are in a fiduciary relation with household be separated from institutions whose 
primary focus is upon trading and investing for the benefit of the owners of the firm’s capital and their staff 
whose compensation is based upon performance. Universality may well exclude pension and mutual funds. 
Thus even as the wall between investment and commercial banking that found expression in the Glass 
Steagall separation in the 1930’s we may need a new separatism as the 21st century approaches, one that 
separates investment banking and the managing of mutual and pension funds. The personnel of a broad post 
Glass Steagall ‘Bank’ are guided by profit maximizing and own income. The fiduciary and the merchant 
banker-trader are different personality types and have quite different objectives. Thus a Bank holding 
company may well be forced to choose between having an investment bank or a mutually fund 
management affiliate (Minsky 1995, 24).  
His suggestions sound really prophetic because few years later, in 1998, the financial 
markets was shaken by the failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge 
fund that needed the bail-out of the Fed. But not even such a catastrophe of trillion-
dollar-dimension induced to some type of derivative finance regulation, which was let 
become in the 2000s so toxic to bring the world economy to the ‘sky falling’ that Minsky 
feared[24].  
These are the main arguments that induce to be sceptical on the effectiveness of this New 
Normal so needed according to Minsky to restore a stable functioning of the economic 
system in the aftermath of the crisis. Although seriously risk-fighting, it doesn’t represent 
a true structural turning-point for the banking/financial sector in both side of the Atlantic. 
The economic deregulation philosophy of the last decades is not inverted. One fact 
remains: the shock to the global financial sector has been a sufficient condition for a 
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creeping depression in the US and a still open depression in EU; surely for a negative 
‘financial cycle’ which still buries the global economy.    
The international capital flow in 2015 was still two third below his 2007 peak when its 
dimension was at the heady summit of 150% of the US GDP (figure, 7). The core of the 
problem is that the EU accounts for almost 70% of the fall with the central banks 
responsible for more than 50% of the flows inside the region. The completion of the on-
going regulatory-banking-reform seems to be crucial in determining the next historic 
course of financial globalization toward a more resilient international capital market. 
Insert About Here Figure 7 
Global cross-border capital flows (1946-2015) 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Macroeconomic policy has a very important role in securing and maintaining a stable 
growth of inclusive welfare. But, to be effective, it must found its strategy and its tools on 
a correct and realistic vision of the functioning of the capitalist system. In light of the 
GFC of 2008 it’s commonly - though may be too late - now recognized that the vision of 
Minsky, his ‘financial instability hypothesis’, was correct[25]: unfortunately almost 
prophetic.  
In the first part, the paper has analysed the mechanics by which a business cycle 
develops, as described by Minsky through his different writings, concluding with his 
doctoral dissertation (supervisors Schumpeter and then Leontieff). The basic Minskian 
perspective is that financial markets become conducive to instability if left free of self-
regulating. The sequence goes from a majority of hedge financial positions (market 
temporary tranquillity) that shifts to speculative positions and then to the so-called 
‘Ponzi’ finance, a situation characterized by borrowers that can’t repay neither interests 
nor the principal, and rely entirely on gambling on rising asset prices. This is a structural 
tendency of financial markets - the supreme skill - so as they attract the majority of 
disposable capital when the expected return from real investment is lower than the 
expected return from financial investment. Even government can transform itself into a 
speculative agent, a special kind of ‘Ponzi’ unit, when it rollovers short term debt. This is 
exactly what occurred in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis two years after the 
burst of the subprime bubble in 2010-2012.  When such wrong incentives are built into 
the economy, expectations will, à la Keynes, bring the economy in an unsustainable path 
ending up with the burst of the assets bubble.  
 33 
The second part of the paper, refines the macrodynamics, as above described by Minsky, 
introducing the Kaleckian profits equation. The five national accounting determinants of 
the level of profits and investments are the on-off key to increase the productive capacity 
of the economy and hence the potential welfare. In the post-Keynesian perspective this is 
a central issue at least from the influential model of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) that 
originated a large - still on-going - debate. The strategic question here is: do we prefer a 
‘profit-led’ or a ‘wage-led’ expansion?  
Here the objective was to enlighten what was the position of Minsky on this issue. We 
must also consider that his interest in addressing the problem is specific: it’s in the 
framework of business cycles, a medium term economic phenomenon. And the 
intellectual interest was to find policies that decrease the level of structural instability of a 
capitalist economy. That said, the paper investigated the different ways and the different 
weights the five Kaleckian determinants impact gross profits. Synthetically the main 
findings are the following:  
1. If we accept the economic system as now it is - going on with blows of booms and 
busts and ever-increasing wage polarization - ‘big government capitalism’ is all we 
need. Subsidizing a shortfall of investments with government spending. This is the 
main street to what Minsky calls ‘the doctrine of salvation through investment’. 
However, the main hazard of this profit-led growth-model is to build a ‘shield’ to an 
inefficient economy and to what he calls ‘foolish investment’ (Section 4). The 
characteristics and the path that brought to the Great Financial Crisis of 2008 could 
be a textbook example (see Section 5).  
2. A second crucial role in sustaining profits can be played by an export-led growth 
whereby a permanent trade surplus has a crucial role in sustaining profits similarly to 
a fiscal deficit. In the aftermath of a financial crisis such a strategy may prevent a fall 
into a deep depression, as highlighted by Minsky. The problem with this strategy is 
the mercantilist outcome. In fact, it’s impossible to achieve an export surplus for all 
countries at the same time, as observed by Kalecki (Section 4). This simple 
observation can acquire substantial significance - and become a good ‘research 
hypothesis’ - if analysed from a Keynesian balance of payments perspective[26], and 
applied to the current macroeconomic exit-strategy from the depression Eurozone is 
currently following; a strategy that enforces a common economic policy rule for very 
different group of countries (Germany and northern countries) export-led and 
southern countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece) more inward-looking.  
 34 
3. Finally, putting together and weighing the two options, the Minsky/Kaleckian 
recommended solution emerges clearly if the aim is ‘stabilizing an unstable 
economy’. The first best policy is targeting full employment through consumption 
production. A profit-led economic growth, and its emphasis on private investment is 
a ‘mistake’, it enhances a fake growth because unstable in its overall performance 
and inequitable. Increasing consumption by increasing employment that in turn 
sustains profits, is a safer policy. The strategy of the ‘big government’ can be 
effective in the short run - when under the threats of the ‘sky falling’ - though at the 
highest cost of validating all kind of private decisions, included the most inefficient 
and inequitable. 
In the third part (Section 5) the paper extends the Minsky-Kaleckian interpretative device 
to the Great Financial crisis of 2007/8, as a sort of case-study apt to test the practical 
relevance of their approach. The paper doesn’t enter the proximate causes of the crisis, 
but the macroeconomic context that allowed and eased the disaster to happen - following 
the main lesson of our authors that crisis comes out from within the system (structurally 
unstable). This part is illustrated by charts chosen with the criterion that they are 
representative of the stylized facts described. The stylized facts headings are the 
followings: 
a) It’s true that ‘big government’ intervention works, in the short run. The Quantitative 
Easing promptly adopted, in December 2008, by the American Federal Reserve has 
been the biggest economic stimulus in history (figure 1) and saved U.S. from the 
financial/economic meltdown. Eurozone that adopted the same measure seven years 
later has not yet recovered.  
b) The period post-World-War II to the late seventies - the so-called Golden Age of 
capitalism - had a wage-led growth-model. It put a stable floor to aggregate demand 
through wages rising with productivity and full employment. Figure 2 depicts 
dramatically, especially for Eurozone, the abandonment of the employment-targeting 
policy defeated in the eighties by the counterrevolution of neo-liberal economics. 
That period translates quite well the Minsky’s prescription enclosed in the quote at 
the beginning of this paper: ‘an economy oriented toward employment rather than 
toward growth’. 
c) Section 6.1 reports how this Minsky policy conclusion matches the Kalecki’s 
position on what he calls ‘the economic doctrine of full employment’. He agrees with 
Minsky on the fact that the attainment of full employment is almost impossible under 
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a profit-led-growth regime. But also a wage-led regime will not be a bed of roses. In 
a famous 1943 short paper he alerts on the existence of a ‘political business cycle’: 
big business and rentiers always push ‘to return to the orthodox policy’. Saying this, 
he predicted what would have happened forty years later. 
d) The second trend opened by the collapse of the Golden Age is a real turning point, 
the ‘Inequality Turn’, as baptized by Atkinson (Section 6.2). The most alarming case 
is Eurozone still with an unemployment rate of 10% in Q3-2016, more than double 
of U.S. There must be a fundamentally flawed growth-model behind the performance 
of the core countries and the peripheral countries of Europe. A growth-model that is 
worthwhile to further investigate. 
e) After the rising unemployment and the rising inequality the third dimension of the 
GFC is the ‘financialization’ of the system. The profit-led growth model turned into 
a finance-led (rent-seeking) model. Here a double issue emerges. The identification 
and the impact of the ‘financial cycles’ on the traditional business cycles (figure 5). 
If the structural medium-term stabilizers of the economy are overlooked, the risk of 
an ‘unfinished recession’ increases. The second issue, well-knitted in a Minsky-
Kalechian framework, is that the rule of thumb ‘more finance, more growth’ is no 
more sustainable. There is growing evidence from econometric and empirical studies 
that financial development seems to follow an inverted U-shaped curve: the impact 
of a growing financial sector on growth turns negative after some threshold of 
development. 
f) The last section brows, very briefly, the new banking/financial regulations that the 
authorities of the two side of the Atlantic have begun to implement: from Dodd-
Frank Act to Basel III Accord and from the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV) 
of the EU to the G-SIFIs. All these are intended to shape a ‘New Normal’ for 
banking/financial institutions. The question to be addressed is: are they a sufficient 
level of reform, being able to stabilize the global economy? Though introducing 
upward and more rigid constraints to the banking and financial industry, section 5.4 
reviews the major hindrances to this goal. Global cross-border capital flows are still 
2/3 lower (2015) than their 2007 peak - uncertain between a further retreat or a fake 
reset. From a Minsky-Kalechian perspective all this seems to have nowise modified 
bank’s incentives. Primarily it seems that all this new regulations are too complex to 
be effective. Above all they have not inverted the economic deregulation philosophy 
of the last decades. 
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In light of the Minsky’s interpretative framework, it is clear that structural reforms able to 
restore a Golden Age of capitalism are far from being implemented and agreed upon. On 
both side of the Atlantic policy makers are still trying to fix this crisis-prone system 
instead of developing a new one: more efficient and equitable, i.e., more structurally 
stable. Debt is the link to time in a capitalist economy with a past, a present and a future: 
if not considered, past mistakes will not only affect today’s generations’ prosperity, but 
remarkably the path towards a human economy and the achievement of a human society. 
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Footnotes 
[1] According to Grantham ‘the absolutely worst part of this belief set was that it led to a chronic 
underestimation of the dangers of asset bubbles breaking’ (Nocera 2009, 1). 
[2] Minsky identified three types of financial postures that contribute to the accumulation of 
insolvent debt: (1) hedge finance: borrowers can meet all debt payments (interest and principle); 
(2) speculative finance: borrowers can meet their interest payments, but must roll over their debt 
to pay back the original loan; (3) Ponzi finance: borrowers can neither repay the interest nor the 
original debt, and rely entirely on rising asset prices to refinance their debt (Minsky 1980, 215). 
[3] According to Bank of England ‘whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a 
matching deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money….rather than 
banks receiving deposits when households save and then lending them out, bank lending creates 
deposits’ (BoE 2014, 14). 
[4] The value of liquidity rises faster if some units fail to meet financial obligations. 
[5] Investors in a financial boom feel a sense of safety, and therefore they will demand little 
compensation for risk. Long-term interest rates are kept endogenously low by investors’ 
expectations about positive financial and economic conditions. Therefore in a booming period 
long-term interest rates are lower than what they should be. 
[6] This has been also called the paradox of deleveraging: ‘precautions that may be smart for 
individuals and firms - and indeed essential to return the economy to a normal state - nevertheless 
magnify the distress of the economy as a whole’ (Yellen 2009, 3). See also: Eggerstone and 
Krugman 2012; Fischer 1933. 
[7] In this case the public debt does not rise because the central bank is owned by the state. The 
supply of money increases and finances public expenditure. Of course an inflationary pressure 
will take place. This is what Keynes has advocated for the 1929 Great Depression. 
[8] Running a budget deficit during a recession is capble to sustain profits in real terms, while 
when it is close to full-employment it may only overheat the economy. This is also remarked by 
the literature that the fiscal multiplier has two different magnitudes according to whether the 
economy is in recession or in expansion. Especially when monetary policy is at the zero lower 
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bound, empirical evidences show that the fiscal multiplier is larger than one (Woodford 2011; 
Christiano et al. 2011; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012). 
[9] According to Minsky ‘whether such a situation fully develops and if it does, how long it lasts, 
depends upon the government’s involvement in the economy, how promptly the government 
intervenes, and how effective the intervention’ (Minsky 1982, 110). 
[10] For a precise analysis regarding the way the state should sustain the profit cycle through a 
policy of strategic investments see Mazzucato (2013). 
[11] This was first shown clearly in Haavelmo (1945), ‘Multiplier Effects of a Balanced Budget’. 
Haavelmo showed that because government expenditure expands total spending more than an 
equal-size tax reduction contracts it, a balanced budget is not neutral but expansionary and 
becomes more so as its size increases. 
[12] In fact Minsky emphasizes that ‘paradoxically, perhaps, private ownership capitalism doesn’t 
work well for industries of extreme capital intensity’ (Minsky 1982, 201). 
[13] She specified that ‘Most of the radical, revolutionary innovations that have fuelled the 
dynamic of capitalism - from railroads to the Internet, to modern-day nanotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals - trace the most courageous, early and capital- intensive ‘entrepreneurial’ 
investments back to the State ... It is the visible hand of the State which made these innovations 
happen’ (Mazzucato 2013, 3). 
[14] As Minsky underlines ‘The general economic tone since the mid-sixties has been conducive 
to short-run speculation rather than to the long-run capital development of the economy’ (Minsky 
1982, 57). 
[15] The same holds for investments, government spending, savings out of wages, and 
consumption out of profits. 
[16] Given the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) scheduled for January 1999, the 
only policy envisaged by the IMF is the adjustments in wages and labour mobility: ‘It is in the 
area of labour markets that the euro area faces its greatest policy challenge. High labour costs and 
entitlement systems that hamper incentives for job search have depressed employment creation. 
The flexibility of European labour markets needs to be enhanced through structural reform 
measures across a wide front to safeguard the key principles and objectives of European welfare 
systems and at the same time lessen distortions and strengthen incentives to work and create jobs’ 
(IMF 1998, 15). 
[17] We must remember that in 1933, the year in which Delano Roosevelt was elected president, 
the unemployment in the U.S. was still around 25%. A short list of the pro-labour institutions 
created includes the followings. The first and more important of the New Deal law was the 
National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 on a series of issues concerning labour (included 
the first minimum wage set at $ 0.25 cent per hour) and collective bargaining. In 1935 the 
Congress pass the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA) in support of workers rights and to 
limit the employers fighting practices. At the same time, in the 1936, Roosevelt brought the 
highest bracket tax rate to 79%. In the post-war period the industrials-workers relations were not 
dismantled: only partially corrected but strengthen by the ‘Full Employment Act’ of 1945 and the 
‘Taft-Hartley Act’ of 1947 that encoded the administrative practices allowed to constrain unions. 
[18] For a retrospective of the international economic shocks of the 1970s see Covi (2015). 
[19] It is not by chance that both made their ruling debut with a famous attack on workers and 
unions: Margaret Thatcher against the year-long coal-miners’ strike in 1984/1985 ended with 25 
mines closed in one shot and Ronald Reagan against the air traffic controllers. 
[20] For a strong call for ‘full employment’ as the first policy target see Palley (2007). 
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[21] See for example: Stockhammer (2004), Palley (2008), Van Treeck (2009), and for a 
systematic review of the topic see Hein and van Treeck (2010). 
[22] ‘Mr. Draghi & Co. need to do whatever they can to try to turn things around, but given the 
political and institutional constraints they face, Europe will arguably be lucky if all it experiences 
is one lost decade’ (Krugman, 2014). 
[23] See Financial Stability Board (2011). For an in-debt analysis of this new regulatory 
architecture of the financial system and its effects, see Covi (2016). 
[24] Failure to regulate the hedge funds in the 1990s, brought them overtime to adopt more and 
more aggressive strategies. A last emblematic example is reported in Guzman and Stiglitz (2016). 
[25] Recently it has been proved also the internal coherence of the Minsky’s financial dynamics, 
as expressed by a macro model (Charles 2016). 
[26] To this respect, Keynes proposed in the Post-War II period an international Clearing Union 
able to control inward and outward capital movements, as well as disequilibria of the balance of 
payments (Keynes, 1980). 
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Figure 1. Total Assets: Federal Reserve and European Central Bank.  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; European Central Bank, author’s calculations. Note: 
The shaded areas depict the recession periods for the Euro Area 19 (Q2-2008 to Q2-2009 and Q4-
2011 to Q1-2013), while the white bar plus the grey bar represents the recession period in US 
(Q1-2008 to Q2-2009). 
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Figure 2. The trend of unemployment in US and Eurozone (1956-2014)  
Source: OECD database, author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The U.S. Top Income Share.  
Source: Piketty and Saez 2003 database, author’s calculations. Note: Dashed lines refer to income 
share excluding capital gains. 
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Figure 4. Income share of the top 10% including capital gains in the United States and All 
Sectors Total financial assets as % of GDP in US.  
Source: US Federal Reserve Database, and Piketty and Saez 2003 database, author’s calculations. 
Updates based on Palma (2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The financial cycle is longer than the business cycle (US example).  
Source: Borio (2016, p.11). Note: 1) The financial cycle as measured by frequency-based filters 
capturing medium-term cycles in real credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio and real house prices. 2) The 
business cycle as measured by a frequency-based filter capturing fluctuations in real GDP over a 
period from 1 to 8 years. 
 
 
 
 
11
Graph 6: The financial cycle is longer than the business cycle 
(the US example)
1 The financial cycle as measured by frequency-based (bandpass) filters capturing medium-term cycles in real credit, the
credit-to-GDP ratio and real house prices. 2 T e business cycle as measured by a f quency-based (bandpass) filter
capturing fluctuations in real GDP over a period from 1 to 8 years.
Source: Drehmann et al (2012), updated.
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Figure 6. Evolution of bank stock price to book ratios, historical and present day (a)(b). Source: 
Haldane (2012, p.34) on Thomson Reuters Datastream. Note: (a) Sample includes: Bank of 
America, Barclays, Bank of Ireland, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase & Co., 
Lloyds Banking Group, Morgan Stanley, National Australia Bank, Northern Rock, Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Santander (b) 31 August 2012 data. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Global cross-border capital flows (1946-2015).  
Source: IMF balance-of-payments statistics, author’s calculations. Note: It includes direct 
investments, portfolio investments, and other investments; US GDP in 2015 amount to $ 18 
trillion. 
 
 
 
 
All speeches are available online at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx 
36 
 
36 
 
 
Chart 18:  VaR violation ratios for portfolio of 
commodities(a) 
Chart 19:  VaR violation ratios for portfolios of 
equities(a) 
  
Source:  Global Financial Data and Bank calculations. 
 
(a) Equally-weighted portfolio of silver, wheat and hogs.  Validation 
period starts in 1970.  95% VaR using monthly returns.   
(b) EWMA:  lambda = 0.94. 
Source:  Global Financial Data and Bank calculations. 
 
(a) For each k-sized portfolio, the result shown is the average of 
100 random k-sized combinations of equities out of a universe 
of 210 stocks in the S&P 500.  Validation period starts in 2005.  
95% VaR using daily returns. 
(b) EWMA:  lambda = 0.94.  
 
Chart 20:  Evolution of bank price to book ratios, 
historical and present day(a)(b) 
 
 
 
Source:  Thomson Reuters Datastream, Calomiris and Wilson (2004) and 
Bank calculations. 
 
(a) Sample includes Bank of America, Barclays, Bank of Ireland, 
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Lloyds 
Banking Group, Morgan Stanley, National Australia Bank, Northern 
Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland and Santander. 
(b) 2012 data to date. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Trade Imbalances Within the Euro Area 
Two Regions, Two Demand Regimes 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Greater trade integration, convergence in economic performance and a high level of 
employment among member states: this was why the Euro Area was created. In this 
respect, the paper analyses the sources of trade imbalances within the Euro Area, 
focusing on the direct trade relationship - intra-EA trade - between surplus and deficit 
countries. The econometric evidence based on a VAR/SVAR methodology suggests that 
asymmetric wage shocks determine asymmetric gains from intra-EA trade, resulting from 
opposing growth strategies. In addition, the empirical evidence shows that the Euro Area 
is divided into two economic regions representing different demand regimes: a northern 
region which is profit-led and a southern region, which is wage-led. The paper suggests 
that wage coordination is an essential macroeconomic tool but is insufficient to achieve 
trade and economic integration given the current state of divergence. Thus, a trade-based 
transfer mechanism is proposed to restore convergence in the Euro Area. 
   
 
Keywords: Wage share, Euro Area, Trade imbalances, Demand Regime, Structural 
Vectorautoregressor. 
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The Community shall have as its task… to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic 
activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the 
environment, a high degree of convergence of economic 
performance, a high level of employment and of social protection, 
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member 
States. (Maastricht Treaty, Title II - Art. G2, 7 February 1992) 
1. Introduction 
Twenty-five years have gone by and the process of convergence has yet to take place. On 
the contrary, the principles at the very basis of the creation of the community have been 
left behind, and economic divergence has inexorably spread among founder members of 
the Euro Area (EA). The first important test the Euro Area faced - the Financial Crisis of 
2008 - clearly revealed the flaws in the European architecture, unable to cope cohesively 
with any of the three crises: economic, sovereign and banking crisis. Ultimately the three 
became one: a political crisis. Rising inequalities across countries brought a wind of 
change, but not as desired. Instead of establishing the basis for a new European Union 
(EU), i.e. by creating mechanisms able to achieve deeper economic integration and social 
cohesion, national interests prevailed, leading to a counter-revolution: more independence 
and inward-looking policies. The United Kingdom voting to leave the EU is the most 
striking example.  
Since political tensions are the natural outcome of economic fragilities, in order to restore 
the common cohesive growth path established by the Treaty of Maastricht, it is necessary 
to tackle the sources of economic divergence between Euro Area members. By fixing the 
core of European problems - the currency area - the European Union will be able once 
more to attract, to retain and integrate countries within the economic community and 
monetary union. Hence this paper aims to investigate the flaws in the European 
architecture by analysing the internal dimension of the diverging EA path, focusing on 
the dynamics of demand and trade flows between surplus (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
and the Netherlands) and deficit countries (France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal)[1]. 
Since the mercantilism view, it has been debated about the importance of acquiring 
foreign markets as a tool to sustain capital accumulation without hindering the growth 
rate of domestic demand (Kalecki, 2010). Although, pre-crisis, trade integration was 
promoted as a win-win strategy by the WTO and IMF, and trade imbalances were thought 
to be temporary and negligible, after the crisis things changed. Trade patterns started to 
be seen as structural, leading countries and institutions to implement policies to achieve 
trade surpluses, which became the solution for fighting the economic downturn and 
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achieving long-lasting growth. The classification initially developed by Badhuri and 
Marglin (1990) concerning wage-led and profit-led growth, was adapted for a new 
dichotomy: debt-led and an export-led growth (Stockhammer, 2015). According to this 
view, imbalances are the outcome of opposing growth strategies, where export-led 
economies benefit from the increasing indebtedness of deficit countries. The outcome is a 
diverging path and possible path-dependency due to hysteresis: lower actual and potential 
production capacity combined with higher structural unemployment (Ginzburg et al. 
2013).  In this macroeconomic context, given their wage-led nature, deficit countries, by 
implementing wage restraint policies, may improve their export competitiveness to the 
detriment of damaging their manufacturing base (Naastepad and Storm, 2015). The 
differentials in the cumulative growth and unemployment rates in the two regions, eight 
years after the crisis, are clear proof of the long-lasting effects of negative demand shocks 
in wage-based economies (Stockhammer, 2011a).  
In this respect, the paper shows that although an extra-EA trade surplus was achieved 
after 2014 by deficit countries[2], the intra-EA trade balance between deficit and surplus 
countries is far from being restored. The persistence in trade differentials within the Euro 
Area is counterintuitive if analysed through the mainstream lens of the ‘consensus view’ 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2015). The reversal in capital flows from core to periphery and 
deflationary adjustments would have restored the intra-EA trade balance together with the 
rebalancing of the external position if they had been the key factors at work. This may 
suggest a latent process of hysteresis, in which current market shares are pre-determined 
by past factors. Hence, intra-EA trade imbalances can be interpreted in line with Myrdal’s 
cumulative and causation forces (1957): an institutional-structural change as the driving 
force behind persistence in the asymmetric gains from trade.  
If, on the one hand, one branch of research has attributed this structural change to wages 
rising in excess of productivity in deficit countries, thereby driving up unit labour costs, 
in turn harming export performance and the trade balance, on the other, extensive 
literature has focused on the complementary role played by German wage moderation 
through relative price (deeper market penetration) and income effects (lower import 
demand) in building up trade surpluses with southern Europe and non-EU countries 
(Ginzburg et al. 2013; Naastepad and Storm, 2015; Stockhammer, 2011).  
This paper contributes to the debate by studying the effects of wage variations on demand 
and trade linkages within a monetary union. In this respect, evidence is brought to 
support the latter research, emphasing how wage adjustments in the northern countries, 
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not only in Germany, contributed decisively to the accumulation of trade imbalances in 
the Euro Area. A VAR methodology shows that the two blocks have opposing growth 
strategies, profit-led in the northern region, and wage-led in the south - table 2. Moreover, 
a set of stylized facts and empirical evidence suggests that the southern and northern 
regions also match the categorization of debt-led and export-led economies, as defined by 
Stockhammer (2015) and Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016). The results show that a 1% 
wage decrease in the northern region (negative wage shock) increases the intra-EA trade 
surplus with the southern region far more than a 1% wage increase in the southern region 
(positive wage shock), respectively by 10.63% and 3.99% in a 5-year horizon - table 4, 
panel (a). Results are robust when the intra-EA trade balance is broken down into exports 
and imports, allowing the price and income effects of wage adjustments to be 
disentangled. On the one hand, in a 5-year period the cumulative price effect of a 
negative 1% wage shock in the northern region increases northern exports to the southern 
region by 2.08% compared to the cumulative income effect of a positive wage shock in 
the southern region, which increases them by 1.45%. On the other hand, the cumulative 
income effect of a negative wage shock in the northern region decreases southern exports 
by 0.59% on impact and by 0.15% within five years, while the cumulative price effect of 
a positive wage shock in the southern region decreases them by 0.53% on impact and by 
0.19% within a 5-year period. This evidence corroborates the analysis of Ginzburg et al. 
(2013) who point out that an expansion of the northern region’s aggregate demand 
through rising wages may not be sufficient to stimulate exports from the southern region, 
which lacks a flourishing and dynamic industrial sector. Moreover, results show how 
wage restraint policies have helped northern exports penetrate the southern market, since 
the negative price effect of an increase in northern wages is the most important factor 
affecting trade imbalances between the two regions. Nevertheless, a coordinated policy of 
raising wages in both regions may be able to rebalance part of the current trade gap by 
restoring virtuous inter-linkages between demand and supply factors so as to restart the 
process of trade integration. Moreover, wage coordination is suggested in order to reduce 
the likelihood of asymmetric shocks within a monetary union.  
In the end, the paper argues that a clear understanding of the demand regime experienced 
by a country/region can contribute considerably to policy effectiveness at the European 
level. Given the lack of automatic stabilizers at the national level and the Euro Area 
mandate to achieve homogeneous and balanced trade integration between its members, 
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the paper concludes by proposing an intra-EA trade-based transfer mechanism to restore 
trade and economic convergence in the Euro Area. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the European divergence 
in the light of Badhuri and Marglin’s theoretical framework and a set of stylized facts. 
Section 3 discusses the econometric method and presents the empirical results. Section 4 
discusses the findings and provides policy implications. Section 5 concludes.  
2. The European Divergence: Theory and Evidence 
2.1 The original flaws of a currency area 
Before the creation of the Euro, it was already known that asymmetric shocks would be 
the main source of fragility in the Euro Area. Clear warnings were made by Meade 
(1957), Scitovsky (1958), Mundell (1961) and lastly by Obstfeld (1997) concerning the 
single currency and the process of European economic integration[3]. As pointed out by 
Mundell (1961, p.664):  
…an increase in foreign demand for the products of one of the regions would cause an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and therefore increased unemployment in the remaining regions, a process which could be 
corrected by a monetary policy which aggravated inflationary pressures in the first region; every change in 
demand for the products in one region is likely to induce opposite changes in other regions which cannot be 
entirely modified by national stabilization policies.  
This is still the essence of the Euro problem. If higher inflationary pressures are not 
accommodated within the currency area, “this means that a potentially deficit member of 
the free-trade area such as France might have to make an undue share of the adjustment 
by a domestic deflation of its money incomes, prices and costs” (Meade, 1957, p.385). 
Given the clear mandate of the European Central Bank - price stability - the latter option 
was the one implemented, endogenously driving the Euro Area towards the current 
outcome: divergence. This was the reason why Meade argued for ‘national currency 
areas’ as a first step towards the single currency; the only way to deal with European 
balance of payments disequilibria without preventing free trade or destroying full 
employment (ivi., p.396). In this respect, European policy makers restricted themselves to 
facilitating free trade, delegating the full-employment objective to individual nations[4].  
Ironically, Meade’s proposal was made in the conviction that “full employment is more 
important than free trade for Europe” (ivi. p.394)[5]. This belief was based on the fact 
that governments at the time were “so wedded (and, in my opinion, rightly so wedded) to 
the idea that it is one of their duties to preserve full employment that the probable 
outcome of this solution would in fact be the breakdown of the free-trade-area 
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arrangements” (ivi. p.385). Astonishingly, nowadays European governments seem to 
have lost track of their primary duties, or even more worrisome, believe that free trade 
and unrestricted capital mobility are more important than full employment. Meade’s 
theoretical explanation is further corroborated by the pragmatic proposal made by Keynes 
for an ‘International Clearing Union’ in the post-World-War II period. As was clear to 
Keynes, balance of payments disequilibria, and imbalances in international trade and 
capital movements are major sources of instability (Keynes, 1980). This instability at the 
macro-level cannot be solved endogenously within the system since cumulative past 
forces tend to reinforce structural differences, while only an exogenous restructuring of 
the system itself can reverse those forces from preserving the pattern of specialization. 
The fundamental reason for this path-dependency was explained clearly by Kaldor (1971, 
p.8): 
…owing to the existence of increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing industries, any initial 
advantage in terms of export competitiveness tends to have a cumulative effect, since the country which is 
able to increase its manufactured exports faster than the others also tends to have a faster rate of growth in 
productivity in its export industries, which enhances its competitive advantage still further.  
Hence, the primary focus of the analysis should be the so-called ‘initial advantage’ - 
asymmetric wage adjustments - which triggered asymmetric intra-EA trade flows, and the 
subsequent divergent process. Nevertheless, a second important point needs to be 
addressed: what could have been done to prevent Myrdal’s (1957) circular and 
cumulative principle of cause and effect from taking place? As Kaldor says, fiscal union 
is the natural solution to trade imbalances in a political union: “a region which forms part 
of a political community, with a common scale of public services and a common basis of 
taxation, automatically gets ‘aid’ whenever its trading relations with the rest of the 
country deteriorates”, the so-called built-in fiscal stabiliser (1970, p. 345)[6].  However, 
the Euro Area is only a monetary union, and it seems unreasonable now to imagine that 
the trade benefits acquired by surplus countries, low unemployment and faster growth, 
would be surrendered. Nevertheless, that is not the final statement on the Eurozone; a 
unified macroeconomic solution needs to be found, which goes beyond regional 
differences, and inclusively, aims to reinforce long-run growth potential. Keynes and 
Meade point in this direction: the need to set up the right macro system to allow micro 
behaviour by firms and households to work optimally within the system. Only with the 
right institutional set-up is it possible to achieve a high degree of convergence.  Hence 
Meade’s suggestion of ‘national currency areas’ for EA members and Keynes 
recommendation of an ‘International Clearing Union’ for the world economy. As we have 
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seen, the original flaws in European institutional design have led to impoverishment and 
social discontent in the Euro Area. If the European system cannot endogenously rectify 
the instability, given the current architectural design, divergence will lead to more 
divergence. If, on the other hand, we do not accept this outcome, and believe in the 
principles established by the Treaty of Maastricht, institutional arrangements need to be 
upgraded to enable the system to work for convergence and not against it. For this 
purpose, it is essential to shed light upon the current structural diversities the two core 
blocks of the Eurozone are facing, clarifying the particular features of both growth 
strategies, and seeking to understand what institutional set-up promotes convergence. 
This could pragmatically shape a long-term, sustainable project for inclusive-growth 
within the Euro Area and create the premise to extend the monetary union to the 
European Union as a whole. To boost further integration into the single currency, and 
make the benefits of joining outweigh the costs of a loss of flexibility when adjusting to 
shocks, it is crucial to set up a macro mechanism able to promote complementarities 
between members, to stabilize intra-EA imbalances, and ultimately reach full 
employment. Creating such a mechanism is of vital importance for the prosperity of the 
single currency and its member states as much as Keynes’s proposal was of key factor in 
shaping the post-war period.  
2.2 Profit-Led and Wage-Led Regime 
The crisis of the Euro Area is analysed according to the theoretical profit-wage 
framework since it fully matches the stylized facts, and allows the current 
macroeconomic environment of the EA to be interpreted consistently, providing clear 
policy indications. Reference is made to business cycle theory, as developed by Badhuri 
and Marglin (1990) concerning profit-led and wage-led growth. The cornerstone of this 
theory is that investments may respond positively or negatively to a wage reduction 
depending on whether investors react strongly or weakly to an increase in the profit 
margin. In the former case, a decrease in wages may stimulate investments since the 
higher profit margin fully compensates the negative effect of a fall in consumption. The 
conceptual framework is that by increasing wages, enterprises face higher labour costs, 
which in turn reduce the profit margin per unit of output. However, the increase in wages 
increases consumption leading to an increase in corporate sales, and therefore boosts 
aggregate profits through an increase in the quantity of output sold. Depending on 
whether the former effect dominates the latter, the posture of the economy assumes a 
profit-led or a wage-led regime. Nevertheless, if this is true in a closed economy, i.e. the 
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right balance may exist between wages and profit margins, in an open economy 
additional dynamics may change the overall outcome. Indeed, in an open economy, the 
‘trade effect’ may enable profit-led growth to be fully effective and sustainable. Although 
a decrease in wages increases the profit margin - as in a closed economy - with a positive 
effect on investments, the negative effect of falling domestic consumption is 
compensated by increased foreign sales. In a closed economy, a trade-off is in place 
between a decrease in the wage share and an increase in the profit margin through higher 
investments and lower consumption, but in an open economy the two positive effects 
clearly outweigh the negative.  
Moreover, provided trade interdependence increases, the greater the share of corporate 
sales from foreign markets, the more sustainable and effective is wage restraint in 
producing growth. In this framework, “a wage-led expansion derived from the 
stagnationist logic may be given up in the pursuit of export surplus by following 
restrictive macroeconomic policies to keep down real wages (and inflation) for greater 
international price competitiveness” (Badhuri and Marglin, 1990, p. 388). Moreover, an 
export surplus cannot be achieved at the same time by all trading partners, thus trade 
imbalances and growth differentials develop endogenously, establishing winners and 
losers from trade.  
Lastly, real-wage adjustments were initially thought of in this theoretical framework as a 
wage rate variation through the exogenous variation of the exchange rate. This would 
affect export prices, but also import prices such as raw materials, increasing aggregate 
profit through higher volumes of sales, and at the same time it would reduce the profit 
margin, with ambiguous effect. In the case of the Euro Area, no exchange rate divides the 
northern region from the southern region, and the wage-adjustment in the northern region 
was implemented by directly reducing the wage share. In this macroeconomic context, 
four headwinds play against the southern region’s ability to respond to negative foreign 
wage shocks: I) without an exchange rate the southern region cannot devaluate to 
counterbalance the loss in competitiveness; II) given intrinsic wage-stickiness, wages 
tend to rise in the southern region, producing and even wider wage-gap between the two 
regions; III) curbing wages in the southern region may be counterproductive if its 
economic structure is in a wage-led regime; IV) the process induces divergence between 
the two regions, which becomes self-reinforcing given the lack of counterbalancing tools 
at the national and supranational level.  
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2.3 Two Regions, Two Interconnected Economic Regimes 
The first and crucial point the paper highlights is that a structural downward adjustment 
of the wage share (WS) took place not only in Germany, as focused on in the literature, 
but also in the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium[7].  
As is clear from table 1, the adjustment took place between 1996 and 2007 in all northern 
countries: the wage share in Austria decreased by 3.7% of GDP, in Belgium by 1.3%, in 
Germany and the Netherlands by 4.5%. Overall the northern region experienced a 
reduction in the wage share between 1996 and 2007 of 4.2%. During the same period, the 
southern region experienced a smooth increase in the wage-share of almost 0.8% over 
GDP[8]. The first stylized fact refers to the asymmetric and opposite-sign variation in the 
wage share. After the crisis, a positive adjustment took place in the northern region, 
which did not offset the initial reduction.  
This structural change in wage policy in the northern region, in conjunction with multiple 
factors during the creation of the common currency, directly impacted on the trade 
balance with the rest of the world (TB), whose surplus increased by 5.5% over GDP 
between 1996 and 2007 - table 1. On the contrary, the southern region shifted from a 
trade surplus to a trade deficit, with a deterioration in its trade balance by 3.9% of GDP.  
This opposing trade pattern is explained in the literature as the result of the interaction of 
multiple dimensions: the effects of eastward enlargement and the impoverishment of the 
production matrix in peripheral countries (Ginzburg et al., 2013); the strong trade 
relationships of Germany with fast-growing countries, and regionalized production in the 
export sector (Danninger and Joutz, 2008); the strong non-EA demand for German 
products, and gains in competitiveness following German labour market reforms 
(Kollemann et al., 2015); growing debt levels in deficit countries boosting aggregate 
demand in the rest of the Euro Area and, in turn, import demand  (Belke and Dreger, 
2013).  
Overall, the focus in the literature was on Germany, southern Europe and the trade 
relationships between Germany and non-EU countries. Table 1 aims to complement the 
state of the literature by showing that in 2007 two-thirds of the northern surplus (4.2% of 
GDP) came from intra-EA trade with the southern region, and two-fifths directly with 
France, a country outside southern Europe but which perfectly mirrors the wage, trade 
and debt patterns of the so-called European periphery. All the more so, France in 2016 
was the country with the largest trade deficit with non-EA countries, the northern region 
and other countries in the southern region.  
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Table 1. Wage Share, Trade Balance, Intra Trade Balance, and Debt Level as Share of 
GDP in the Northern and Southern Region 
 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, BIS. Note: WS, TB, Intra TB and DEBT refer respectively to the wage share, 
trade balance with the rest of the world, the trade balance with the other region, and the debt of the non-
financial (private and public) sector. Data for the debt level is at market value. 
 
The network charts in figure 1 summarize net export flows between the two regions and 
countries in the same region. Before the monetary union was created in 1999 (fig. 1a), the 
export surpluses between regions were smaller (thickness of the arrow) and more 
diversified between countries than after the Euro (fig. 1b). In fact, net export flows 
especially from Germany and the Netherlands increased in their region and outside the 
northern region. Italy and Spain became net importers from the northern region, while 
France became the hub of export surpluses from both regions. After the crisis hit and 
capital flows were reversed, intra-EA trade imbalances remained strong, and in some 
cases, such as France in relation to Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium deteriorated 
further. The second stylized fact refers to the drastic shift of barycentre in trade 
relationships in the EA, resulting in clear winners and losers from trade. 
Insert About Here Figure 1 
Intra Euro Area Net Export Flows between Deficit and Surplus Countries 
The change in trade relationships is increasingly structural given that 80% of the value of 
intra-EA trade flows comprises manufactured goods classified in the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) as chemicals (section 5), machinery and 
transport equipment (section 7), and other manufactured goods (sections 6 and 8). The 
key interpretation to assess the stylized facts presented necessarily reflects Kaldor’s 
summary of the role of increasing returns to scale: “success breeds further success and 
failure begets more failure” (1981, p. 596). The initial advantage in terms of export 
competitiveness derived from wage restraint policies has a cumulative effect. The 
TIME AT BE DE NL NORTH IT FR ES PT SOUTH
1996 41.1% 37.1% 43.0% 42.2% 42.2% 26.9% 36.9% 37.8% 38.2% 33.4%
2007 37.4% 35.8% 38.5% 37.7% 38.0% 28.0% 37.2% 37.9% 36.2% 34.2%
2016 39.6% 36.2% 41.7% 38.7% 40.5% 29.3% 38.1% 37.5% 34.2% 35.0%
1996 -3.2% -0.3% 0.2% 6.8% 0.9% 3.1% 1.2% 1.1% -4.6% 1.7%
2007 3.6% 2.9% 6.7% 8.4% 6.4% -0.4% -1.1% -6.0% -7.1% -2.2%
2016 3.9% 2.5% 6.5% 11.6% 6.8% 2.2% -2.9% 4.1% -1.2% 0.3%
1996 -0.4% 5.3% 0.5% 3.8% 0.8% -0.6% -1.6% -1.4% -1.1% -0.6%
2007 1.8% 9.0% 3.1% 7.1% 4.2% -2.5% -3.4% -4.0% -4.0% -3.3%
2016 0.7% 7.6% 1.8% 7.3% 2.9% -1.6% -3.9% -2.1% -2.7% -2.5%
1999 187% 261% 183% 257% 203% 193% 190% 172% 126% 187%
2007 210% 258% 183% 278% 208% 218% 217% 240% 193% 224%
2016 244% 352% 185% 309% 226% 275% 299% 284% 192% 289%
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existence of increasing returns to scale in manufacturing industries has allowed the export 
sector to achieve productivity gains, which further strengthened the initial competitive 
advantage. In this way, “free trade in the field of manufactured goods leads to a 
concentration of manufacturing production in certain areas - to a “polarisation process” 
which inhibits the growth of such activities in some areas and concentrates them in 
others” (ibid.). The thickness of the arrows - exports surpluses - in figure 1, their trend 
and persistence even after deflationary pressures hit deficit countries, indicates the 
production polarisation process within the EA.  
Furthermore, a decrease in domestic wages not only improves net exports through lower 
unit labour costs, but negatively affects imports, i.e. the exports of foreign countries, due 
to a shrinking domestic aggregate demand. In this macroeconomic context, without 
supranational mechanisms - exchange rate adjustments, fiscal transfers, and any 
automatic counterbalancing stabilisers - the southern region became a chronic debtor to 
the northern region and the rest of the world. This represents the original flaw in Euro 
Area architecture: deficit countries underwent the effects of wage-policy adjustments in 
the northern region without any domestic policy tool to counteract the negative trade 
spiral. Kalecki describes the dynamics of the macro mechanism at work (2010, p. 51):  
The capitalists of a country which manages to capture foreign markets from other countries are able to 
increase their profits at the expense of the capitalists of the other countries…. The counterpart of the export 
surplus is an increase in the indebtedness of the foreign countries towards the country considered…. The 
counterpart of the budget deficit is an increase in the indebtedness of the government towards the private 
sector…. The above shows clearly the significance of 'external' markets (including those created by budget 
deficits) for a capitalist economy…. It is the export surplus and the budget deficit which enable the 
capitalists to make profits over and above their own purchases of goods and services.  
Therefore, the interaction between wage adjustments and net export flows within a 
monetary union does not work in isolation, but impacts on a third dimension, the level of 
private and public debt. According to table 1, the debt level of the non-financial sector 
(private and public) in the northern region increased between 1999 and 2016 by 23% over 
GDP, compared to a steady increase of 102% in the southern region[9]. The third 
dimension is the financial linkage between the two regions, and the continuity of its 
smooth functioning assures the viability of both the export- and debt-led growth models 
(Stockhammer, 2015; 2011a)[10]. Moreover, in this regard there is a substantial 
difference between the two regions: the debt overhang in the northern region is mainly 
the outcome of private debt decisions, while in the southern region, the public sector is an 
important driver of the country’s total debt[11]. This difference also exists in the private 
dimension with regard to household and non-financial corporation debt. The third stylized 
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fact refers to the asymmetric dynamics of private and public debt levels in the two 
regions.  
This reflects not only a structural weakness and an unsustainable process in the EA 
macro-mechanism, but also a potential economic and political constraint to restore 
convergence. Hence, it produces sticky path-dependency by impairing current growth as 
well as by constraining future growth. In this way, the existence of economic divergence 
becomes a chronic feature of the monetary union, and the economic costs of joining 
outweigh its benefits, while the political costs of leaving are smaller than would be the 
case under a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities.  
In the next section, the empirical analysis assesses the impact of wage adjustments on 
economic activity defining the demand regime in both regions, as well as their effects on 
the trade balance between the two regions.  
3. Empirical Approach 
The aim of the empirical investigation is twofold: to test the aggregate demand regime in 
both regions - the wage-led and profit-led hypothesis - and to evaluate the impact of wage 
variations on the trade balance between the two regions. In this respect, two different 
model specifications are used. A VAR model tests the demand regime and a SVAR 
quantifies the causes of the intra-EA trade surplus/deficit. The analysis focuses on short-
term business cycle fluctuations, i.e. in a period of 2 to 5 years. No assumptions are made 
on long-term equilibrium, which would require a VEC model and cointegration analysis.  
A VAR system approach is implemented following the specification of Stockhammer and 
Onaram (2004), and Jump and Mendieta-Munoz (2017) so as to treat functional income 
distribution as endogenous, avoiding any endogeneity bias[12]. The analysis is performed 
in first differences since unit roots tests suggest that variables are integrated of order 
one[13]. Furthermore, the standard specification of Badhuri and Marglin (1990) is 
augmented by including financial controls, which, according to the most recent literature 
(Stockhammer, 2017), have important effects on demand dynamics and may help to 
overcome the omitted variable bias from which the results in the literature suffer.  
4.1 Data and Methodology 
The data are quarterly ranging from q1-1996 to q4-2016, totalling 84 observations. The 
data are aggregated at regional level weighted by the share of each country’s GDP. The 
variables used for the analysis are: 1) gross fixed capital formation [𝐼]; 2) private 
consumption expenditure 𝐶 ; 3) exports and imports vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
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𝑋,𝑀 ; 4) unemployment rate 𝑈 ; 5) unit labour cost 𝑢𝑙𝑐 ; 6) wages 𝑊 ; 7) private-
non financial sector debt 𝑃𝐷 ; 8) the real effective exchange rate - narrow index [𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟]; 
9) long-term interest rate [𝑖𝑟𝑙]; 10) intra-EA exports and imports in goods between the 
two regions 𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑋 𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑀 . Variables from (1) to (3) were downloaded from OECD’ 
Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database and (4) to (6) from OECD’s Economic 
Outlook No 100, while (7) to (8) from Bank of International Settlements (BIS) database, 
and (9) to (10) from Eurostat. Definitions and data sources are provided in table A1 in the 
appendix.  
Given the above, the price deflator provided from the OECD database concerning 
variables (1) to (3) is applied to W, PD, and INT_X and INT_M, which are at current 
prices. Ultimately INT_X and INT_M, unadjusted data, are seasonally adjusted by 
regressing the original series on a set of quarterly dummies. Therefore, the overall dataset 
is at constant prices (base year 2010) and is seasonally adjusted. 
The VAR was estimated with four lags and seasonal dummies[14]. This lag structure was 
used for the following reasons: I) in a small sample the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) selects the correct specification more often (Lütkepohl, 2005); II) to get rid of any 
serial correlation in the residuals in each specification, which is verified by an LM 
test[15]; III) economic variables such as gross fixed capital formation may take longer 
than one or two quarters to respond to changes in economic conditions[16].  
A summary of the model specifications and LM tests is provided in table A2 in the 
appendix. The overall analysis is carried out on 79 data points, since 1 observation is lost 
on first-differences and 4 for the lag structure. 
4.2 Model Specification 
4.2.1 Aggregate Demand Regime 
Model one is set up to assess the impact of a wage share shock on the demand regime. 
The variables are entered into the vector [ 𝑊𝑆 , 𝐼 ,𝐶 , 𝑇𝐵 , 𝑈 ] and identification is 
based on a lower-triangular Choleski decomposition according to this particular ordering. 
The underlying economic intuition for this selection is that a reduction (increase) in the 
wage share has two opposite effects: it increases (decreases) corporate profits, which in 
turn boost (impair) investments, GDP and so exports over imports; on the contrary, it 
decreases (increases) aggregate domestic demand through falling (rising) disposable 
income, which in turn negatively (positively) affects investment decisions and therefore 
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aggregate demand. Depending on whether the former effect predominates the latter, the 
demand regime is profit- or wage-led (Badhuri and Marglin, 1990).  
In this context, a shock to the wage share [𝑊𝑆] affects all variables simultaneously. This 
implies that wages do not react to GDP components or unemployment within a quarter. 
This assumption, though not always satisfied, is consistent with the literature on wage-led 
aggregate demand (Druant et al., 2012; Mendieta-Munoz, 2017)[17]. Observe that, since 
the focus is on the impulse responses to a wage share shock only, the ordering of the 
variables after the wage share does not affect the impulse responses (Christiano et al., 
1999).  
To sum up, the baseline model is a five-variable VAR, which is increased gradually to an 
eight-variable VAR by controlling for the real effective exchange rate [𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟], long term 
interest rate [𝑖𝑟𝑙] and private non-financial sector debt 𝑃𝐷 [18].  
4.2.2 Intra-EA Trade Balance 
Model two is fine-tuned to assess the impact of wage variations on net exports between 
the northern and southern region. All the variables are transformed into growth rates by 
taking the natural logarithm and then the first differences. This differs from model one 
because wages and net exports are not treated as a share of GDP. The advantage is the 
good fit of the model, which better captures the effects of domestic and foreign wage 
variations on net export flows between the two regions[19]. The identification scheme is 
based on the lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition, and the vector of endogenous 
variables become:  [ 𝑊∗ , 𝑊 , 𝐼  , 𝐶 ,   𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑁𝑋, 𝑈𝐿𝐶  ],  where 𝑊∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑊  represent 
respectively wages in the foreign and home region, and 𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑁𝑋 the net exports between 
the home and the foreign region[20].  
Given that throughout it is assumed that 𝑊  does not simultaneously react to  [ 𝐼  ,𝐶 ,   𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑁𝑋, 𝑈𝐿𝐶 ]  it seems reasonable also to assume that it does not simultaneously 
react to 𝑊∗. This is achieved by imposing a zero restriction on the response of 𝑊 to 𝑊∗[21].  Moreover, it also reasonable to think that the effects of foreign wage variations 
are transmitted to the domestic market through the export and import channel, i.e. 
through a change in net exports. Accordingly, a zero restriction on the response of [ 𝐼 , 𝐶 , 𝑈𝐿𝐶]  to 𝑊∗  is imposed. Therefore 𝑊∗  is allowed to have a simultaneous 
relationship only with [𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑁𝑋]. Thus, a structural over-identified VAR (SVAR) is 
estimated.   
Furthermore, since the model aims to explain trade flows which are not subject to 
exchange rate variations - intra EA - the real effective exchange rate is dropped from the 
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model and replaced with the unit labour cost[22]. In addition, to avoid making the SVAR 
too large and so run out of degrees of freedom, the debt ratio and interest rate are also 
dropped. To sum up, the baseline model is a six-variable SVAR, which becomes a seven-
variable VAR by separating the trade balance into its components, exports [𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑋] and 
imports [𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑀]. This helps to trace the sources of intra-trade imbalance movements, 
and to interpret the income and price effects of wage variations[23].  
4.3 Empirical Results 
4.3.1 Impulse Response Function Analysis: Aggregate Demand Regime 
Figure 2 shows the baseline cumulative orthogonalized impulse responses to a unit 
standard deviation wage share shock and 90% confidence bands, respectively for the 
northern region (left panel) and the southern region (right panel). 
 It is evident that a positive shock to the wage share has remarkably different effects in 
the two regions. First, investments tend to fall in both regions within one year, but more 
sharply and with greater persistence in the northern region than in the south. Overall, 
after 20 quarters, an increase in the wage share increases investments in the southern 
region and decreases them in the northern region. Consistently, consumption tends to fall 
in the northern region and rises in the southern region, while the trade balance falls in 
both regions. Remarkably, the effect on the trade balance in the northern region is much 
stronger than in the southern region, with a sharp effect on impact. Lastly, the 
unemployment rate, which can be interpreted as a proxy for the overall economic activity 
and labour share, increases in the northern region and decreases after one year in the 
southern region. All in all, the northern region demand regime can be classified as profit-
led, while the southern region is in a wage-led regime. 
This result underlines the role played by functional income distribution on aggregate 
demand, i.e. the relationship between output - investment, consumption, trade balance - 
and unemployment. The sequence of causal relationships among endogenous variables 
can be divided into three steps: I) the positive shock on the wage share decreases 
investments on impact and the trade balance, causing investments to fall further; II) the 
fall in investments increases unemployment, which in turn offsets the positive effect on 
consumption of the initial increase in the wage share; III) falling consumption negatively 
affects investments giving rise to a vicious circle.  
On the first point, Stockhammer et al. (2008) emphasize that the degree of openness is 
crucial in determining the overall regime. The sharper fall in the trade balance on impact 
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in the northern region is consistent with the difference in the degree of openness between 
the two regions: in 2016, the sum of exports and imports in the northern region amounted 
to 113% of GDP, compared to 63% in the southern region. To be precise, as a share of 
GDP exports and consumption account respectively for 60% and 52% in the northern 
region, against 32% and 57% in the southern region.  
Insert About Here Figure 2 
Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions to a Wage Share Shock 
Clearly exports weigh more than consumption in the northern region, therefore the shocks 
affecting the international competitiveness of products tend to have more negative effects 
on output than shocks affecting domestic demand. Conversely, domestic shocks have a 
stronger negative effect on output in the southern region, since consumption is 
undoubtedly the most important component of aggregate demand. This difference 
underlines the transmission channel through which a wage share shock propagates within 
the economy, and the nature of the demand regime.  
Moreover, a fall in investments, given they are the key variable explaining aggregate 
unemployment across countries and over time (Stockhammer, 2011b), affects the current 
and future level of unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate increases faster in the 
northern region than in the southern region consistently with a sharper fall in the 
investment rate. This amplifies the negative effects of a positive wage share shock in the 
northern region, resulting in a lower level of consumption, which in turn negatively 
affects investments, and thus creates a vicious circle of unemployment and low 
investments. On the contrary, the rise in consumption expenditure in the southern region - 
the engine of a wage-led regime - is able to counterbalance the fall in the trade balance, 
pulling investments out of the negative after 6 quarters. Unemployment decreases after 8 
quarters, consumption further increases, as do investments.  
Table 2 summarizes at specific moments after the shock the results of the baseline 
responses - panel (a) - to an increase of 1% of the wage share in the two regions. For the 
real effective exchange rate, private non-financial sector debt and the long-term interest 
rate the impulse responses are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in 
panel (a). Furthermore, the results for the aggregate demand regime, i.e. the wage-led 
hypothesis for the southern region and the profit-led hypothesis for the northern region 
are confirmed. In addition, the results of the baseline model are also quantitatively 
consistent with the stylized facts specified in the previous section. As shown in table 1, a 
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decrease in the wage share of 4.2% of GDP in the northern region led between 1996 and 
2007 to a surplus in the trade balance of 5.5% of GDP. According to the baseline 
estimates - panel (a) - a decrease in the wage share of 4.2% of GDP would increase the 
trade balance in the northern region by 5.9% of GDP[24]. Results for unemployment, 
investment and consumption are also consistent with the stylized facts, though not as 
precisely as for the trade balance. 
Lastly, it is important to stress that if the results vary little in the northern region for 
different model specifications, i.e. the control variables neither qualitatively or 
quantitatively affect the impulse responses, in the southern region the introduction of the 
private non-financial sector debt - panel (c) - quantitatively produces an amplification 
effect compared to panel (b). Moreover, this amplification effect is exacerbated when the 
private non-financial sector debt interacts with the long-term interest rate - panel (d).  
Table 2. Robustness: Responses to a Wage Share Shock Increase of 1% of GDP 
 
Note: The cumulative orthogonalized impulse responses are expressed as a percentage of the underlying 
variable, except for the long-run interest rate and unemployment rate, which are in basis points, and the 
wage share, trade balance and private debt, which are shown as percentages of GDP.  
 
a) Baseline North South North South North South North South
    Wage Share / GDP 1.0 1.0 0.96 1.00 0.48 0.94 0.52 0.88
    Investments -2.00 -0.56 -4.82 -0.94 -3.33 1.25 -2.59 1.88
    Consumption -0.33 0.06 -0.48 0.63 -0.41 1.63 -0.30 1.94
    Trade Balance / GDP -0.67 -0.31 -0.85 -0.50 -0.74 -0.81 -0.74 -0.94
    Unemployment 0.11 0.00 0.67 0.13 0.82 -0.13 0.67 -0.25
b) Baseline plus Reer North South North South North South North South
    Wage share / GDP 1.0 1.0 0.96 1.07 0.50 0.87 0.58 0.87
    Investments -1.89 -0.47 -4.24 -0.53 -2.00 0.80 -2.00 0.33
    Consumption -0.31 0.13 -0.35 0.80 -0.12 1.27 -0.04 1.00
    Trade balance / GDP -0.73 -0.33 -0.92 -0.47 -0.77 -0.47 -0.77 -0.40
    Unemployment 0.12 -0.60 0.58 -0.73 0.62 -2.93 0.46 -0.12
    Real eff. exchange rate -0.04 -0.20 0.04 -1.20 -0.42 -1.73 -0.62 -1.60
c) Baseline plus Reer and PD North South North South North South North South
    Wage share / GDP 1.0 1.0 0.89 0.93 0.35 0.87 0.46 0.87
    Investments -2.19 -0.33 -5.01 0.13 -2.31 1.33 -2.19 0.93
    Consumption -0.31 0.13 -0.42 0.93 -0.31 1.47 -0.15 1.40
    Trade balance / GDP -0.77 -0.33 -0.92 -0.53 -0.81 -0.60 -0.81 -0.60
    Unemployment 0.15 -0.07 0.69 -0.20 0.73 -0.53 0.54 -0.40
    Private debt / GDP 0.89 0.60 3.08 1.47 1.81 2.20 2.08 2.67
    Real eff. exchange rate -0.15 -0.27 0.00 -1.53 -0.35 -2.00 -0.54 -2.00
d) Baseline plus Reer, PD, Irl North South North South North South North South
    Wage share / GDP 1.0 1.0 1.00 0.94 0.38 1.00 0.50 1.19
    Investments -2.17 -0.63 -5.00 2.13 -2.04 8.13 -2.29 8.31
    Consumption -0.29 -0.06 -0.38 0.38 -0.25 3.75 -0.08 4.06
    Trade balance / GDP -0.75 -0.13 -0.96 -0.50 -0.83 -1.19 -0.83 -1.31
    Unemployment 0.13 -0.06 0.71 -0.19 0.71 -1.31 0.58 -1.31
    Private debt / GDP 0.92 1.06 2.83 2.94 1.21 6.88 1.75 11.25
    Real eff. exchange rate 0.21 -0.38 0.54 -0.31 0.25 0.25 -0.17 0.81
    Long-run interest rate -0.13 -0.25 -0.42 -0.75 -0.46 -0.38 -0.38 0.06
Shock: Wage Share Impact Effect After one year After three years After five years
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Although in both regions a positive shock in the wage share has a positive effect on the 
debt level as a share of GDP, this effect is six times larger in the southern region. Faced 
with a reduction in the long-term interest rate on impact, an economy with a wage-led 
aggregate demand experiences strong positive spillovers. Although investments fall on 
impact probably due to higher labour costs, they recover within a year due to the 
simultaneous fall in interest rates, easier access to debt-financing, and increased 
consumption expenditure. This initial shock sets in motion an even more complex set of 
interactions à la Minsky (1982), in which financial effects work as an amplifier of 
business cycle fluctuations. In fact, if unemployment is the key variable reinforcing the 
consumption pattern and hence the investment rate in a wage-led regime - as previously 
described - private debt and the interest rate are the variables which directly influence the 
size of investments and thus the unemployment rate. Therefore, financial variables have a 
stronger amplification effect in a wage-led than in a profit-led regime. 
This result provides additional evidence of the role played by private debt as the key 
driver of aggregate demand (Stockhammer and Wildhauer, 2016) and new insights into 
the relationships between debt-led and export-led economies within the EMU 
(Stockhammer, 2015). 
4.3.2 Impulse Response Function Analysis: Intra-EA Trade Imbalances 
The impulse response analysis of the second model is based on a 1% shock to the growth 
rate of wages, and not a shock of 1% of GDP to the wage share. Table 3 shows the results 
for the previous model specification for a 1% wage shock increase[25].  
 As we can see, the demand regime is unchanged. Investments and consumption respond 
negatively to a wage shock in the northern region and positively in the southern region. 
Moreover, intra net-exports respond negatively in both regions. In line with the previous 
results, the inclusion of private non-financial sector debt and interest rates in the set of 
endogenous variables produces financial amplification effects in the southern region. 
These variables have negligible effects in the northern region.  
After showing the consistency of the baseline results for both model specifications, the 
focus now moves to the impact of wage variations on net exports between the northern 
and southern region. This second part of the investigation aims to test whether intra trade 
imbalances are the result of different growth models so as to clarify their origin and 
causes. Moreover, the advantage of focusing on the intra trade balance is twofold: net 
exports between the two regions are the outcome of interaction between a narrower set of 
factors internal to the monetary union, and do not depend directly on supply and demand 
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factors outside the Euro Area. This gives the model a better performance in terms of 
goodness of fit and therefore increases the reliability and comparability of the results 
between the two regions.  
A 1% wage shock in the northern region has a much stronger negative impact on net 
exports to the southern region than a 1% wage increase in the southern region. This result 
is qualitatively and almost quantitatively unchanged when the model is augmented with 
debt and interest rates and by taking into consideration the relative magnitude of the wage 
shock - column ‘as if 1%’[26]. From this first insight, wage restraint policies 
implemented in the northern region seem to be the key factor triggering trade imbalances 
within the Euro Area. 
Table 3. Responses to 1% Wage Shock Increase 
 
Note: The cumulative orthogonalized impulse responses are expressed in percentage of the underlying 
variable.   
Nevertheless, the baseline model (a) and the augmented baseline (b) work in isolation; 
there is no interaction between the northern and southern region, and intra net-exports are 
the result of the interplay of solely domestic variables and domestic shocks. Obviously, 
this is not the case. In this respect, wages of the opposite region [ 𝑊∗] are added to the set 
of endogenous variables as the most exogenous variable - first in Cholesky ordering. This 
allows us to overcome an omitted variable bias and to improve the overall fit of the intra 
net exports equation. By including foreign wages in the model,  simultaneous 
relationships must also be modelled. This is achieved - as previously discussed - by 
imposing a set of zero restrictions on the response of [ 𝑊, 𝐼 , 𝐶 , 𝑈𝐿𝐶] to 𝑊∗. This 
implies that an over-identified SVAR is estimated.   
Table 4 reports the results of the cumulative structural impulse responses of intra net 
exports [𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑁𝑋] to a 1% increase in foreign wages [𝑊∗] - panel (a) - and domestic 
wages [𝑊] - panel (b). A shock to foreign wages [𝑊∗] in the ‘South column’ represents 
the effect of a 1% increase in northern wages on intra net exports in the southern model. 
a) Baseline North South North South North South North South North South
    Domestic wage 1.0 1.0 1.10 0.90 0.68 0.60 0.60 0.50 1.00 1.00
    Investments 0.91 0.40 0.37 0.60 -0.83 0.38 -0.71 0.33 -1.19 0.67
    Consumption 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.23 -0.21 0.15 -0.24 0.13 -0.41 0.25
    Intra net exports -0.44 -2.17 -5.91 -3.25 -7.55 -2.04 -8.18 -1.77 -13.65 -3.54
b) Baseline plus PD and Irl North South North South North South North South North South
    Domestic wage 1.0 1.0 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.2 1.00 1.00
    Investments 0.95 0.44 0.47 0.98 -1.17 1.68 -0.91 1.79 -1.26 1.51
    Consumption 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.40 -0.17 0.72 -0.22 0.82 -0.31 0.69
    Intra net exports -1.15 -2.42 -5.90 -3.47 -9.02 -4.94 -9.90 -5.10 -13.64 -4.29
After 5 years
As if  1%Shock: Domestic Wage (W) Impact Effect After one year After three years After five years
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This effect should be the mirror image of a 1% increase in domestic wages on intra net 
exports in the northern region.  
A 1% shock to southern wages [𝑊∗] increases northern intra net-exports to the southern 
region by 8.30%, while a 1% shock to northern wages increases southern intra-net 
exports to the northern region by 12.54%. This result consolidates the evidence shown in 
table 3 for the closed economy model. Results are even stronger if the relative size of the 
wage shock after 5 years is taken into consideration - column ‘as if 1%’. Moreover, the 
result of a foreign wage shock [𝑊∗] - panel (a) - is qualitatively similar to the results of a 
domestic wage shock [𝑊] - panel (b). Quantitatively, impulse responses to a domestic 
wage shock [𝑊] - panel (b) - are larger due to interaction with domestic variables. 
Overall, the results show the important contribution of wage adjustments in the northern 
region to the creation of trade imbalances with the southern region. 
Table 4. Intra Net Exports Cumulative Structural Responses to a 1% Increase in Foreign 
and Domestic Wages  
 
Note: The cumulative structural impulse responses are expressed as a percentage of the underlying variable. 
Lastly, the specification by separating net exports into its export and import components 
enables the model to capture the income and price effects of wage variations. This further 
specification is important in light of the recent literature which asks whether the price or 
income effects of wage variations contributed most to the growing deficits in the euro 
area (Ginzburg et al., 2013, p. 662)[27]. To be precise, the impact of a 1% increase in 
foreign wages on exports reflects the income effect of stronger foreign demand, while the 
impact on imports reflects the price effect of higher unit labour costs. Vice versa, the 
impact of a 1% increase in domestic wages on exports reflects the price effect of higher 
unit labour costs, while the impact on imports reflects the income effects of stronger 
domestic demand. 
Table 5, which maintains the same structure of table 4, reports the results of the 
cumulative structural impulse responses of intra exports [𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑋] and imports [𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑀] 
Panel (a) North South North South North South North South North South
   Foreign wage (W*) 1.0 1.0 1.41 1.67 1.82 1.24 2.08 1.18 1.00 1.00
   Intra net exports (INT_NX) 0.44 -0.45 3.26 3.24 6.78 12.44 8.30 12.54 3.99 10.63
Panel (b) North South North South North South North South North South
   Domestic wage (W) 1.0 1.0 1.21 1.05 0.85 1.72 0.84 1.74 1.00 1.00
   Intra net exports (INT_NX) -0.03 -2.14 -6.42 -7.46 -10.89 -12.04 -12.96 -11.03 -15.51 -6.33
After five years
After five years
As if 1% 
Shock: Domestic Wage (W)
Shock: Foreign Wage (W*) Impact Effect After one year After three years After five years
Impact Effect After one year After three years After five years
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to a 1% increase in foreign wages [𝑊∗] - panel (a) - and domestic wages [𝑊] - panel 
(b)[28]. The first important result to be noticed is that the price and income effects tend to 
be stronger in relation to northern exports (southern imports), than to southern exports 
(northern imports). More specifically, a 1% shock in southern wages increases northern 
exports after 5 years by 4.22% - income effect - and decreases northern imports by 0.56% 
- price effect; conversely a 1% shock in northern wages increases southern exports by 
0.17% - income effect - and decreases northern exports by 2.41% - price effect. These 
empirical estimates back up Ginzburg et al., i.e, their main point that the export base in 
the southern region is too narrow to sustain development driven only by external demand 
(2013, p.662). This means that, even if northern import demand expands, exports from 
the southern region benefit only marginally.  
A second important point that sheds light on the origin and persistence of intra-trade 
imbalances, is that wage restraint policies in the northern region played and still play a 
crucial role in terms of price competition and export penetration[29]. This is the most 
important factor if the relative magnitude of the wage shock after 5 years is taken into 
consideration. In fact, a 1% increase in northern wages in a 5-year period  - column ‘as if 
1%’ - reduces southern imports by 2.08%, against a 1% increase in southern wages which 
increases northern exports by 1.45%. This result is corroborated by the impulse response 
to the domestic wage shock shown in panel (b). In this case, both in absolute and relative 
terms, a 1% shock to domestic wages in the northern region has a stronger negative effect 
on northern exports than the positive effect of an equivalent increase in domestic wages 
in the southern region.  
Furthermore, a positive shock to foreign wages in the northern region - panel (a) - has 
only a small negative price effect of 0.19% on northern imports, meaning that cost 
competitiveness is not crucial for southern export performance. Nevertheless, as is 
evident from panel (b) this estimate is not consistent with the effect of an increase in the 
domestic wages in the southern region. In fact, a 1% increase in domestic wages in the 
southern region tends to increase - not reduce - exports to the northern region by 2.03%. 
Although there are opposing effects, one interpretation is that the foreign wage shock 
interacts only with variables in the opposite region and is not affected by the positive 
spillovers that a wage shock may have on domestic investment and productivity. It 
mainly captures the negative price effect on domestic imports. Estimating the effect of a 
domestic wage shock on exports, the model is likely to capture positive interactions 
between wage, aggregate demand, investments, and productivity. This explanation and 
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result is consistent with the main argument of Storm and Naastepad (2015, p. 972) who 
underline how lower wage growth in the southern region is reflected in lower labour 
productivity growth and thus in weaker export performance[30].  
Table 5. Intra Exports and Imports Cumulative Structural Responses to a 1% Increase in 
Foreign and Domestic Wages 
 
Note: The cumulative structural impulse responses are expressed as a percentage of the underlying variable. 
4.3.3 Robustness 
The robustness of the results was ensured by performing a series of tests 
throughout the empirical analysis. The first check was to see whether the results 
were sensitive to omitted variables, therefore additional controls such as the real 
effective exchange rate, private non-financial sector debt, and the long-term 
interest rate were included in both specifications, as suggested by Stockhammer 
(2017). Second, evidence was provided that results concerning the demand 
regimes are not sensitive to variable specification, i.e. a 1% shock to the wage 
share or 1% increase in wages.  Moreover, the effects of a wage share shock are 
consistent with both the responses of the GDP components and the unemployment 
rate. Third, results are robust when the model is estimated for sub-periods[31]. 
Fourth, results are robust to a different selection of the lag-length. Four lags were 
chosen to tackle residual autocorrelations across the model specifications to avoid 
changing the lag-length here and there, and complicate the comparability of 
results. Fifth, results are region-specific, and each country may respond differently 
to internal and external shocks. In this analysis, it has been prioritized the 
opposition of the two regions by grouping the countries according to a common 
trade pattern. Wage and debt patterns are also consistent, although Portugal and 
Panel (a) North South North South North South North South North South
    Foreign Wage (W*) 1.0 1.0 1.38 1.25 2.24 1.18 2.92 1.16 1.00 1.00
    Intra Exports (INT_X) 0.74 -0.59 0.75 0.09 2.96 0.14 4.22 0.17 1.45 0.15
    Intra Imports (INT_M) 0.53 -0.26 -0.68 -0.73 -0.70 -1.94 -0.56 -2.41 -0.19 -2.08
Panel (b) North South North South North South North South North South
   Domestic  Wage (W) 1.0 1.0 1.22 1.20 1.05 1.39 1.00 1.41 1.00 1.00
    Intra Exports (INT_X) -0.18 1.30 -0.80 3.44 -2.93 2.80 -3.91 2.86 -3.90 2.03
    Intra Imports (INT_M) -0.15 1.16 0.96 3.45 0.17 3.02 0.17 3.00 0.17 2.13
After five years
As if 1%
After five yearsShock: Foreign Wage (W*) Impact Effect After one year After three years After five years
Shock: Domestic Wage (W) Impact Effect After one year After three years After five years
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Belgium differ respectively in the wage share pattern - decreasing - and the debt 
pattern - increasing. Sixth, the results on intra-EA net exports are robust when they 
are estimated in isolation - solely domestic wage shocks - and when foreign shocks 
are added to the model. Moreover, the impulse responses do not change 
qualitatively and quantitatively when estimated for the northern or the southern 
region. Seventh, the results are also consistent when net exports are broken down 
into exports and imports[32]. The conclusion is that the results are robust to the 
time dimension, variable selection, model specification, region estimation, and in 
particular, they do not seem to be due to omitted variables or specific proxies.  
4. Policy Implications 
The analysis has revealed that the Euro Area, albeit with a wage-led demand regime as a 
whole (Ederer et al., 2009; Onaram and Obst, 2016), can be divided into two regions with 
clearly different wage, trade, and debt patterns. The specific patterns of each region 
proved to be the result of two opposing demand regimes: the wage-led southern region 
and profit-led northern region. It follows that wage restraint policies may be self-
defeating if applied to the southern region. Structural reforms aimed at restoring price 
competitiveness through wage moderation or neoliberal policies only produce a painful 
internal devaluation, which tends to reinforce divergence, and increase deflationary 
pressures. In this macroeconomic context, “a current account deficit can look like a major 
asymmetric shock” (Obstfeld, 2012, p.17).  
On the one hand, the analysis shows that this major asymmetric shock endogenously and 
silently developed within the Euro Area, has created trade imbalances and in turn an 
accumulation of debt for more than a decade. On the other hand, it has also been shown 
how the northern intra-EA trade balance was forced out of balance vis-à-vis the southern 
region, reaching a surplus of 4.2% of GDP in 2007. The exogenous wage adjustments in 
the northern region represent Kaldor’s initial advantage. The structural change took place 
at the inception of the Euro Area, when the northern economies started to adjust their 
wage share downwards. In the context of the monetary union, the southern and northern 
regions faced a sharp asymmetric shock to their level of relative prices and wages. The 
cumulative results of price and income effects are reflected in the trade balance between 
the two regions. Intra-EA trade imbalances have become a chronic feature of the 
monetary union to the point of being perceived as the result of the normal functioning of 
efficient markets: the optimum allocation of capital and production of goods. Capital 
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flows, the illusory and temporary convergence in interest rates, and easy credit from the 
banking system gave the system apparent stability and prosperity (Borio and Disiyatat, 
2015). Nevertheless, what guaranteed stability at first, later became the source of 
fragility. Debt-overhang became the major source of economic and financial instability, 
not because of the 2008 Financial Crisis, but due to negative spillovers between the 
sovereign, banking and economic systems, which impair and constrain current and future 
growth (Shambaugh, 2012). Thus, path dependency is the outcome of a cumulative 
process, in which current and future output is pre-determined by the initial conditions. 
Current deflationary forces have neither reduced southern import-dependency on northern 
countries, nor increased southern exports to the northern region. The clear outcome is a 
polarisation process in terms of trade flows, industrial production, growth rates, 
unemployment and the ability of a country to respond to shocks, which reflects the 
divergence between the two regions in their productive base (Ginzburg et al. 2013; Storm 
and Naastepad, 2015). The tragedy of the Euro Area consists in the lack of 
countercyclical tools at the national and supranational level able to tackle the endogenous 
source of instability. In the absence of fiscal transfers from surplus to deficit regions, the 
macro-mechanism of the Euro Area is naturally flawed and trapped into a divergent and 
politically self-destructive trajectory. By referring to Myrdal’s cumulative causation 
theory, Blanckenburg et al. (2013, p.466) emphasize that dynamic elements of trade 
trigger backwash and spread effects, resulting in uneven economic development. 
Empirical analysis quantifies the negative effects of uncoordinated wage policy on trade 
relationships within the Euro Area, and explains how unemployment and the level of debt 
are both the outcome and amplifying factors of the initial shock, ultimately creating 
winners and losers from trade.  
Given this empirical evidence, it seems clear that wage coordination should become a 
macroeconomic priority within a monetary union with fiscal and political independence 
(Stockhammer, 2008; 2011a; Laski and Podkaminer, 2012; Onaram and Obst, 2016). 
Furthermore, wage coordination by indexing wage growth to productivity growth may act 
as an automatic-countercyclical policy tool so that countries experiencing a boom may 
play the role of pullers by stimulating aggregate demand and aggregate exports from 
neighbour countries (Stockhammer, 2007). A supranational European institution in 
charge of supervising and coordinating the Euro Area macroeconomic strategy would be 
useful to prevent national policies, taken in aggregate, destabilizing the objective of the 
single currency: trade integration and economic convergence. In order to reach these two 
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objectives however, policymakers need to tackle the current divergence in a coordinated 
manner. From this perspective, wage coordination is just one ingredient in the policy mix, 
whose priority is to restore a process of convergence within the Euro Area. Because trade 
asymmetries are the outcome of a polarisation process between the southern and northern 
region, and unemployment differentials are the outcome of an investment gap, these 
factors being mutually reinforcing, the practical task is to rebalance the productive base. 
Moreover, since convergence cannot be achieved through endogenous forces, which tend 
to preserve the specialisation pattern, exogenous forces - an ad-hoc investment package - 
are needed to shock the current state of the system. The Stability and Growth pact does 
not give the necessary fiscal flexibility to counteract a debt-deflation process, and a 
deterioration of the fiscal stance may foster financial speculation over sovereign default, 
deeping recession due to growing uncertainty and a weakened fiscal position, forced to 
deploy the necessary stimuli. Overall, the institutional design of the EMU plays a key 
role in exacerbating pro-cyclical outcomes, leaving each individual country with the task 
of implementing policies to restore convergence, without the right to choose what to do. 
Moreover, political independence includes fiscal independence, so fiscal transfers can 
only be achieved on the basis of a political union.  
Therefore, this paper proposes a transfer mechanism based on intra-EA trade, in order to 
overcome the political impasse and provide automatic countercyclical stabilisers within 
the EMU. In this respect, this mechanism should be able to relax fiscal policy constraints 
and provide an alternative to the austerity rules and deflationary prescriptions of the 
Berlin-Washington Consensus (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013). The mechanism should 
track trade imbalances among EA member states, so surplus countries contribute to 
building up a European fund for countercyclical investments. The mechanism should 
work as follows: each deficit country draws from the fund according to their deficit 
quota, incentivizing local public and private investments, which in turn attract foreign 
capital. This mechanism increases long-term productivity in deficit countries by 
rebuilding the productive base, necessary to rebalance trade asymmetries as well as for 
sustainable and inclusive convergence. This countercyclical investment package should 
act as supply side policy, while wage coordination plays the complementary role of 
demand side policy, in order to guarantee a rising level of consumption and imports in the 
EMU. Strategically, the fund can be integrated into the scope of the European Investment 
Bank to avoid the mismanagement of funds by local government. This proposal expands 
further the suggestion of Arestis et al. (2001) and Sawyer (2013) by giving a precise 
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countercyclical role to the EIB, which should seek to smooth asymmetric shocks and 
reduce persistent trade differentials through an active European industrial policy 
(Mazzucato, 2013; Ginzburg et al. 2013; Storm and Naastepad, 2015). The virtues of this 
mechanism comprise the following features: I) Flexible: it overcomes the loss in 
flexibility due to the lack of a national exchange rate system. II) Attractive: it creates new 
incentives to join the monetary union for countries in the common market; III) 
Countercyclical: it assures a direct (in the country of origin) countercyclical industrial 
policy at the Euro Area level - the macro stabilisers needed in a monetary union with 
political and fiscal autonomy; V) Fair: the countries that benefit most from EA trade 
need to contribute to the EA fund, while those that contribute most in terms of import 
demand should be rewarded; VI) Inclusive: sooner or later, each member state will be in 
surplus or deficit and hence he will be a net contributor or net receiver. Moreover, the 
fund would be of the on-off type, since a parity of the trade balance does not involve 
fiscal transfers.   
5. Concluding Remarks 
The original set-up of the Euro is the beginning, not the end, of a journey. The objectives 
were enshrined in article G2 of the Treaty of Maastricht. Those principles are the only 
reason the Euro Area exists. And we should refrain from confusing the rules adopted to 
implement those principles with the objectives themselves. Monetary and fiscal rules are 
not objectives per se, but are means to achieve agreed targets. The rules and current 
institutional set-up have not led to the desired results, and therefore require rethinking. 
The institutional set-up needs to be updated and adapted pragmatically to the unexpected 
challenges of the common currency. Institutional change is a cumulative process, 
requiring learning from experience before moving forward. The original flaw in the Euro 
Area - a monetary union with fiscal and political autonomy - has produced asymmetric 
benefits, which now reinforce inward-looking policies and the political and economic 
self-interest of the winners. As Obsfeld says (2012, p.1) “Policies motivated by purely 
national advantage may well be counterproductive if widely undertaken, which is why 
countries have sought to coordinate their trade and sometimes macroeconomic and 
financial policies”. From this perspective, the true risk for the Euro Area is that by 
confusing a short-run remedy with the solution, a vicious circle may subvert the long-
term path agreed. The suggestions put forward in this paper seek to tackle the problem of 
asymmetric gains from intra-EA trade between members. This is only one aspect of the 
flawed Euro Area architecture; many other problems need to be addressed. The principal 
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motivation for the creation of the Euro was to foster ‘Pareto-efficient’ gains from trade. 
The analysis shows that due to concurrent asymmetric shocks the common currency has 
produced asymmetric benefits lasting almost two decades. This mechanism has 
determined path dependency, and the lack of a mechanism able to cope with diverging 
forces has left countries without proper tools to combat a massive and vicious 
mechanism. Monetary union first and foremost implies social cohesion and solidarity 
among member states, as well as a humane economy as the first step towards a humane 
society.  
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Footnotes 
[1] This subdivision resembles one identified by Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016). Moreover, I 
wish to stress that, taken together, the northern and southern region represent more than 90% of 
total GDP in the Euro Area and have similar weight within the EA, 43% and 48% of GDP 
respectively. 
[2] The extra-EA surplus is certainly driven by the nominal depreciation of the Euro that has led 
to a real depreciation of the effective exchange rate. The only exception is France, which faces a 
persistent trade deficit, the outcome of an expansionary fiscal stance. 
[3] Meade favoured national currency areas since Europe lacked the necessary condition of high 
labour mobility between regions, whereas Scitovsky was in favour of a single European currency 
since he believed it would promote greater capital mobility. Nevertheless he recognised the 
problem of asymmetric shocks by emphasizing the need to render labour more mobile and to 
create a supranational institution to promote and coordinate employment policies.  
[4] This was the misconception that free trade would bring higher living standards and lower 
unemployment in every sector and country through efficiency gains due to greater economic 
integration. Although there is evidence of aggregate gains, unsurprisingly, they have 
distributional consequences, producing winners and losers from trade (Autor et al. 2013). 
[5] Clearly the best outcome would have been to maintain full employment without setting 
restrictions on intra-European trade, and this could have been achieved by sticking to the three 
main principles. See Meade’s explanation for further details (ivi., 394). 
[6] Arestis and Sawyer (2004, p.6) emphasize that I) a political union is a prerequisite for the 
survival of a monetary union; and II) in the absence of political union economic convergence is 
necessary for the survival of the monetary union. 
[7] In particular by implementing the ‘pact for work, education and competitiveness’ in 1998, the 
Germany of Gerhard Schröder (Bonfinger, 2015) saw the wage share over GDP decrease for eight 
consecutive years. 
[8] The only exception is Portugal, with a wage share reduction.  However, this reduction was 
smaller than in three of the four countries in the northern region, thereby resulting in a loss of 
competitiveness compared to countries in the northern region. The outcome was the deterioration 
of the non and intra-EA trade balance. 
[9] Looking at single countries, Belgium underwent a remarkable increase in its debt share over 
GDP, almost 90%. This is the only exception among northern countries, and is lower than the 
debt increase in Spain and France. 
[10] This does not mean that adjustment on both sides is unnecessary; it is urgent in order to 
avoid future political and economic crisis in the EMU. Otherwise, given the crisis-prone system, 
when the instability of the mechanism develops once more, painful endogenous restructuring will 
take place, and social and political discontent will again undermine the benefits of monetary 
union, with harsher consequences than before. 
[11] As explained by Borio and Disiyatat (2015, p.7) current accounts and hence trade imbalances 
represent net wealth transfers and not financial flows from surplus to deficit countries. Therefore 
domestic credit plays a crucial role in stimulating import demand, which can be financed entirely 
at home or abroad, regardless of the current account position. 
[12] The alternative approach in the literature is the single equation approach. The advantage is 
that results are easier to interpret than in a VAR. On the negative side, results may include  
estimation bias  arising from the fact that it treats functional income distribution as exogenous and 
does not consider investments, consumption and net exports as parts of GDP (Ederer et al. 2009, 
p. 145). For a detailed comparison of the methodologies, see Onaram and Obst (2016, p. 1526). 
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[13] This is standard practice in the literature (Jump and Mendieta-Munoz, 2017; Onaram and 
Obst 2016). Stationarity tests are available on request. 
[14] Although seasonal dummies have little impact on the results, they are necessary to avoid 
autocorrelation in the residuals. 
[15] Following standard practice in modern econometric modelling, a different lag specification 
was applied whenever there was evidence of residual autocorrelation. However, results are robust 
to alternative lag lengths. 
[16] Stcokhammer and Onaram (2004) adopt a lag length of four on semi-annual data - two years 
- to capture the effects on investments. 
[17] This is also consistent with the stylized facts. Wage adjustments in the northern countries 
were the result of the exogenous implementation of policy measures between 1996 and 2007. 
Similarly, structural reforms aiming to reduce labour costs and boost competitiveness were 
imposed in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis in the southern region. 
[18] WS TB, PD are weighted by GDP, while C, I and reer are transformed in natural logarithm. 
Then first differences are taken for all the variables, i.e. WS, C, I, TB, U, irl, reer, pd. 
[19] If in the first specification, working with the trade balance as a share of GDP is binding since 
the overall trade balance is both negative and positive during the sample period - hence growth 
rates cannot be computed - in the second specification net exports between the two regions are 
positive for the northern region throughout the entire sample. This allows the growth rate of net 
exports for the northern region to be computed. Since the growth rate of the net exports of the 
southern region is specular, we need only multiply by -1 the series obtained for the northern 
region.  
[20] Precisely, positive net exports refer to an excess of exports over imports in the home region 
to and from the foreign region, i.e. a trade surplus.  
[21] This approach was used by Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011) who assessed the impact of the 
foreign economic activity of thirteen EU countries on the domestic activity of one EU country. 
They analysed the potential gains from the coordination of fiscal expansion. As in this analysis, 
the focus is on the potential gains from wage coordination across EA countries, and the potential 
negative spillover if wage policies are settled independently. 
[22] This is also consistent with the literature focusing on intra-EA trade imbalances. See for 
example Ginzburg et al. (2013) or more generally for trade imbalances see Storm and Naastepad 
(2015).  
[23] The trade balance decomposition in a VAR approach is used by Beetsma et al. (2008) to 
assess the effects of a shock to public spending. 
[24] Computations are based on the impulse response estimates of the baseline model for the 5-
year period, since the wage share endogenously adjusts to the initial shock. Note that the 
estimates are a linear function of the shock, therefore a change in the magnitude of the shock has 
no effect on the estimates of the impulse responses.    
[25] In this model, the trade balance is replaced by the trade balance between the two regions, 
which is defined as intra net-exports [𝐼𝑁𝑇_𝑁𝑋]. 
[26] Here I refer to the effects of debt and interest rate on wages. If we set the wage shock at 
0.5% ‘after five years’ for model (b), the magnitude of the impulse responses is pretty closer to 
those of baseline model (a). Therefore, the amplification effect works by pushing wages higher, 
which in turn has a scale effect on the other endogenous variables in the model. It is important to 
keep this in mind when comparing results in the two regions. 
[27] “Whilst disentangling the composition, price and income effects lying behind the growing 
deficits of the various peripheral eurozone countries would require further investigation, it seems 
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evident that their export base is at the moment too narrow to sustain development driven only by 
external demand” (Ibid.).  
[28] Here too a set of zero restrictions is imposed on the response of [ 𝑊, 𝐼 , 𝐶 , 𝑈𝐿𝐶] to 𝑊∗. 
[29] This effect may be more detrimental to those southern countries such as France and Italy, 
which have an industrial base that can compete with Germany. 
[30] See Storm and Naastepad (2009, 2017). 
[31] The first sub-period is from Q1-1999 to Q4-2016, and the second sub-period from Q1-1996 
to Q-2008. Impulse responses do not change remarkably from the full period when estimated for 
both sub-periods. 
[32] Although the price effect of higher domestic wages on southern exports is positive when 
estimated on the southern region and negative when estimated on the northern region as foreign 
wages, a possible explanation is provided. 
List of Figures 
                  a) Net Export Flows 1994-1998                         b) Net Exports Flow 1999-2008        
 
c) Net Export Flows 2009-2016 
 
Figure 1. Intra Euro Area Net Export Flows between Deficit and Surplus Countries 
Source: Eurostat. Note: Arrows show the average trade surplus for the selected countries in the 
specific time period. The amount of flow is represented by the thickness of the arrow. Countries 
are divided into two subsets: blue for Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (surplus 
countries), and red for France, Italy, Portugal and Spain (deficit countries).  
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
Northern Region              Southern Region 
 Wage Share (WS)    Wage Share (WS) 
 
Investments (I)            Investments (I) 
 
      Consumption (C)                      Consumption (C) 
 
   Trade Balance (TB)      Trade Balance (TB) 
 
  Unemployment (U)              Unemployment (U) 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions to a Wage Share 
Shock 
Note: The Shock is the first in the Cholesky decomposition (unit standard deviation). The solid line refers 
to point estimates, dotted lines to 90% confidence region. The responses are expressed as a percentage of 
the underlying variable, except for the unemployment rate, which is in basis points, and the wage share and 
trade balance, which are shown as a percentage of GDP. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Definitions and Data Sources 
 
 
 
Table A2. Model Specifications and LM tests 
 
Notes: LR: sequential modified likelihood ratio statistic, Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike (AIC), 
Schwarz (SC) and Hannan & Quinn (HQ) criteria, LM: Lagrange multiplier tests. 
MODEL
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 201.6 2.2E-20* -31.06 -30.52* -29.71* 0.181 / 179.73 5.6e-22* -34.75 -34.21* -33.40* 0.122 /
2 40.5 2.6E-20 -30.94 -30.103 -28.84 0.267 / 37.73 6.60E-22 -34.60 -33.76 -32.50 0.087 /
3 48.24 2.70E-20 -30.92 -29.78 -28.07 0.324 / 53.13 6.50E-22 -34.64 -33.50 -31.79 0.262 /
4 59.29* 2.50E-20 -31.07* -29.60 -27.44 0.247 4 51.506* 6.70E-22 -34.76* -33.22 -31.06 0.140 4
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 226.23 2.4e-24* -37.37* -36.65* -35.57* 0.351 / 212.37 3.4e-26* -41.613 -40.89* -39.81* 0.211 /
2 48.643 3.3E-24 -37.07 -35.919 -34.19 0.306 / 73.27 3.50E-26 -41.63 -40.48 -38.75 0.211 /
3 65.322 3.80E-24 -36.99 -35.40 -33.03 0.728 / 60.43 4.30E-26 -41.48 -39.90 -37.52 0.318 /
4 82.452* 3.70E-24 -37.121 -35.10 -32.08 0.652 4 95.859* 3.50E-26 -41.78* -39.766 -36.75 0.388 4
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 263.12 2.2e-24* -34.62* -33.77* -32.51* 0.131 / 269.75 2.9E-26 -38.942 -38.01* -36.61* 0.682 /
2 89.976 2.5E-24 -34.52 -33.08 -30.92 0.128 / 110.81 2.6e-26* -39.11 -37.58 -35.30 0.703 /
3 84.336 3.30E-24 -34.34 -32.31 -29.27 0.226 / 91.031 3.20E-26 -39.02 -36.90 -33.73 0.917 /
4 104.87* 3.60E-24 -34.432 -31.81 -27.88 0.127 4 109.51* 3.30E-26 -39.16* -36.45 -32.40 0.186 4
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 294.53 1.7e-25* -34.36 -33.19* -31.46* 0.136 / 297.95 2.4e-27* -38.61 -37.44* -35.71* 0.601 /
2 115.19 2.1E-25 -34.19 -32.26 -29.36 0.164 / 130.99 2.50E-27 -38.65 -36.71 -33.81 0.161 /
Panel (d) 3 96.366 3.80E-25 -33.79 -31.08 -27.02 0.480 / 121.69 3.20E-27 -38.57 -35.86 -31.80 0.326 /
4 168.9* 3.20E-25 -34.4* -30.83 -25.61 0.339 4 174.85* 2.50E-27 -39.1661* -35.68 -30.46 0.546 4
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 140.85 6.00E-20 -30.07 -29.59* -28.87* 0.197 / 174.31 4.9E-21 -32.58 -32.10* -31.38* 0.872 /
2 70.497 4.7E-20 -30.33 -29.547 -28.38 0.566 / 55.276 4.60E-21 -32.65 -31.87 -30.70 0.827 /
3 40.187 5.50E-20 -30.20 -29.12 -27.50 0.387 / 82.055 3.2e-21* -33.06 -31.97 -30.36 0.280 /
4 84.331* 3.7e-20* -30.64* -29.26 -27.19 0.143 4 53.509* 3.20E-21 -33.09* -31.72 -29.65 0.470 4
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 229.95 1.4e-25 -37.40 -36.47* -35.08* 0.246 / 249.13 1.9E-26 -39.36 -38.52* -37.25* 0.676 /
2 132.28 9.2e-26* -37.84* -36.319 -34.04 0.076 / 123.27 1.40E-26 -39.69 -38.25 -36.09 0.468 /
3 60.654 1.60E-25 -37.36 -35.25 -32.08 0.880 / 125.81 1.1e-26* -40.05 -38.01 -34.97 0.631 /
4 130.86* 1.30E-25 -37.786 -35.08 -31.02 0.214 4 108.12* 1.20E-26 -40.176* -37.55 -33.62 0.088 4
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 166.99 2.4e-24 -37.38 -36.74* -35.76* 0.211 / 229.62 3.9E-25 -39.173 -38.525 -37.55* 0.638 /
2 85.487 2E-24 -37.56 -36.474 -34.86 0.280 / 122.3 2.10E-25 -39.81 -38.73* -37.11 0.287 /
3 53.213 2.70E-24 -37.32 -35.80 -33.54 0.410 / 93.327 1.70E-25 -40.08 -38.57 -36.30 0.410 /
4 127.93* 1.5e-24* -38.03* -36.08 -33.17 0.140 4 80.041* 1.7e-25* -40.18* -38.24 -35.32 0.636 4
Lag LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection LR FPE AIC HQIC SBIC LM Test Selection
1 216.65 1.20E-28 -44.40 -43.56* -42.30* 0.133 / 247.43 1.9E-29 -46.256 -45.331* -43.9468* 0.368 /
2 88.184 1.5E-28 -44.28 -42.847 -40.71 0.257 / 129.16 1.4e-29* -46.65 -45.14 -42.87 0.351 /
3 72.965 2.20E-28 -43.96 -41.94 -38.92 0.527 / 99.314 1.50E-29 -46.67 -44.56 -41.42 0.125 /
4 164.44* 1.1e-28* -44.80* -42.19 -38.29 0.118 4 114.49* 1.50E-29 -46.876* -44.18 -40.16 0.673 4
Table 4
Table 5
Panel (a)
Table 2
Table 2
Southern RegionNorthern Region
Panel (c)
Table 2
Panel (b)
Table 3
Panel (a)
Table 3
Panel (b)
Table 2
Time Series Data Variable Definition Source
Gross domestic product GDP Gross domestic product, at 2010 constant prices OECD Main Economi Indicator - March 2017 Edition
Investments I Gross fixed capital formation, at 2010 constant prices OECD Main Economi Indicator - March 2017 Edition
Consumption C Private consumption expenditure, at 2010 constant prices OECD Main Economi Indicator - March 2017 Edition
Exports X Exports of goods and services, at 2010 costant prices OECD Main Economi Indicator - March 2017 Edition
Imports M Imports of goods and services, at 2010 costant prices OECD Main Economi Indicator - March 2017 Edition
Wages W Wages, values annual. Deflated with OECD implicit price deflator. Economic Outlook No 100
Private non-financial sector debt PD Privare non-financial sector - all sectors - market value - perecntage of GDP Bank of International Settlements
Real effective exchnage rate Reer Narrow Index Bank of International Settlements
Long-term interest rate Irl Long-term interest rate for EMU convergence criterion bond yields Eurostat
Unemployment rate U Unemployment rate, % of labour force Economic Outlook No 100
Unit labour costs ULC Unit labour cost in total economy Economic Outlook No 100
Intra exports INT_X Exports of goods Eurostat
Intra imports INT_M Imports of goods Eurostat
Wage share WS Wages as share of GDP Computed
Trade balance TB Exports minus Imports (of goods and services) Computed
Intra net exports INT_NX Intra Exports minus intra imports (of goods) Computed
Price deflator / Price deflator OECD Main Economi Indicator - March 2017 Edition
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Euro Area Growth Differentials  
Diverging and Reinforcing Factors in a Minsky-Kaleckian SVAR Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to disentangle the factors shaping and exacerbating growth 
differentials in the Euro Area between Southern and Northern countries. The Minsky 
business cycle theory and the Kaleckian five determinants of profits are used in the 
paper as the interpretative framework to disentangle the sources of divergence. 
According to a SVAR methodology, eight diverging factors and seven reinforcing 
factors were detected as the main drivers of the differentials. Hence, the two regions 
represent different economic structures and growth models, and this dichotomy, in turn, 
means that symmetric shocks have asymmetric effects, while asymmetric shocks 
reinforce the regional differences. An endogenous investment-growth feedback process 
and an investment-unemployment loop are mutually reinforcing mechanisms, which 
impair the production base and constrain future growth, so temporary shocks have long-
lasting effects. Ultimately, the analysis emphasizes the need to rethink the European 
macro mechanism and the implementation of a common and shared European macro 
strategy that goes beyond national political interests, and inclusively pursues the same 
objective: convergence.  
 
 
Keywords: Euro Area, Business Cycle, Growth Differentials, Path-Dependency, 
Minsky/Kalecki. 
JEL Classification: E11, E12, E22, F45, F44. 
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The problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of 
payments between countries has never been solved, since 
methods of barter gave way to the use of money and bills of 
exchange. During most of the period in which the modern world 
has been evolved and the autarky of the middle ages was 
gradually giving way to the international division of labour and 
the exploitation of new sources of supply by overseas enterprise, 
the failure to solve this problem has been a major cause of 
impoverishment and social discontent and even of wars and 
revolutions (J. M. Keynes, From a letter to Richard Kahn, 21 
August 1941, 1980. p. 21). 
 
1. Introduction 
In a globalized world, trade imbalances are the very basis of recessions and expansions 
directly affecting corporate profits and thus business investments, and indirectly 
sustaining or reducing employment, i.e., household investment and consumption 
decisions. 
It is then the country in the debtor position on the balance of payments, which is by 
hypothesis the weaker and above all the smaller in comparison with the rest of the 
world, that has to implement the restoration of equilibrium by changing its prices and 
wages. This compulsory adjustment consequently drives the debtor country to 
experience the negative side of the business cycle, resulting in higher level of 
unemployment, deflationary pressures, lower investments and weaker growth. 
If this is not immediately counteracted by a means to sustain profits in the economy, 
such as government expenditure in the form of public investment and consumption, the 
outcome of the adjustment will not only be worse than expected but partially permanent, 
leading to a prolonged period of stagnation (Minsky, 1982) and giving rise to what is 
called the principle of hysteresis: current and future output is predetermined by previous 
economic conditions. According to Krugman “cumulative past output determines 
current productivity” (1987: 47). A locked-in path-dependent process is the unavoidable 
consequence. 
This process is represented by the growth differentials the two regions of the Euro Area 
experienced in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) until now. The 
Northern region - Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria - enjoyed a strong 
recovery and low levels of unemployment, while the Southern region - France, Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal[1] - experienced double-digit unemployment rate, and slower 
growth. Although the creation of the common currency aimed at greater trade 
integration among Euro Area members, the benefits were mainly in one direction for 
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various reasons (Belke and Dreger 2013; Chen et al. 2012; Kollmann et al. 2015). After 
the crisis, the initial hope of the Euro triggering rapid economic convergence turned into 
widespread social and political discontent towards the rules and architecture of the 
common currency, thereby echoing Keynes’s words.  
Blanchard et al. (2015) showed that temporary shocks have long-lasting consequences 
on potential output, arguing for an active and quick response to detrimental shocks. 
DeLong and Summers (2012) and Fatàs and Summers (2015) investigated the impact of 
fiscal measures on the economic performance of the Southern region, suggesting that 
austerity policies are self-defeating tools, and that active countercyclical stabilizers are 
necessary to prevent the divergence widening. Other researchers (Eichengreen 2010; 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2010; Stockhammer 2011a) studied the imbalances within the 
Euro Area by focusing on the virtuous Northern savings versus the over-indebtedness of 
the Southern region. Shambaugh (2012) analysed the interdependence of the growth, 
sovereign, and banking crisis, mutually reinforcing events. Ginzburg et al. (2013), and 
Naastepad and Storm (2015) recommended a European industrial policy to rebalance 
internal trade and enable Southern region productivity to catch up with the core. 
Recently, following the theoretical framework of Badhuri and Marglin (1990), 
Stockhammer (2011a; 2011b; 2015), Naastepad and Storm (2017), and Covi (2017) 
have investigated the role played by asymmetric wage shocks in a monetary union, and 
their effects on the demand and growth regime. The factors highlighted in the literature 
reflect different points of view and provide complementary explanations of the crisis 
and its consequences. Nevertheless, they are all connected to one topic: intra-EMU 
differentials are the outcome of an incomplete system (O’Rourke and Taylor 2014; 
Padoan 2015; Pasimeni 2014), whose flaws were made obvious by the 2008 GFC and 
subsequent European sovereign-debt crisis. The macro-system allowed and fostered the 
creation of opposing economic structures among Euro Area members: a deficit and a 
surplus region. Hence, Euro Area imbalances are the result of opposing growth 
strategies (Stockhammer 2015), which in turn reflect different economic structures. 
Surplus countries benefited from the growing indebtedness of deficit countries, which, 
with wage-led demand regimes (Covi 2017), experienced faster growth in investments 
and consumption during the pre-crisis period.  
The paper contributes to this view by identifying and comparing the characteristics of 
both economic structures, by assessing a region’s ability to respond to shocks, and, in 
light of empirical evidence, by discussing the processes that tend to exacerbate 
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divergence. Hence, the stylized facts underline that the two regions experienced 
remarkably different shocks to private investments in the aftermath of the crisis. This 
asymmetry was treated with the same remedy - austerity measures - leading to the 
opposite outcome in the two regions. In light of the four Kaleckian determinants of 
profit, this paper investigates the factors affecting Euro Area business cycle 
fluctuations, and how the economy responds to shocks from each of them. Although, it 
is well-known that asymmetric shocks within a currency area are important sources of 
economic fragility (Mundell 1961; Obstfeld 1997; De Grawue 2007), symmetric shocks 
may have a destabilizing outcome if the endogenous response of the economy differs 
between countries. For this purpose SVAR methodology estimates are compared in the 
two regions in order to categorize the asymmetric responses to common shocks. The 
results are then divided into two sets of factors - diverging and reinforcing. The former 
set refers to factors asymmetrically affecting the two regions, leading to divergence in 
the event of a common shock. The latter set refers to factors that produce common 
effects in the two regions, leading to divergence in the event of asymmetric shocks. 
Clearly, Euro Area members have undergone both asymmetric and symmetric shocks 
during the last decade, and the heterogeneity in their responses and lack of a common 
EU macro-strategy ended up reinforcing divergence.  
The categorization of symmetric and asymmetric responses in Euro Area countries is 
the empirical contribution of the paper, and the interpretation of shocks as self-
reinforcing/self-defeating mechanisms is the theoretical contribution. An investment-
growth feedback process and an investment-unemployment loop work as amplifiers of 
the business cycle. The responses of corporate investments to an export shock shows the 
need for an automatic rebalancing mechanism able to offset trade imbalances and bring 
the two regions back to a convergence path. As persistent latent factors, these temporary 
shocks render divergence self-reinforcing, i.e., produce a larger gap in output between 
Northern and Southern Euro Area members, a lower level of capital formation, and 
ultimately, lower export volumes in the South. By impulse responses analysis, these 
factors can be mutually reinforcing, and are exacerbated by higher levels of 
unemployment, which in turn constrain growth (Blanchard and Summers 1986; Badhuri 
and Marglin 1990; Stadler 1990).  
Clearly, the combination of shocks, differences in economic structure, and amplifying 
forces reinforce divergence, making the Southern region more inward-looking and 
domestic-demand driven, and the Northern region more reliant on the performance of 
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exports. Ultimately, the paper argues that the Southern region cannot rely exclusively on 
fiscal spending to overcome domestic demand crises, and that a deeper rethink of 
European macro-architecture is needed in light of the current divergence.   
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework to interpret the stylized facts on which the 
empirical analysis is grounded. Section 3 presents the most important patterns of growth 
differentials. Section 4 describes the empirical methodology and discusses the results of 
the impulse response functions analysis. In light of the empirical evidence, section 5 
sets out policy implications, and compares them with proposals in the literature. The last 
section concludes. 
2. The Four Determinants of Profits 
Rather than the standard approach used in the neo-classical synthesis, where profits are 
determined by technology through the production function, Kalecki tries to address the 
question of how the volume of profits is determined in the economy deriving it from 
national accounting identities, as follows (Kalecki 2010: 49): 𝜋 ≡ 𝐼 + 𝐷𝐹 + 𝐵𝑃𝑆 − 𝑆𝑊 + 𝐶𝜋 
Gross profits net of taxes - the left hand side of the equation - are equal to gross private 
investment (I), plus budget deficit (DF), plus the balance of payments surplus (BPS), 
minus savings out of wages (SW), plus consumption out of profits (C𝜋)[2]. As we can 
see, two variables positively enter into the equation - private investment and budget 
deficit - one negatively - saving out of wages - and one may be positive or negative 
depending on the country’s balance of payments. Theoretically the algebraic sum of 
these components determines the volume of profits in the economy. A volatile profit 
index leads to larger amplitude of the business cycle, and may trigger recession as well 
as expansion depending on its size and growth rate. According to Kalecki, any change 
in investments unequivocally affects profits by the same amount, and expected profits 
determine the current investment magnitude. Therefore the key variable driving the 
variation of the index and its volatility is private investment, which is also the only one 
able to increase the production capacity of the economy and to reduce the 
unemployment rate (Minsky 2008; Stockhammer 2011b).  
On the other hand, the budget deficit is the only source of profits completely under 
government control. This is an essential feature in times of crisis since controlling the 
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level of profits can prevent a deep recession. By giving incentives to households and 
corporations, the investment volume may be sustained despite the discouraging unstable 
business conditions. As Minsky emphasizes, ‘big governments’ are necessary to prevent 
a shortfall of investments from triggering an interactive debt-deflation process (Minsky 
1982: 201).  
The third variable - a balance of payments surplus - increases current profits by the 
same amount, if and only if, all the other determinants of profits remain unchanged. For 
example, if an export-oriented sector undergoes an increase in export volumes and the 
excess of cash flow is neither invested nor consumed but is sterilized by a higher level 
of savings, current profits do not increase. On the contrary, if the export revenues are 
invested to enlarge the production base or are used to buy consumption goods in the 
domestic market, current profits increase more than proportionally through the positive 
multiplier effect, common to all the variables in the Kalecki identity[3]. It is important 
to note that an excess of imports over exports, i.e. a trade deficit, has a negative impact 
on the profit level and therefore on investments. During the sixteenth century the 
mercantile doctrine rooted its policy precisely on this principle. A trade deficit was seen 
as the main source of economic fragility since it decreases the amount of available 
resources in the domestic market, and therefore its level of output and employment, 
ultimately leading to an adjustment of living standards. For this reason, the mercantile 
approach uses currency devaluations, import tariffs and export subsidies as remedies to 
counteract a persistent trade deficit. As Minsky says, “whether a full-fledged financial 
crisis takes place depends upon…whether gross profits are sustained by an increase in 
the government deficit or changes in the balance of payments” (Minsky 1982: 108). 
According to him, the creation of a trade surplus in the aftermath of a financial crisis 
may prevent the economy from falling into a deep recession by sustained profits. 
Therefore, a trade surplus plays a crucial role similar to a budget deficit in sustaining 
profits. On this point, Kalecki states that:  
The capitalists of a country which manages to capture foreign markets from other countries are able to 
increase their profits at the expense of the capitalists of the other countries…. The counterpart of the 
export surplus is an increase in the indebtedness of the foreign countries towards the country 
considered…. The counterpart of the budget deficit is an increase in the indebtedness of the government 
towards the private sector…. The above shows clearly the significance of 'external' markets (including 
those created by budget deficits) for a capitalist economy…. It is the export surplus and the budget deficit 
which enable the capitalists to make profits over and above their own purchases of goods and services 
(Kalecki 2010: 51).  
 87 
Ultimately savings out of wages - the fourth determinant - may have a positive or a 
negative impact on the profit index depending on whether its growth rate is negative or 
positive. Building up savings is a successful strategy on the positive side of the cycle, so 
when the business cycle turns negative, the economy is well prepared. This may act as a 
perfect countercyclical tool to avoid the overheating of the economy. On the other hand, 
if this good behaviour takes place on the negative side of the cycle, it can simply 
magnify the distress in the economy and drag down the profit index, giving rise to what 
has been called the paradox of deleveraging. Together, the four determinants of profits 
determine the boom and bust cycles.  
This business cycle theory concerns the path-dependent process that directly derives 
from the endogenous character of the investments cycle and the role of profits in 
shaping investment opportunities; this is the interpretative framework on which the 
empirical analysis below is grounded. In this respect, the paper aims to disentangle the 
feedback processes existing among the determinants of profits and the growth rate of 
the economy, and between investments and the unemployment rate, i.e., the region’s 
capability to respond to shocks.  
3. Stylized Facts 
In order to construct the profit index the following proxies for the four determinants of 
profits are used[4]: 
I: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
DF: Government Expenditure[5] 
BPS: Current Accounts 
SW: Gross Household Savings 
As can be seen in figure 1, the profit index is quite volatile, ranging between 30% and 
40% of GDP. The first consideration is that heterogeneous economic structures exist in 
each economy, and a country may have found its own balance although it differs 
remarkably at the level of profits as a share of GDP. The type of equilibrium depends 
upon the intrinsic features of the economy, and it can be divided into two types of 
growth model: a profit-led growth and a wage-led growth (Badhuri and Marglin 1990; 
Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013; Stockhammer and Onaran 2013).  
 Insert about here Figure 1 
Profit Index at Country Level  
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What matters is not the absolute value of the index, but its growth above the growth rate 
of the economy, and how investments respond to an increase in the four determinants of 
profits. Consequently, this paper addresses the question by pooling together core Euro 
Area countries with common growth strategies. The analysis is based on the 
categorization developed in Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016) and further investigated 
by Covi (2017). In this conceptual framework, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal 
comprise the Southern region with debt-led growth and a wage-led demand regime, 
whereas Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria comprise the Northern region 
characterized by export-led growth and a profit-led demand regime. These two sets 
were initially put forward given the opposing pattern of the trade balance - the third 
determinant of profit - for which the former group has a deficit and the latter a surplus. 
According to this definition, figure 2 shows the evolution of the profit index at the 
region level[6]. 
Insert about here Figure 2 
Figure 2: The Profit Index  
As is clear, up to 2003, the Southern region outperformed the Northern region profit 
index by 2% of GDP. However, from 2003 on, the Northern outpaced the Southern 
region. During the boom period preceding the financial crisis the gap was 2-3 
percentage points of GDP, whereas in 2016 and during the period 2009-2011, it reached 
5%. Moreover, the real gap is even larger, since the increase of the profit index in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis in the Southern region was due to falling GDP, i.e., a 
decrease in the denominator.  
In order to understand what drives the profit index, its determinants need to be looked at 
on the disaggregated level, as shown in figure 3. It is evident that investments in the 
Southern region underwent a boom period, increasing from 21.5% of GDP to a peak of 
24% in Q4-2007. Nevertheless, as the crisis hit, investments fell sharply, reaching a 
level 2% of GDP lower than in 2000. Clearly, investments in the Southern region have 
yet to recover, while in the Northern region they grew at the same pace as GDP, 
remaining flat as a share of GDP over the entire period. According to Minsky’s theory, 
government expenditure should have expanded as much as the fall in investments, but 
didn’t, only increasing by 2% of GDP, not enough to counterbalance the 4% fall in 
investments. On the contrary, in the Northern region, government expenditure increased 
more than proportionally than the fall in investments. On top of that, the third 
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determinant of profit - current account - underwent an asymmetric pattern, working as 
an amplifier of the profit index in the North and as profit-drainer in the South. Only in 
2016 did the current account of the South achieve an overall surplus, after fourteen 
years (2000-2013) of chronic deficit. Nonetheless the differential with the Northern 
region is still wide. Although it has decreased since the 2008 peak of 10% of GDP, it 
still stands at 7%. This is a key point for the analysis since it is the driving force of the 
large divergence in the profit index between the two regions. Moreover, given the fact 
that expected profits are the incentives needed to stimulate current investments, this 
may only further widen the gap in growth potential between the two regions, increasing 
the likelihood of self-reinforcing divergence.  
Insert about here Figure 3 
Evolution of the Four Determinants of Profits  
Finally, savings out of wages decreased by 1-1.5% over GDP in the Southern region, 
sustaining the profit index but not enough to keep consumption stable after the crisis, 
with a decrease of 5% in its aftermath. In contrast, savings in the Northern region 
remained stable over GDP, and this is consistent with the growing pattern of private 
consumption, which did not undergo a fall after the crisis.  
Figure 4 shows the causes of the collapse in investments by private non-financial 
corporations and households. First of all, corporate investments account for half of the 
overall investment volume, while household investments account for one-third[7]. For 
the former, the fall after the crisis was steeper in the South than in the North; moreover, 
in the Northern block corporate investments recovered faster than in the South, although 
both remained below the pre-crisis peak. In contrast, household investments had the 
opposite pattern: boom and bust in the South, flat in the North. Clearly, the inverse-U 
pattern in the South resembles the pattern in overall investments, suggesting that 
household investment was - à la Minsky - a non-negligible driver of the investment 
cycle.  
Insert about here Figure 4 
Investment Decomposition 
The stylized facts presented here and the existing relationships between the four 
determinants of profits and business cycle fluctuations caused the large divergence in 
the capacity of the economy to produce and create employment. As figure 5 shows, the 
gap in GDP growth since the crisis kept on widening, reaching almost 7% in 2016. 
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Clearly, the Southern region has yet to recover the pre-crisis peak in output, while the 
North achieved this in just a few years. The second divergence is related to the 
unemployment level, which is 7.5% higher in the South than in the North. The point is 
not when the unemployment rate returns to the pre-crisis level, but whether, due to the 
loss in production capacity, it has become a structural feature of the Southern region, 
creating a new equilibrium (Ginzburg et al. 2013). Hence, the primary question is 
whether these two diverging patterns are self and mutually reinforcing, that is, current 
forces in place may work for divergence and not against it. Household investment in the 
Southern region seems to strongly depend on the state of the economy, and 
unemployment appears to be an amplifier of the business cycle, reinforcing the boom 
and exacerbating the bust. By analysing the structural differences between 
unemployment in Europe and USA, Blanchard and Summers argued that “long-run 
equilibrium depends on history…and that identifying the circumstances under which 
persistence is likely to arise is crucial” (1986: 71). For this purpose, in the following 
paragraph a SVAR methodology attempts to estimate these forces in order to compare 
them in the two regions and clarify the nature of the massive divergence. 
Insert about here Figure 5 
  The Divergence 
4. Empirical Analysis: Evidence from a SVAR Approach 
This section presents two benchmark SVAR models to assess the impact of each of the 
four determinants of profits on GDP growth and the unemployment rate.  Hence I 
quantify the different responses in the two regions to each determinant. The results of 
the empirical analysis   show whether the two blocks have significant structural 
differences in their economies, providing further evidence for an ineffective European 
‘one size fits all’ growth strategy and macroeconomic policy. Additional variations to 
the benchmark models highlight specific traits, which may have triggered the 
divergence process discussed in the stylized facts. Finally the results are divided into 
two categories: diverging factors and reinforcing factors in order to identify the precise 
channels through which divergence commences, and subsequently self-reinforces. 
Albeit with different specifications, the model set-up resembles one proposed by 
Stockhammer and Onaran (2004; 2005). Furthermore, following critiques of 
Stockhammer (2017), the benchmark model has been enhanced with additional control 
variables which, according to the literature, may be important sources of omitted 
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variable bias. Robustness checks are performed in section 4.6. 
4.1 Data  
The sample period for analysis is from Q1-1999 to Q2-2015, with quarterly and 
seasonally adjusted data. The Southern region comprises France, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain, and the Northern region Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Next, 
all the variables are in first differences to overcome the problem of non-stationary time 
series, since unit roots tests indicate that they are I(1). Table A in the statistical 
appendix summarizes the result of an augmented Dicky-Fuller test. I decompose the 
balance of trade into exports (EX) and imports (IM) following Beetsma et al. (2011), so 
as to better assess the responses of the four determinants of profits. Thus, the variables 
of interest for the benchmark model are investments, government expenditure, exports, 
imports, and savings out of wages. This set of variables represents the core specification 
of the two econometric models dealing with the determinants of business cycle 
fluctuations, GDP growth and the unemployment rate, respectively specification 1 and 
2. Moreover, using alternative model specifications, investments are decomposed into 
corporate investments (CI), and household investments (HHI)[8]. Finally, Unit labour 
cost (ULC) is included as an endogenous variable in specification II. Table B in the 
statistical appendix shows summary statistics for all the variables.  
4.2 Empirical Model  
The benchmark specification investigating the business cycle - model 1A - is a four-
variable SVAR which includes investments, exports, imports, and the gross domestic 
product as endogenous variables, while government expenditure is initially treated as an 
exogenous variable[9]. Additional specifications are then developed for this model: 
• Model 1B further develops model 1A by adding savings out of wages to the set of 
endogenous variables. 
• Model 1C further develops model 1A by adding the imports of the other region to the 
set of endogenous variables. 
• Model 1D decomposes investments into the private non-financial sector and household 
investments. 
The benchmark specification for the unemployment cycle - model 2A - is a four-
variable SVAR. It includes unit labour costs, investments, exports, and the 
unemployment rate as endogenous variables, while government expenditure is treated 
initially as an exogenous variable[10]. An additional extension is as follows: 
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• Model 2B decomposes investments into the private non-financial sector and household 
investments. 
Thus, the endogenous variables depend on current and past values and on the current 
value of the exogenous variable:  𝑦! = 𝜇!𝑥! + 𝐴!𝑦!!!!!!! + 𝜀!        𝑜𝑟        A L 𝑦! =  𝜇!𝑥! + 𝜀!                                     (1) 
where 𝑦! and 𝑥! are the vector of endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. To 
this respect, 𝐴! ~ with i = 1,..., p is the coefficient matrix, and 𝜀! a vector of structural 
shocks with diagonal variance matrix ∑! = 𝐸(𝜀! 𝜀′! ). A structural model assumes that 
the one-step-ahead prediction errors 𝜀! from a statistical model can be thought of as 
linear functions of the structural shocks 𝑢!. The model referred to is the AB-model 
developed by Amisano-Giannini (1997). 𝜀! = 𝑦! − 𝐸 𝑦! Ϝ!!!         𝑎𝑛𝑑         𝐴𝜀! = 𝐵𝑢!                                                              (2) 
The objects of estimation are the square matrices A and B - equation 2. Their estimation 
is carried out by maximum likelihood. The off-diagonal elements of the impact matrix 
A contain the contemporaneous effects of structural shocks on the endogenous 
variables. 
Lags of the endogenous variables are included according to the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Final Prediction Error (FPE) since in a small sample they more 
often select the correct specification and are designed to minimize forecast error 
variance (Lütkepohl 2005)[11].  
4.3 Identification Strategy 
For the estimation of the structural parameters, we need to define 𝐶 = 𝐴!!𝐵 and impose 
some restrictions on matrices 𝐴 and 𝐵 in order to have a unique local maximum in the 
log-likelihood: ℒ = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 − ln 𝐶 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑡𝑟(Σ 𝐶𝐶! !!                                                                      (3) 
In this system, the number of unknown parameters is larger than the number of 
independent equations. We need additional information to identify the unknown 
parameters on the right-hand side. For this reason 2𝐾! − ! !!!!  restrictions have to be 
placed, where K is the number of equations in the system[12].  
First, structural shocks are uncorrelated, i.e. the off-diagonal entries in 𝐵 are zero. This 
assumption is standard in structural VAR modelling. Second, normalization restrictions 
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together with a Wold causal ordering (recursive structure), for matrix 𝐴, provide the 
K(K+1)/2 necessary restrictions to uniquely identify the structural shocks and impulse-
responses as in the case of a just-identified SVAR. This set of restrictions also ensures 
just-identified IRFs, which are qualitatively the same as the orthogonalized IRFs based 
on a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form 
VAR disturbances[13].  
Once estimation is completed, and after having checked for the stability of the VAR, 𝐴 
and 𝐵  can be used to compute the structural VMA representation. If the matrix 
polynomial 𝐴 𝐿  in eq. (1) is invertible, then 𝑦! can be written as[14]: 𝑦! = 𝐴 𝐿 !!𝜀! = Θ 𝐿 𝜀! + Θ!𝜀!!! +⋯                                                                        (4) 
which is known as the VMA representation of the VAR. 
Moreover, this strategy allows to place some additional short run constraints - in 
addition to the traditional recursive structure - to help improve the estimation of the 
structural impulse-response functions (SIRFs). The additional constraints imposed are 
tested as over-identifying restrictions by implementing a Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests.  
4.4 Estimation Stage 
The aim of this estimation stage is to specify an underlying VAR model containing all 
necessary right-hand side variables and as parsimonious as possible since the model 
quickly runs out of degrees of freedom (Stokhammer and Onaram 2004); a model 
which could also help us to improve the accuracy of the implied impulse-responses. For 
this purpose, the sequential elimination of regressors procedure as suggested by 
Brüggemann et al. (2003) and Lütkepohl (2005) is implemented. The procedure 
involves testing zero restrictions on individual coefficients (to eliminate lags of 
variables in the underlying VAR) in each of the model equations. At each step of the 
procedure a single regressor was sequentially eliminated in one equation if its 
corresponding P-value was higher than 0.1. This reduces the parameter space and 
thereby improves the estimation procedure.  
Over-identifying restrictions on the matrix of contemporaneous effects A were 
determined following a procedure similar to the sequential elimination of regressors. 
These additional zero restrictions correspond to setting elements 𝑎!" in the A matrix 
equal to 0. It is important to note that the sequential elimination procedure is 
implemented to improve the confidence bands of the impulse response analysis, to 
increase the significance of the remaining parameters, and to improve identification of 
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the relationships between the endogenous variables, given the small data sample[15]. 
4.5 Model 1 - Business Cycle 
We start by analysing the simultaneous causal relationships between the endogenous 
variables for the benchmark model 1A. The order of the model is 1, and was chosen 
according to the results of the AIC and FPE shown in the statistical appendix - Table 
2A.  Then 4 and 9 insignificant regressors were eliminated in the model for the Northern 
and Southern block respectively. Next, a Jarque-Bera test is carried out to check the 
normality of the residuals, as well as a lagranger-multiplier test for auto-correlation at 
lag order 4, and the test for the eigenvalue stability condition, shown respectively in 
table 1B, 1C, and figure 1A in the statistical appendix. After having controlled for the 
residuals analysis, I estimate a just-identified structural VAR and subsequently an over-
identified VAR if contemporaneous effects of matrix A are not statistically significant.  
4.5.1 Identification Scheme 
The Cholesky decomposition implicitly imposes specific restrictions on the 
contemporaneous responses of the endogenous variables to structural shocks. In 
particular, given the order of the endogenous variables, the identification scheme 
assumes that [ 𝐼 ] affects contemporaneously all variables  [𝐸𝑋  𝐼𝑀 𝐺𝐷𝑃] , [𝐸𝑋] contemporaneously affects [𝐼𝑀 𝐺𝐷𝑃], while [ 𝐼𝑀 ]  affects only the [𝐺𝐷𝑃].  
The economic rationale for identification of the shocks comes from Minsky’s business 
cycle theory, which states that causation ‘runs from investment to profits’. Therefore, 
investment decisions affect in advance all the other decisions such as exporting and 
importing, and fluctuations of GDP are the outcome of this process. A more technical 
justification concerns the proxy used for investments. Gross fixed capital formation is 
an indicator that comes after the investment has been made, since capital formation is 
the outcome of the investment decision. Next, exports come before imports since higher 
profits may be offset by a higher consumption of foreign goods, i.e., higher imports[16]. 
GDP is last in the order since it is the response-variable of interest. In addition, it is 
important to note that, the ordering of the variables after [ 𝐼 ] does not affect the 
responses to an investment shock - the first variable in the Cholecky ordering - whereas 
it may affect the impulse responses of the remaining variables (Christiano et al. 
1999)[17].  
4.5.2 Impulse Responses and Discussion 
The upper part of table 1D - statistical appendix - shows the estimated direct causal 
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effects of an identified SVAR to a structural shock of one standard deviation (in 
columns) on the endogenous variables (in rows), keeping all other variables constant. It 
summarizes the C matrix - the Cholesky - and the inverse A matrix[18]. The lower part 
of the table shows the overall causal effects of an over-identified SVAR[19]. For each 
region, figure 6 shows the estimated impulse response function for GDP to a one 
standard deviation shock to [ I  EX  IM ]. Each row represents the estimates for the 
Northern and Southern Models, respectively. The chosen time period is 8 quarters (2 
years), i.e., short-term business cycle fluctuations according to the Misnky interpretive 
framework.  
Regarding the relation between [ EX ]  and GDP, as well as [ I ]  and GDP, both the 
direct and the overall effects are positive in both regions. It is important to note that - as 
expected from the stylized facts analysis - a standard deviation shock to exports 
produces a positive effect on GDP twice as large as in the Northern region than in the 
Southern region. Precisely, a one standard deviation shock to exports has a direct 
contemporaneous impact on GDP growth of 0.4% in the Northern region and 0.2% in 
the Southern region. This can be called the first diverging factor.  
The contemporaneous relationship between [ IM ]  and GDP is negative in the Northern 
region, while neutral in the South. This partly confirms the idea that higher imports 
negatively affect profits and therefore GDP growth[20]. Another important fact that has 
to be highlighted from figure 6 is that a unit shock to investments increases GDP growth 
by 0.4% and 0.3% in the Northern and in the Southern region, respectively. This is the 
first reinforcing factor.  
Insert about here Figure 6 
Model 1A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to an Export, 
Investment and Import Shock. 
Figure 7 portrays a standard deviation shock to [ EX ], which increases [ IM ] by almost 
1% in both regions. In contrast, a positive shock to[ EX ] has a completely different 
effect on [I] in the two blocks, respectively leading to a 0.6% increase in the Northern 
region and 0.2% in the South. This channel - higher exports, larger gross fixed capital 
formation - clearly reinforces the productive base of a country and its future growth 
potential, creating a source of path-dependence, and reinforces divergence. This is 
defined as the second diverging factor.  
Insert about here Figure 7 
Model 1A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to an Export Shock. 
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Figure 8 shows SIRFs for a unit standard deviation shock to GDP. As can be seen, it 
affects investments and imports in both regions in the same manner, i.e., it leads to a 
0.4% increase. This provides evidence for a feedback-process between investments, 
GDP growth and investments, that may lead to a self-reinforcing mechanism of boom 
and bust cycles as clearly described by Minsky. This is the second reinforcing factor. 
Insert about here Figure 8 
Model 1A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a GDP Shock. 
By extending the benchmark model 1A to include savings out of wages, two additional 
structural characteristics can be assessed: the short-run negative impact on GDP growth 
and the retaining profit behaviour after an export shock.  
Figure 9 shows the SIRFs for model 1B[21].  A positive shock to savings out of wages 
negatively affects GDP growth as stated by Minsky. It directly constrains private 
consumption expenditure. To be precise, a standard deviation shock to [ Sw ] decreases 
GDP by 0.05% in the North and by 0.08% in the South. Furthermore, a standard 
deviation shock to [ EX ] leads to a 3.5% increase in [ Sw ]  in the Northern region, and a 
1% increase in the South (figure 14). Both the magnitude and the persistence of the 
shock are stronger in the Northern block. This shows the retaining profit behaviour of 
Northern export-led economies, and is the third diverging factor.  
Insert about here Figure 9 
Model 1B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to a Saving 
Shock (First Raw) and of Savings to an Export Shock (Second Raw). 
Another extension that can be made is to see how a shock to imports in one region 
impacts GDP and exports in the other region[22]. Figure 10 shows the impulse 
responses of model 1C.  As can be seen, a unit shock to the imports of the Southern 
region leads to a 0.3% GDP increase in the Northern region; vice versa a unit shock to 
imports of the Nordic region leads to a GDP increase by 0.1% in the Southern region. 
This is defined as the fourth diverging factor.  
Insert about here Figure 10 
Figure 10: Model 1C - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to 
Import Shock of the Opposite Block. 
The last model specification developed is the decomposition of investments between 
corporate investments (CI) and household investments (HHI). Table 1E, 1F, 1G, 1H and 
figure 1E in the statistical appendix show respectively the selection order criteria, 
normality test, autocorrelation test, the estimated direct causal effects, and the 
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eigenvalue stability condition of the SVAR model as previously described for the 
benchmark model 1A. 
For each region, figure 11 shows the estimated impulse response function of GDP to 
one standard deviation shock to [ CI, EX,HHI , IM]. Each row represents the estimates 
for the Northern and Southern Model, respectively. As can be seen, a unit shock to CI 
leads to a 0.3% increase in GDP in the Northern region and a 0.1% increase in the 
Southern region. Moreover, a unit shock to household investments has a small positive 
impact on GDP in the Northern region, which dies out after the first quarter; in contrast, 
the response of the Southern block has a slightly larger but especially more persistent 
effect. These two effects are defined as the fifth diverging factor.  
Insert about here Figure 11 
Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to a Shock to 
Corporate Investments, Exports, Households’ Investment and Imports. 
In addition, figure 12 shows the responses of [ CI ]  and [ HHI ] to a unit shock to [ EX ]. 
The effects are similar in the two regions, respectively 1.5% for [ CI ]   and 0.5% for [ HHI ]. Vice versa, a unit shock to [ CI ]   leads to an equal 0.7% increase in exports in 
both regions (figure 13). These effects together are defined as the third reinforcing 
factor. These estimates corroborate the findings of figure 7, and provide additional 
evidence in favour of Ginzburg et al. (2013), i.e., the rebalancing of trade flows between 
northern and southern countries can only take place with the strengthening of the 
Southern production base.  
Insert about here Figure 12 
Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to an Export Shock. 
Insert about here Figure 13 
Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a Corporate 
Investment Shock. 
 
A unit shock to GDP leads to a stronger and more persistent increase in corporate and 
household investments in the Southern block (figure 14). This reflects a more inward-
looking domestic demand-driven posture in the Southern region than in the North. This 
result is consistent with the degree of openness in the two regions, the South relatively 
more closed than the North, as well as with their demand-regimes, respectively wage-
led and profit-led (Covi, 2017).  This is the sixth diverging factor.  
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Insert about here Figure 14 
Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a GDP Shock. 
 
 
4.6 Model 2 - Unemployment Cycle 
The aim of this model specification is to assess whether unemployment works as an 
amplifier of the business cycle as already argued by Naastepad and Storm (2015) and 
Ginzburg et al. (2013). For this, as Blanchard and Summers say, a deep understanding 
of the circumstances of its (unemployment) creation and growth (1986: 71) is required.  
We start by analysing the contemporaneous causal relationships between the 
endogenous variables for the benchmark model 2A. The order of the model is 1. It was 
chosen according to the results of the AIC criteria set out in the statistical appendix - 
Table 2A.  Insignificant regressors 4 and 7 were eliminated respectively in the model 
for the Northern and Southern region. A Jarque-Bera test was performed to check for 
normality of the residuals, followed by a lagranger-multiplier test for autocorrelation at 
lag order 4, and the test for the eigenvalue stability condition, shown respectively in 
tables 2B, 2C, and figure 2A in the statistical appendix. After controlling for the 
residuals analysis, I estimate a just-identified structural VAR and subsequently an over-
identified SVAR if contemporaneous effects of matrix A are not statistically significant.  
4.6.1 Identification Scheme 
The Cholesky decomposition implicitly imposes specific restrictions on the 
contemporaneous responses of the endogenous variables to the structural shocks. In 
particular, given the order of the endogenous variables, the identification scheme 
assumes that [ 𝐼 ]  contemporaneously affects [ 𝑈𝐿𝐶 𝐸𝑋 𝑈𝑟 ] , [ 𝑈𝐿𝐶 ] 
contemporaneously affects [ 𝐸𝑋 𝑈𝑟 ], while [ 𝐸𝑋 ]  contemporaneously impacts [ 𝑈𝑟 ].  
The identification of the shocks is anchored to the rationale of model 1A. In addition, 
unit labour costs enter as the second variable in the Cholesky order since it is assumed 
that higher unit labour costs simultaneously reduce exports, while higher investments 
should increase productivity and therefore decrease unit labour costs[23].  
4.6.2 Impulse Responses and Discussion 
The upper part of Table 2D - statistical appendix - shows the estimated direct causal 
effects of a just-identified SVAR to a structural shock of one standard deviation (in 
columns) on the endogenous variables (in rows), keeping all other variables constant. It 
summarizes the C matrix - the Cholesky - and the inverse A matrix. The lower part of 
the table shows the overall causal effects of an over-identified SVAR[24]. As can be 
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seen in figure 15, a standard deviation shock to [ 𝐼 ] decreases the growth rate of 
unemployment by 0.4% in the Northern region and by 1.1% in the South. Conversely, a 
unit shock to unemployment decreases the growth rate of [ 𝐼 ] in both regions by 0.2%. 
Nevertheless, clearly both effects have a stronger persistence in the Southern region, 
since the SIRF returns to 0 only after 8 quarters and after 2 quarters in the Northern 
region. These effects can be defined respectively as the seventh diverging factor and the 
fourth reinforcing factor.  
Insert about here Figure 15 
Model 2A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of the Unemployment 
rate to Investments Shock (First Raw) and of Investments to an Unemployment Shock. 
Another important fact that needs to be highlighted is the role played by unit labour 
costs. A unit shock to [ 𝑈𝐿𝐶 ] increases the growth rate of unemployment by 0.7% and 
0.9% in the Southern and Northern regions , and the growth rate of exports (figure 16) 
by 0.8% and 1.1% respectively. 
Insert about here Figure 16 
Model 2A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a Unit Labour Cost 
Shock. 
 
In the next and last model specification, [ 𝐼 ]  is decomposed into corporate investments 
(CI) and household investments (HHI). Table 1E, 1F, 1G, 1H and figure 1E - statistical 
appendix - respectively show the selection order criteria, normality test, autocorrelation 
test, the estimated direct causal effects, and the eigenvalue stability condition of the 
SVAR model as previously described for model 2A. 
For each region, figure 17 shows the estimated impulse response function of 
unemployment to a  [ 𝐶𝐼 ] and [ 𝐻𝐻𝐼 ] unit standard deviation shock, and vice versa. 
Each column represents the estimates for the Northern and Southern model respectively. 
Clearly, a unit shock to corporate investments (CI) decreases the unemployment growth 
rate in both regions by almost 0.5%; vice versa a unit shock to the unemployment 
growth rate decreases corporate investments by 0.4% (figure 17). This is the fifth 
reinforcing factor.   
Insert about here Figure 17 
Model 2B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of the Unemployment 
rate to a Unit Corporate Investment Shock (First Raw) and of Corporate Investments to 
an Unemployment Shock (Second Raw). 
 
In addition, a positive shock to household investments (HHI) does not have any effect 
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on unemployment in the Northern region and a negative effect of almost 0.2% in the 
Southern region; vice versa a unit shock to the unemployment growth rate decreases 
household investments by 0.5% in the Southern region, and has no effect in the 
Northern region (figure 18). In this case, the economic impact on the two regions is 
remarkably different, and is defined as the eighth diverging factor. 
Insert about here Figure 18 
Model 2B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of the Unemployment 
rate to a Unit Household Investment Shock (First Raw) and of Household Investments 
to an Unemployment Shock (Second Raw). 
 
Finally, the focus shifts to the role of unit labour costs in affecting exports and the 
unemployment rate. A unit shock to [ 𝑈𝐿𝐶 ] increases the growth rate of unemployment 
by 0.8% in both regions, and decreases the growth rate of exports respectively by 1,.2% 
and 0.9% in the Northern and Southern region (figure 19). This is the sixth reinforcing 
factor. 
Insert about here Figure 19 
Model 2B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a Unit Labour Cost 
Shock. 
 
4.7 Robustness Analysis 
In this section, model specifications 1A and 2A are augmented by including in the set of 
endogenous variables: government expenditure [ 𝐺 ], long-term interest rate [ 𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑅 ], 
and the real effective exchange rate [ 𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅 ]. Furthermore, the estimates are provided 
for 12 quarters ahead, so as to better appraise the persistence of the impulse response 
functions. The ordering of the variables does not change from model 1A. Precisely, the 
Cholesky order is the following: [ 𝐼 𝐺 𝐸𝑋 IM GDP LTIR REER ]. [ 𝐼 ]  has a 
contemporaneous effect on [𝐺 𝐸𝑋 IM GDP LTIR REER], and so on. Moreover, in line 
with the sequential elimination of regressors implemented in the previous models, over-
identified SVAR structural impulse response functions are estimated by setting 
elements 𝑎!" in the A matrix equal to 0 when the corresponding p-value is higher than 
0.1. According to this, the simultaneous impact of [ 𝐼 ] on [ 𝐺 ], which is not statistically 
significant, is set at 0. Nevertheless, the estimates of the orthogonalized impulse 
responses - unconstrained by definition - match the estimates of the structural impulse 
responses. Both are shown in the statistical appendix - figure 3A, 3B, and 3C. Overall, 
the inclusion of these additional control variables does not change the previously 
obtained results. Concerning the augmented model 2A, the endogenous variables added 
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are: [𝐺 IM LTIR REER]. Moreover, as a robustness check, ULC now enters the set of 
endogenous variables first. This allows the robustness of the estimates to the variable 
ordering to be tested. Accordingly, the new set of contemporaneous effects is: [ 𝑈𝐿𝐶 𝐼 𝐺 𝐸𝑋 IM Ur LTIR REER ]. The results are consistent with the previous model 
specification and are shown in figures 3D and 3E in the statistical appendix.  
Finally, since the second determinant of profits - government expenditure - now enters 
the equation system as an endogenous variable, we can assess the impact of a unit 
standard deviation shock to G on investments and gross domestic product. Figure 20 
shows the cumulative impulse responses[25].  
Insert about here Figure 20 
Model 1A - Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Responses to a Government 
Expenditure Shock. 
 
Clearly the effect of a government expenditure shock on both investments and GDP is 
similar in the two regions. To be precise, after 12 quarters they increase by 0.8% in the 
Southern region and by 0.7% in the Northern region. This can be defined as the seventh 
reinforcing factor.  
The robustness of the estimates provided for the different model specifications was 
verified for the data sample preceding the crisis, i.e., between 1999q1 and 2008q1. The 
findings do not differ significantly from those reported and discussed. This strongly 
reinforces the contents of section 5 - policy implications[26]. 
The next paragraph sets out a comprehensive and critical assessment of the eight 
diverging factors and seven reinforcing factors. 
4.8 Summary of the Results 
This section discusses the results presented in sections 4.5 and 4.6 more 
comprehensively. The factors characterizing each region’s economic structure and 
ability to respond to shocks are divided into two categories to capture the forces creating 
and exacerbating divergence.  
Diverging factors (DF) are classified as shocks that have significantly different impacts 
on the two blocks. This categorization helps to highlight the structural differences, the 
reason why ‘a one size fits all policy’ may not be the right tool to create convergence in 
the Euro Area. The reinforcing factors (RF) are classified as the shocks that have 
similar responses in the two regions. This set draws attention to how asymmetric shocks 
may be a source of divergence in the two regions.  
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This classification is especially important for the post-crisis analysis of the drivers of 
the Euro Area divergence process, as pointed out in section 3 - stylized facts. The 
analysis collected evidence for eight diverging factors and seven reinforcing factors, 
which is shown in table 1. The importance exports played in the recovery in Northern 
countries by directly and indirectly (through the growth rate of investments, I.DF and 
II.DF) boosting GDP growth is clear. A negative shock to investments, as occurred after 
the crisis, was easily offset by an increase of the flow of profits through the export 
channel in the Northern region, but not to the same extent in the South.  
A second feature of the analysis links the behaviour of the two regions. A shock to 
exports leads to a remarkable increase in the savings rate in the Northern region, four 
times larger than the effect in the Southern region. This provides evidence of retaining-
profit behaviour of the Northern region (III.DF). Furthermore, a shock to imports in the 
Southern region boosts GDP growth in the Northern region within 8 quarters by 1% 
compared to only 0.2% in the Southern region (IV.DF). This indicates the reliance of 
the growth strategy of the Northern region on the import capacity of the South, and not 
vice versa. Thus, an under-performing Southern region may directly negatively affect 
the growth rate in Northern countries. This is an important point for policy-makers since 
the Euro Area relies on growth complementarity. It means that by stimulating recovery 
in the Southern region through the import channel, the Northern region may in turn 
enjoy larger export volumes to that destination. This may lead to a win-win strategy for 
Euro Area members. Nevertheless, these diverging factors - II.DF and III.DF - are also 
consistent with the Stockhammer (2015) hypothesis i.e., that the export-led model of the 
Northern region benefits from the increasing indebtedness of the Southern region, the 
result of strong import dependence and low export volumes.    
Finally, disentangling investment drivers into corporate and household investments, 
shows that the Northern region relies much more on the former, while the Southern 
region relies equally on both (V.DF). This diversity reinforces two points made 
previously: first, the Southern region, which faced a drastic fall in HHI and CI in the 
post-crisis period - figure 4 - suffered considerable damage to its growth fundamentals. 
A massive injection of profits in the Southern region through government spending 
would have been necessary to sustain the drastic fall in investments. Second, the 
economy of the region is more inward-looking.   
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Table 1. Summary of the Impulse - Response Analysis 
 
Concerning the reinforcing factors, asymmetric shocks contributed to triggering 
divergence through two major self-reinforcing mechanisms: I) an investment-growth 
feedback process (tick-dashed-dotted line in table 1); and II) the investment-
unemployment loop (tick-dashed line in table 1). Lower growth in investments leads 
directly to lower GDP growth (I.RF), and in turn to lower investments (II.RF). 
Especially, the reinforcing mechanism that a falling GDP may have on CI and HHI 
(VI.DF) is indicative of the vicious circle the Southern region has fallen into. Moreover, 
lower CI leads to lower EX (III.RF), which in turn directly affects GDP growth, and 
indirectly impacts on investments. This channel is especially important in the Northern 
region since the coefficients are larger compared to the South. In contrast, the 
investment-unemployment loop is of crucial importance in the Southern region, and this 
provides further evidence of why the Southern region is still undergoing a weak 
recovery. As can be seen, a negative shock to investments simultaneously increases the 
growth rate of unemployment by 1.1%. This first effect has clear negative lagged effects 
on CI and HHI which decrease by 0.4% and 0.5%, respectively (V.RF and VIII.DF). 
Moreover, the persistence of the shock and its amplification forces are much stronger in 
SIRF COIRF** SIRF COIRF**
I(Diverging(Factor 1A EX GDP 0,2% 0,5% 0,4% 0,9%
II(Diverging(Factor 1A EX I 0,2% 0,5% 0,6% 1,3%
III(Diverging(Factor 1B EX Sw 1,0% 2,6% 3,5% 9,1%
IV(Diverging(Factor 1C Foreign(IM GDP 0,1% 0,2% 0,3% 1,0%
V(Diverging(Factor 1D CI( GDP 0,1% 0,2% 0,3% 0,6%
HHI GDP 0,1%* 0,5% / 0,1%
VI(Diverging(Factor 1D GDP CI( 1,0%* 2,8% 0,5% 0,3%
GDP HHI 1,0%* 3,5% 0,5% 0,3%
VII(Diverging(Factor 2A I Ur K1,1% K5,9% K0,4% K0,7%
VIII(Diverging(Factor 2B HHI Ur K0,2% K0,6% / /
Ur HHI K0,5% K1,8% / /
I(Reinforcing(Factor 1A I GDP 0,3% 1,1% 0,4% 0,5%
II(Reinforcing(Factor 1A GDP I 0,4% 1,6% 0,4% 0,7%
III(Reinforcing(Factor 1D CI EX 1,5% 1,1% 1,5% 1,4%
EX CI 0,7% 2,2% 0,7% 2,2%
IV(Reinforcing(Factor 2A Ur I K0,2% K0,8% K0,2% K0,1%
V(Reinforcing(Factor 2B CI Ur K0,5% K1,1% K0,5% K2,4%
Ur CI K0,4% K1,4% K0,4% K0,7%
VI(Reinforcing(Factor 2B ULC Ur 0,9% 2,7% 1,2% 4,7%
ULC Ex K0,9% K1,7% K1,1% K2,5%
VII(Reinforcing(Factor 1A G I / 0,6% / 0,5%
G GDP / 0,6% / 0,6%
*(More(Persistency(in(the(Overall(Effect.
**(Cumulative(Effect(8(Quarters.
Effects(that((are(similar(
across(the(two(blocks,(
leading(to(a(divergence(
process(in(case(of(
asymmetric(shocks.
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RESULTS
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Effects(that((strongly(
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the Southern region. The cumulative effect within 8 quarters of a negative investment 
shock to the unemployment rate is almost 5.9% in the South, and just 0.7% in the North 
(VII.DF). This is evidence of hysteresis, i.e., current and past economic conditions 
affect future levels of output and employment. The stronger persistence of negative and 
positive effects of shocks in the South shows the need for policy-makers to implement 
countercyclical policies when the economy is in recession as well as in expansion.   
5. Policy Implications 
By characterizing the specific structural features of the Southern and the Northern 
regions, this analysis implicitly highlights the massive economic heterogeneity of the 
Euro Area. Clear differences, and some similarities were detected in the way the two 
economic regions respond to shocks. On the one hand, the Southern region has a more 
inward-looking and domestic demand-driven posture, i.e., it is more susceptible to a 
self-sustaining or self-defeating process than the Northern region. On the other hand, the 
Northern region is more exposed and vulnerable to external shocks, although its 
recovery is faster and is helped by foreign markets. One of the reasons for these 
asymmetric responses is the relative degree of openness. Exports in the Northern region 
weigh as much as domestic consumption, whereas, in the Southern region, consumption 
and investments comprise a major portion of total expenditure, making the role of 
government expenditure in sustaining domestic income in times of crisis even more 
critical. 
Moreover, as Stadler states, “many innovations in technology take place in response to 
market conditions, particularly demand conditions….and endogenous technical change 
acts as propagation mechanism for shocks that have only transitory effects” (1990: 777).  
If this is true, then the vicious circle of lower investment - higher unemployment - lower 
investment (I-U-I) may determine a permanent downward-shift in the aggregate 
production function. Blanchard et al. (2015: 3) have shown that recessions may have 
“permanent effects on the level of output relative to trend”, meaning that cyclical shocks 
matter not only in the medium-term, but also in the long-run. This is the essence of 
hysteresis in economic growth: a temporary higher level of unemployment, and a lower 
level of investment and so of productivity leads to permanent effects on potential 
output. On this specific point, the practical policy implications of Minsky’s analysis 
address this issue: ‘big governments’ are necessary to prevent a temporary downturn 
becoming a deep recession with long-lasting consequences. 
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The export-oriented economies of the Northern region were hit more strongly in the 
aftermath of the crisis - between 2009 and 2010 - but then, due to the positive effects of 
the fiscal stimuli implemented worldwide and absorbed through the export channel, 
recovery took place without a backlash. It is important to note that, in order to avoid a 
sharp fall in investments, the southern region should have sustained the profit index 
with much stronger government intervention. France and Spain (unlike Italy) partially 
implemented an expansionary fiscal policy, but it was clearly insufficient[27]. Indeed, 
fiscal policy was constrained by the subsequent sovereign crisis and by financial 
speculation, which further weakened the already weak stimulus under the Stability and 
Growth pact. Indeed, the EU infringement procedure gave precise targets to speculators 
during the sovereign debt crisis, and this, in turn, led governments to pursue self-
defeating recovery policies. As pointed out by Arestis et al. (2001: 118) “this system of 
financial penalties for breaches of the budget deficit criterion implies that deflationary 
fiscal policies will continue, and indeed intensify, as those countries that just meet the 
3% requirement in conditions of cyclical upswing will have to tighten their fiscal stance 
to meet the 3% requirement in times of cyclical downswing”. However, this is only part 
of the story, which is rooted in the beliefs of European policy-makers in the positive 
effects sustainable public finance has on confidence (Konzelmann 2014: 727). Although 
many are convinced of the macroeconomic importance of sustainable and solid public 
finances, the belief that in the aftermath of a crisis austerity measures would restore 
confidence was misguided. As stated by Laski and Podkaminer (2012: 264) “… 
attempts at suppressing the deficits emerging (or rising) under growth deceleration may 
be counterproductive as far as both real growth and fiscal positions are concerned”. 
Though, austerity measures were strongly recommended and implemented, they 
widened the divergence. The investment-growth feedback process and the vicious circle 
I-U-I affected the economy more than proportionally through the multiplier effect 
described in section 2. Although the shocks and type of propagation mechanism are 
different in the two regions, the same treatment, involving, austerity measures, was 
adopted by both economies. Clearly, this proved to be a self-defeating tool in the 
Southern region, and “not only [did] not achieve its objective but [led] to a higher debt-
to-GDP ratio” (Fatàs and Summers 2015: 27). This analysis complements the evidence 
of DeLong and Summers (2012), underlining the factors by which fiscal consolidation 
produced precisely opposite outcomes in the North and South, i.e., strong recovery in 
the former and a permanent reduction of output and chronic high level of 
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unemployment in the latter: the big divergence[28].  
It was well-known back in the 60s that within a monetary union asymmetric shocks 
through so-called reinforcing factors are the main source of economic divergence 
(Meade 1957; Mundell 1961). Nevertheless, it has been clarified that given the strong 
economic and structural heterogeneity of the Euro Area - here divided into the Northern 
and Southern regions - common shocks, may to the same extent become a non-
negligible source of instability. Common shocks played a crucial role in exacerbating 
divergence in the aftermath of the crisis because the fiscal and monetary responses 
produced asymmetric effects, and hence asymmetric benefits[29]. The recovery may 
vary across countries, and can be slower and harsher depending on the type of stimuli 
deployed and on initial conditions, such as the level of debt, unemployment rate, profit 
index, and the state of confidence in the economy, factors that affect a country’s ability 
to respond to shocks. This asymmetry in the effects and measures taken led to further 
de-synchronization in the business cycles of countries, creating the so-called two-speed 
Euro.  
At this stage, the common shock has become asymmetric, and its burden for almost its 
entirety has been transferred from the European political debate to the national political 
sphere. Each member in different ways is left to deal with it, although fiscal policy is 
limited and monetary policy is shared. At this point, divergence starts to magnify the 
consequences of the initial shock, reinforcing structural differences and exacerbating 
asymmetry in the ability to respond to shocks. Endogenously, weak heterogeneity 
becomes strong in terms of a country’s ability to produce and create employment, and in 
the way countries support each other, and finally, in the way weaker countries benefit 
from, and in turn, perceive the common currency. Therefore, economic heterogeneity 
increases the cultural and political distance between members, making the EMU and the 
EU integration process slower and weaker. In such a context, Europe has tried to tackle 
some of the spillovers, the banking crisis through the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (Covi 2016), leaving the sovereign and economic crises to the temporary 
remedies of the European Central Bank, which, although theoretically the most neutral 
European institution, has been the most active on both sides.  
Indeed, an urgent rethinking of the direction the Euro Area aims to pursue needs to 
place, along with the required tools and national and supranational areas of 
responsibility. This is the key factor determining the potential for further integration and 
social cohesion, or increasing isolation and fragility. The former aim led twelve 
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members to sign the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht on 7 February 1992,, 
which established the European Economic Community - clearly defined in Title II - Art. 
G-2 – as follows:  
The Community shall have as its task….. to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and 
balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the 
environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level of employment and of 
social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States.  
Most of these founding principles have been completely left behind, abandoning the 
essence of what European Union means. Since the great depression the same problems 
have persisted in our economic system, demonstrating that in capitalist economies 
instability arises endogenously and very suddenly. In such a macroeconomic context, 
European institutions need to be strengthened - first of all - to prevent members of the 
community from ending up isolated and left behind, as in the case of Greece. Maastricht 
viewed the European Economic Community as an inclusive, not exclusive, group of 
countries; cohesion is the greatest aim and the lack of it the most significant failure of 
the treaty.  
Hence, a rethinking of the European macro-mechanism is needed: a common and 
agreed European growth strategy, which goes beyond the short-sighted approach of 
national governments, and gives a precise direction to European economic policy by 
defining clear objectives in terms of unemployment, inequalities and sustainable 
growth[30].  
Alternative and complementary devices and proposals to the current EU architecture 
have been discussed in the literature: Arestis et al. (2001) regarding a ‘New Full 
Employment, Growth and Stability Pact’, Bibow (2015) for a ‘Euro Tresury’, and 
Claessens et al. (2012) on ‘Euro Bonds’. Non-discretionary fiscal rules need to be 
shared as long as the cornerstones of a ‘transfer union’ remain elusive. In addition, a 
trade-off exists between increasing the 3% of GDP limit on national budget deficits and 
strengthening the European budget. Although the 3% fiscal deficit is too small to absorb 
shocks, an excessive burden on national public finances may be a destabilizing factor 
given the already high public debt overhang. For these reasons, the EU budget which is 
1% of EU GDP (and 40% of which is spent on Agriculture) needs to be enlarged in 
order to play an active pro-convergence role (Pasimeni 2014; Cottarelli 2016).  Second, 
a Euro Treasury may be a viable solution to guarantee a long-term homogenous 
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investment plan, to alleviate pressure on national governments cutting public 
investments (to avoid a EU budget infringement procedure), and to pragmatically enable 
the fall in national public debt ratios to low and safe levels.  
Moreover, these new institutional arrangements need to be accompanied by 
complementary structural reforms directed at creating tightened coordination between 
Euro Area members. Hence, labour market reforms need to be settled jointly since the 
natural response to unemployment differentials within a monetary union should be a 
high degree of labour mobility (Scitovsky 1958; Mundell 1961).  Similarly, wage 
policies need to be agreed given cross-border spillovers, and their role in the creation of 
European imbalances (Stockhammer, 2007; 2008; Naastepad and Storm, 2017; Covi 
2017). Here, an important point needs to be clarified. Arestis and Sawyer (1998: 188) 
summarize the heart of Kaleckian reasoning[31]: “the national income accounting 
counterpart of a budget deficit is some combination of net private savings (savings 
minus investments) and trade deficit (capital inflow). According to this, there is an 
intertwined relationship between Euro Area trade imbalances and national budget 
deficits. This implies that a rebalancing of intra-EA trade flows is a necessary condition 
to achieve balanced national public finances. A transfer union directly tackles most of 
the issues here discussed, although it implies a loss of political independence and a 
higher degree of cultural and social integration. As Kaldor writes (1970: 345) “… a 
region which forms part of a political community… automatically gets aid whenever its 
trading relations with the rest of the country deteriorates”.   
Overall, a gradual shift towards deeper macroeconomic cooperation should be seen as 
an essential step in achieving further political integration in order slowly to settle on a 
second macro-mechanism that for the future of the Eurozone needs to transfer the 
burden of adjustment from the national to the monetary union level. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
By using the Minsky-Kaleckian theoretical framework, the paper interprets and 
discusses the sources of instability and fragility in the European monetary union. The 
focus is on reinforcing and diverging factors which endogenously produce divergence in 
unemployment and growth differentials, culminating in the post-crisis period. The 
SVAR approach shows that the two regions have intrinsically different economic 
structures, leading to the conclusion that a ‘one size fits all policy’ is detrimental to the 
economic and political prosperity of the Euro area. These differences reflect the 
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asymmetries in the region’s ability to respond to shocks, and the symmetries in the 
recovery measures allowed and fostered major divergence. Furthermore, the lack of an 
effective supranational rebalancing mechanism abandoned them to themselves without 
tools to fight the unavoidable. The dynamics of corporate and household investments 
and exports differed remarkably both before and after the crisis, reflecting the strong 
economic heterogeneity of the Euro Area. Empirical evidence confirms the role of 
investments as the key variable in determining swings in the business cycle, their role in 
shaping the growth differentials between the Northern and Southern region, and how the 
unemployment rate is affected by, and in turn affects, the investment rate. The result is 
that the creation of a countercyclical investment mechanism within the Monetary Union 
is crucial, since the necessary macroeconomic tools and conditions to smoothly comply 
with a fair and balanced growth pact are lacking. Given that institutions are the 
fundamental cause of long-run growth, and particular events at critical junctures have 
long-lasting effects (Acemoglu et al. 2004), a rethinking of the European macro-
mechanism may still convert divergence into convergence.  
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Footnotes 
[1] This division resembles Stockhammer and Wildauer (2016). Only countries that joined the 
Euro at its inception - 1999 - were taken into consideration for a homogenous length of the time 
series. For Greece and Luxemburg data is lacking for empirical analysis, and Finland and 
Ireland resemble neither the Southern nor the Northern model.  
[2] Minsky (1982: 44) emphasizes that the role of the fifth determinant - consumption out of 
profits - to a large extent depends on interpreting “the allocation of profits to salaries, research, 
advertising, and ‘business style’ expenditures…the allocation of profits to consumption follows 
from the building of a bureaucratic business style, which, like inherited debt, may lead to 
current period ‘uncontrolled’ expenditures”. Since in the empirical literature it is difficult to find 
a proxy for this variable, and since it is of small magnitude and is relevant mainly in a 
sophisticated financial economy, it is omitted from the analysis. 
[3] Therefore, the profit function has a multiplicative behaviour of degree one or higher 
depending on the uses to which these export revenues are put. The same holds for investments, 
the budget deficit, savings out of wages, and consumption out of profits. 
[4] All the data are on a quarterly basis, at constant prices, and seasonally adjusted. The OECD 
is the source for all the variables except savings out of wages which was taken from Eurostat. 
Using the trade balance instead of the current account does not change the analysis. The two are 
almost identical. 
[5] Government expenditure is used since for the budget deficit data for Germany and Austria 
are not available for the period Q1-1999 to Q4-2001 and Q1-1999 to Q4-2000, respectively. 
Nevertheless, total government revenues are stable over time and, therefore, variations in the 
deficit are mainly driven by variations in government expenditure. In this respect, the level of 
the profit index is higher, but the variation is not affected much. Moreover, most empirical 
studies investigating fiscal multipliers use government expenditures as a proxy for fiscal shock 
(Corsetti and Muller 2006; Beetsma and Giuliodori 2011). 
[6] In the Northern region, Germany counts for almost 70%, the Netherlands 16%, Belgium 
10% and Austria 7%, while in the Southern region France has a weighting of 40%, Italy 35%, 
Spain 21%, and Portugal 4%. Although the Northern region pattern is mainly driven by the 
German economy, the other countries have a similar trend in the trade balance, wage index and 
debt level (see: Stockhammer 2015; Stockhammer and Wildauer 2016; and Covi 2017).  
[7] The remaining one-third comes from private-financial corporations such as banks and 
insurance companies. 
[8] The investment decomposition has been exploited according to a new quarterly dataset 
provided by Eurostat, and represents one of the novelties of the research, as well as a major 
contribution to the empirical literature. 
[9] Government consumption expenditure is deemed exogenous for two main reasons: 1) it is 
the only variable directly under government control and because “austerity measures” set an 
exogenous limit to its growth; 2) the Wald-test does not reject the hypothesis that the interaction 
between G and the coefficients of other endogenous variables are simultaneously equal to zero. 
For this reason, government consumption expenditure is used as a control variable in all the 
following models. Nevertheless, in robustness checks it is included as an endogenous 
component and results do not change.  
[10] Empirical literature has extensively discussed whether government expenditure should be 
treated as an endogenous or exogenous variable, i.e., whether it fluctuates and responds to GDP 
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shocks or is mainly driven by the fiscal policy of the government. For this reason, to check 
robustness, government expenditure is added to the set of endogenous variables in section 4.6. 
[11] The results are also robust to a different lag-length. 
[12] This is a necessary condition, but not sufficient in itself. 
[13] The standard approach to recover the structural shocks is the strategy of short-run 
restrictions originally developed by Sims (1980): the Cholesky decomposition imposes a Wold 
causal order on the variables so that the shock to𝑌!feeds contemporaneously into 𝑌!,𝑌!, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌! 
while the shock to Y2 feeds contemporaneously into 𝑌!,𝑌!, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌!, but into 𝑌! only with a lag, 
and so on. The order of the 𝑌!" in the vector 𝑌! is arbitrary; but, for each such ordering, the 
Choleski decomposition is unique. 
[14] It is assumed here that 𝑥! = 0. 
[15] This procedure is different from testing hypotheses concerning the contemporaneous 
effects of shocks on the coefficients of matrix A as in Stockhammer and Onaram (2004). 
[16] Exports are directly correlated with the production capacity of the economy, and therefore 
come after investment in the Cholesky order. 
[17] In this specific case, switching the ordering of imports and exports does not change the 
results. 
[18] I reverse the signs of the off-diagonal entries of the A matrix to simplify interpretation. 
[19] All the parameters of an over-identified SVAR are statistically significant at 10% levels, 
since all the variables not statistically significant in a just-identified SVAR were set equal to 0. 
[20] This contributes to the discussion that a higher expenditure on foreign goods from the 
Northern countries may directly hamper their economic growth due to their growth model. On 
the contrary, in the Southern region lower imports of intermediate goods have a direct effect on 
final output - export capacity. 
[21] The model was estimated following the same procedure as for Model 1A. Concerning the 
order of the shocks, savings out of wages enter the system of equations as the last endogenous 
variable before GDP growth.  
[22] The order of the shocks is the following: GFCF, (IM-S/N), EX, IM, GDP. 
[23] Results are robust even if ULC is ordered first. 
[24] All the parameters of an over-identified SVAR are statistically significant at 10% levels, 
since all the variables not statistically significant in a just-identified SVAR were set at 0. I 
reverse the signs of the off-diagonal entries of the A matrix to simplify interpretation. 
[25] The estimates are shown as cumulative responses to highlight the fiscal multiplier, and the 
critical role that fiscal policy plays à la Minsky in sustaining investments, and thus economic 
recovery after deep recession. Note that the fiscal impact is larger in recessions than during 
expansions, and these estimates refer to the average effect during the period 1999 and 2015 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2011). 
[26] Estimates for the impulse response functions are available on request. For the sake of 
brevity, they are not included in the text.  
[27] Unemployment in France and Spain were twice as high as in Germany. See Bibow (2013) 
for a comprehensive analysis of the Franco-German contradiction. 
[28] They claimed that austerity policies not only caused significant temporary damage to 
growth but achieved the opposite outcome by permanently reducing output (De Long and 
Summers 2012: 234). 
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[29]  “… the monetary union probably exacerbated these national booms and busts. Second, the 
existing stabilizers that existed at the national level prior to the start of the union were stripped 
away from the member-states without being transposed at the monetary union level. This left 
the member states “naked” and fragile, unable to deal with the coming national disturbances” 
(De Grauwe 2013: 5). 
[30] As De Grawue says (2013: 5) “the endogenous dynamics of booms and busts continued to 
work at the national level and that the monetary union in no way disciplined these into a union-
wide dynamics”. 
[31] See the discussion in Chapter 2, page 7. 
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Figure 1. Profit Index at Country Level  
Source: OECD and Eurostat Database; Author’s Calculations. 
 
  
Figure 2: The Profit Index  
Source: OECD and Eurostat Database; Author’s Calculations. 
Note: The Northern Block is composed by Germany, Austria, Belgium and Netherlands, while 
the Southern one by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
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Figure 3. Evolutions of the Four Determinants of Profits  
Source: OECD and Eurostat Database; Author’s Calculations. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4. Investment Decomposition 
Source: Eurostat database, author’s calculations.  
Note: Corporate Investments refer to non-financial corporations’ gross fixed capital formation: 
buildings, machinery, software, and major improvements to fixed assets. Dwellings account for 
most of households' investment. The residual part includes the investment in equipment, 
machinery, transport equipment and constructions other than dwellings by the self-employed 
workers and Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households. 
 117 
 
    
Figure 5. The Big Divergence 
Source: OECD and Eurostat Database; Author’s Calculations.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Model 1A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to an Export, 
Investment and Import Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Exports, Imports, and GDP. The Shock is a unit 
standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% 
confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % 
points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
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Figure 7. Model 1A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to an Export Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Exports, Imports, and GDP. The Shock is a unit 
standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% 
confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % 
points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Model 1A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a GDP Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Exports, Imports, and GDP. The Shock is a unit standard 
deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for 
structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, 
i.e two years. 
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Figure 9. Model 1B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to a Saving 
Shock (First Raw) and of Savings to an Export Shock (Second Raw).  
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Exports, Imports, Savings and GDP. The Shock is a 
unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% 
confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % 
points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 10. Model 1C - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to Import 
Shock of the Opposite Block.  
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Imports from the Opposite Blocks, Exports, 
Imports, and GDP. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light 
and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, 
respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
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Figure 11. Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of GDP to a Shock to 
Corporate Investments, Exports, Households’ Investment and Imports. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is corporate investment, exports, households’ investment, Imports 
and GDP. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark 
grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. 
The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
 
Figure 12. Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to an Export Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is corporate investment, exports, households’ investment, imports 
and GDP. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark 
grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. 
The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
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Figure 13. Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a Corporate 
Investment Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is corporate investment, exports, households’ investment, imports 
and GDP. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark 
grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. 
The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Model 1D - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a GDP Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is corporate investment, exports, households’ investment, imports 
and GDP. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark 
grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. 
The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
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Figure 15. Model 2A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of the Unemployment 
rate to Investments Shock (First Raw) and of Investments to an Unemployment Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is investments, unit labour costs, exports, and the unemployment 
rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey 
area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The 
Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
 
 
Figure 16. Model 2A - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a Unit Labour Cost 
Shock.  
Note: The Variable Ordering is investments, unit labour costs, exports, and the unemployment 
rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey 
area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The 
Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e two years. 
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Figure 17. Model 2B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of the Unemployment 
rate to a Unit Corporate Investment Shock (First Raw) and of Corporate Investments to an 
Unemployment Shock (Second Raw).   
Note: The Variable Ordering is corporate investments, unit labour costs, households’ 
investments, exports, and the unemployment rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid 
lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural 
and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, 
i.e two years. 
    
  
Figure 18. Model 2B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses of the Unemployment 
rate to a Unit Households’ Investment Shock (First Raw) and of Households’ Investments to an 
Unemployment Shock (Second Raw). 
Note: The Variable Ordering is corporate investments, unit labour costs, households’ 
investments, exports, and the unemployment rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid 
lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural 
and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, 
i.e two years. 
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Figure 19. Model 2B - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse Responses to a Unit Labour Cost 
Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is corporate investments, unit labour costs, households’ 
investments, exports, and the unemployment rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid 
lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural 
and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, 
i.e two years. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Model 1A - Cumulative Orthogonalized Impulse Responses to a Government 
Expenditure Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Government Expenditure, Exports, Imports, GDP, 
long-term interest rate, and real effective exchange rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. 
Solid lines are point estimates, dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions, respectively. The 
Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e three years. 
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Statistical Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A. Unit Root Test - ADF 
 
 
 
 
Table B. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Augmented)Dickey/Fuller)test)for)unit)root))
VARIABLES Δ*log*GDP Δ*log*GFCF Δ*log*EX Δ*log*IM Δ*log*SW Δ*log*G Δ*log*CI Δ*log*HHI Δ*log*Ur Δ*log*ULC
Test*Statistic
South B2,9*** B2,616*** B3,81*** B3,587*** B5,62*** B1,64* B5,04*** B3,14*** B2,480** B2,296**
Test*Statistic
North B3,66*** B4,34*** B3,68*** B3,67*** B5,42*** B3,62** B4,3*** B5,37*** B2,815*** B3,433***
No*Constant,*lag*order*(1),**Number*of*obs**=**62
****CV*at*1%*(B2,615),****CV*at*5%*(B1,95),***CV*at*10%*(B1,61).
VARIABLES Obs Mean Std.3Dev. Min Max Mean Std.3Dev. Min Max
Δ3log3GDP 64 0,26% 0,59% F2,11% 1,25% 0,33% 0,77% F3,88% 1,68%
Δ3log3GFCF 64 0,12% 1,36% F4,72% 2,45% 0,24% 1,80% F8,03% 5,14%
Δ3log3G 64 0,37% 0,39% F0,42% 1,29% 0,36% 0,53% F1,00% 1,75%
Δ3log3EX 64 0,75% 2,08% F8,98% 3,66% 1,19% 2,26% F10,72% 5,75%
Δ3log3IM 64 0,70% 2,07% F8,50% 3,78% 1,01% 1,96% F7,52% 5,77%
Δ3log3SW 64 F0,47% 4,23% F29,30% 2,59% 0,68% 9,41% F51,85% 29,89%
Δ3log3CI 64 0,64% 3,41% F9,28% 9,70% 0,52% 2,79% F10,11% 7,41%
Δ3log3HHI 64 0,37% 3,06% F6,37% 11,91% 0,28% 2,61% F4,54% 7,61%
Δ3log3ULC 64 0,46% 0,55% F0,86% 1,97% 0,29% 0,67% F0,86% 3,33%
Δ3log3Ur 64 0,40% 2,98% F4,02% 13,09% F0,54% 2,67% F5,31% 5,31%
Note:3Quaterly3Changes
Southern3BlockDescriptive*Statistics Northern3Block
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Model 1A  
Table 1A. Selection Order Criteria 
 
 
Table 1B. Jarque-Bera Normality test 
 
Table 1C. Lagranger-Multiplier test 
 
 
Figure 1A. Eigenvalue Stability Condition – SB (LHS) NB (RHS) 
 
Lag FPE AIC HQIC SBIC FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 1,20E217 227,5858 227,3127 226,8876 1,10E216 225,3955 225.1224* 224.6973*
1 4,3e218* 228,6386* 228,1471* 227,382* 9,0e217* 225,6028* 225,1113 224,3462
2 5,10E218 228,4944 227,7844 226,6793 1,20E216 225,3778 224,6679 223,5627
3 5,90E218 228,3834 227,455 226,0098 1,20E216 225,3733 224,4449 222,9997
4 5,60E218 228,4946 227,3477 225,5625 1,60E216 225,142 223,9951 222,2099
Sample:A2000q222015q1,ANumberAofAobsA=A60
Endogenous:AΔAlogAGFCF,AΔAlogAEX,AΔAlogAIM,AΔAlogAGDP
Exogenous:AΔAlogAG,Aq1,Aq2,Aq3,Aq4
Selection)order,criteria NorthenABlockSouthernABlock
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Equation chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
Δ)log)GFCF 2,794 2 0,24731 0,302 2 0,85966
Δ)log)EX 0,582 2 0,74733 4,681 2 0,09627
Δ)log)IM 6,063 2 0,04823 0,801 2 0,67009
Δ)log)GDP 0,108 2 0,94746 0,965 2 0,61718
ALL 9,548 8 0,29819 6,750 8 0,56388
Sample:)2000q2Q2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)Normality
Jarque'Bera)test
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Lag chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
1 22,5280 16 0,12695 15,1677 16 0,51239
2 13,8409 16 0,61057 14,7547 16 0,54267
3 21,2701 16 0,16836 17,0815 16 0,38034
4 24,1478 16 0,08633 13,9394 16 0,60323
Sample:)2000q2G2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)No)autocorrelation)at)lag)order.
Lagrange'multiplier.test
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Table 1D. Model 1A - Direct Effects: Cholesky and Inverse A matrix 
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Model 1D 
Table 1E. Selection Order Criteria 
 
Table 1F. Jarque-Bera Normality test 
 
Table 1G. Lagranger-Multiplier test 
 
Figure 1E. Eigenvalue Stability Condition – SB (LHS) NB (RHS) 
 
Lag FPE AIC HQIC SBIC FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 8,0e220 229,7842 229,4428 228,9115 2,40E219 228,6972 228,3558 227,8245*
1 2,4e220 230,9842 230,3016 229,2389* 1,3e219* 229,3519* 228,6692* 227,6066
2 1,8e220* 231,3344 230,3104* 228,7165 1,90E219 228,9772 227,9532 226,3593
3 2,6e220 231,0297 229,6643 227,5391 1,60E219 229,2118 227,8464 225,7212
4 2,0e220 231,4627* 229,756 227,0995 2,00E219 229,1311 227,4244 224,7679
Sample:@2000q222015q1,@Number@of@obs@=@60
Endogenous:@Δ@log@CI,@Δ@log@EX,@Δ@log@HHI,@Δ@log@IM,@Δ@log@GDP
Exogenous:@Δ@log@G,@q1,@q2,@q3,@q4
Selection)order,criteria Southern@Block Northen@Block
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Equation chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
Δ)log)CI 1,137 2 0,56639 0,792 2 0,67299
Δ)log)EX 7,468 2 0,02389 0,5617 2 0,0603
Δ)log)HHI 1,361 2 0,50641 1,403 2 0,49591
Δ)log)IM 12,358 2 0,00207 4,573 2 0,10162
Δ)log)GDP 3,535 2 0,17079 0,74 2 0,69061
ALL 25,859 10 0,00393 13,125 10 0,21677
Sample:)2000q2Q2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)Normality
Jarque'Bera)test
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Lag chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
1 14,5054 25 0,95219 16,5353 25 0,89795
2 29,7217 25 0,23488 22,5035 25 0,60653
3 20,7259 25 0,70779 29,3836 25 0,2482
4 32,4464 25 0,1455 37,9270 25 0,04703
Sample:)2000q2G2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)No)autocorrelation)at)lag)order.
Lagrange'multiplier.test
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Table 1H. Model 1D - Direct Effects: Cholesky and Inverse A matrix 
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Model 2A 
Table 2A. Selection Order Criteria 
 
Table 2B. Jarque-Bera Normality test 
 
Table 2C. Lagranger-Multiplier test 
 
Figure 2A. Eigenvalue Stability Condition - SB (LHS) NB (RHS) 
  
 
Lag FPE AIC HQIC SBIC FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 2,300E216 224,67 224,40 223,97 1,20E215 223,04 222,77 222,35
1 8,3e217* 225,68* 225,19* 224,42* 2,6e216* 224,54* 224,05* 223,28*
2 1,000E216 225,47 224,76 223,66 3,60E216 224,23 223,52 222,41
3 9,900E217 225,57 224,64 223,19 4,70E216 224,01 223,08 221,63
4 1,200E216 225,46 224,31 222,52 5,70E216 223,88 222,73 220,95
Sample:@2000q222015q1,@Number@of@obs@=@60
Endogenous:@Δ@log@GFCF,@Δ@log@ULC,@@Δ@log@EX,@Δ@log@Ur
Exogenous:@Δ@log@G,@q1,@q2,@q3,@q4
Selection)order,criteria Southern@Block Northen@Block
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Equation chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
Δ)log)GFCF 1,36 2 0,50643 0,013 2 0,99343
Δ)log)ULC 3,08 2 0,21395 10,23 2 0,006
Δ)log)EX 0,11 2 0,94747 13,94 2 0,00094
Δ)log)Ur 1,55 2 0,45974 1,64 2 0,44047
ALL 6,11 8 0,63526 25,82 8 0,00113
Sample:)2000q2O2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)Normality
Jarque'Bera)test
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Lag chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
1 10,62 16 0,83245 14,75 16 0,54295
2 20,88 16 0,18318 14,93 16 0,52995
3 23,44 16 0,10245 12,38 16 0,71734
4 9,89 16 0,87247 11,17 16 0,7986
Sample:)2000q2G2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)No)autocorrelation)at)lag)order.
Lagrange'multiplier.test
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Table 2D. Model 2A - Direct Effects: Cholesky and Inverse A matrix 
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Model 2B 
Table 2E. Selection Order Criteria 
 
Table 2F. Jarque-Bera Normality test 
 
Table 2G. Lagranger-Multiplier test 
 
Figure 2C. Eigenvalue Stability Condition – SB (LHS) NB (RHS) 
 
Lag FPE AIC HQIC SBIC FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 1,50E218 226,84 226,50 225,97 1,90E218 226,64 226,30 225,76
1 5,80E219 227,82 227,14 226,07* 3,4e219* 228,34* 227,66* 226,60*
2 4,2e219* 228,19 227,16* 225,57 5,30E219 227,95 226,92 225,33
3 4,50E219 228,19 226,83 224,70 6,20E219 227,86 226,50 224,37
4 5,00E219 228,21* 226,51 223,85 7,60E219 2278005,00 226,09 223,44
Sample:@2000q222015q1,@Number@of@obs@=@60
Endogenous:@Δ@log@CI,@Δ@log@ULC,@@Δ@log@EX,@Δ@log@HHI,@Δ@log@Ur
Exogenous:@Δ@log@G,@q1,@q2,@q3,@q4
Selection)order,criteria Southern@Block Northen@Block
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Equation chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
Δ)log)CI 1 2 0,56699 0.476 2 0,78828
Δ)log)ULC 2 2 0,41008 2,310 2 0,31512
Δ)log)EX 5 2 0,06465 14,421 2 0,00082
Δ)log)HHI 2 2 0,31686 1,082 2 0,58210
Δ)log)Ur 1 2 0,53105 0,115 2 0,94431
ALL 12 10 0,28777 18,196 10 0,05175
Sample:)2000q2P2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)Normality
Jarque'Bera)test
Southern)Block Nothern)Block
Lag chi2 df Prob)>)chi2 chi2 df Prob)>)chi2
1 28,0170 25 0,30707 18 25 0,84568
2 27,6387 25 0,32475 21 25 0,70536
3 23,9595 25 0,52172 27 25 0,37415
4 23,0623 25 0,57392 28 25 0,2978
Sample:)2000q2G2015q1,)Number)of)obs)=)60
Ho:)No)autocorrelation)at)lag)order.
Lagrange'multiplier.test
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Table 2H. Model 2B - Direct Effects: Cholesky and Inverse A matrix 
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Figure 3A. Model 1A - Robustness Figure 6 - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse 
Responses of GDP to an Export, Investment and Import Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Government Expenditure, Exports, Imports, GDP, long-term 
interest rate, and real effective exchange rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point 
estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, 
respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e three years. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3B. Model 1A - Robustness Figure 7 - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse 
Responses to an Export Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Government Expenditure, Exports, Imports, GDP, long-term 
interest rate, and real effective exchange rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point 
estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, 
respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e three years. 
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Figure 3C. Model 1A - Robustness Figure 8 - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse 
Responses to a GDP Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Investment, Government Expenditure, Exports, Imports, GDP, long term-
interest rate, and real effective exchange rate. The Shock is a unit standard deviation. Solid lines are point 
estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, 
respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis shows quarters, i.e three years. 
 
 
  
  
Figure 3D. Model 2A - Robustness Figure 15 - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse 
Responses of the Unemployment rate to Investments Shock (First Raw) and of 
Investments to an Unemployment Shock (Second Raw). 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Unit Labour Cost, Investment, Government Expenditure, Exports, 
Imports, Unemployment rate, long-term interest rate, and real effective exchange rate. The Shock is a unit 
standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence 
regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis 
shows quarters, i.e three years. 
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Figure 3E. Model 2A - Robustness Figure 16 - Orthogonalized and Structural Impulse 
Responses to a Unit Labour Cost Shock. 
Note: The Variable Ordering is Unit Labour Cost, Investment, Government Expenditure, Exports, 
Imports, Unemployment rate, long-term interest rate, and real effective exchange rate. The Shock is a unit 
standard deviation. Solid lines are point estimates, light and dark grey area are the 90% confidence 
regions for structural and orthogonalized IRFs, respectively. The Y-axis is in % points and the X-axis 
shows quarters, i.e three years. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
The Emerging Regulatory Landscape  
A New Normal 
Breaking the Link between Banks and Sovereigns 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The study provides an insight on the regulatory requirements banks have been complying 
with since the financial crisis of 2009. Precisely it focuses upon the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive’s full implementation and effectiveness. An empirical analysis on 
the European banks’ CDS market sheds light on the mechanisms driving its current and 
historical developments, emphasizing the motivations for the change in the regulatory 
architecture. The policies will be proved to be effective in changing investors’ risk 
perception, that is, a shift of risk burden from senior bondholders towards subordinated 
debt holders, as well as a breach in the link between banks and sovereigns’ default 
probabilities, the so-called doom loop. Ultimately a comparative analysis on banks’ 
capital requirement, return on equity, leverage and risk weighted assets provides evidence 
on the impact regulations have on the European banks’ business strategies, thereby 
shaping the New Normal. In conclusion the paper discusses if the current regulatory 
regime will be able to prevent future sources of instability.  
 
 
Keywords: Financial Stability, Banking Regulation, Systemically Important Institutions, 
Financial Crisis. 
JEL Classification: E58, G01, G18, L51. 
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The notion of spontaneous order: the mutual interaction of 
multitudinous individual components that generates a regular, 
self-reproducing pattern (or order) of activities. Now the 
essential point about a spontaneous order is that it is definitely 
not a preconceived design; there is no single or group mind 
behind it - there is nobody ‘minding the whole store’… 
micromotives lead to macrobehaviour that individual agents 
neither foresee nor intend; and yet the result - the macro-order - 
is a self-stabilising system, not a mere anarchic chaos of events 
(T.C. Schelling, 1978:20-22) [1]. 
The time path of the economy depends upon the financial structure. 
As a result of cumulative changes financial relations became 
conducive to instability… Policies to control and guide the 
evolution of finance is necessary… The enforcement of simplicity 
in financial arrangements will be difficult (H.P. Minsky, 
1982:15-92-113)[2]. 
The primary aim is a humane economy as a first step toward a 
humane society (H.P. Minsky, 2008:326) [3]. 
 
1. Introduction 
Historically the link between banks and sovereigns has been always intertwined: the bank 
was the economic guarantor of the state, while the sovereign was the guardian of the 
bank. The fortune of a bank followed the fortune of a state, and the fortune of the state 
was often financed by the fortune of its bank. The first prototype of bank appeared in the 
eleventh century in the form of a group of investors called “The Lombards” who were 
spreading their business across France, Germany, England and Italy. Still today in the 
heart of London and Paris a street testifies their contribution to the banking system, 
respectively Lombard Street and Rue des Lombards. The expression ‘Lombard Banking’ 
in the common usage refers to the commitment to lend against obligation, or in the 
current state of the arts - a collateralized operation. Despite the regulators of that time - 
the Church - which was against usury, financial intermediation was growing fast[4]. The 
natural consequence was the flourish of markets and fairs - trade - which, in turn, boosted 
economic growth and the wealth of nations. The growing number of financial 
intermediaries and the creation of new instruments such as ‘bills of exchange’ and 
‘surety’ were the spark outlined the end of the Middle Age and the birth of the City-State 
and Sovereigns in Europe[5]. Finance was at the root of the economic development since 
credit allowed the state to boost trade. In turn ‘social mobility’ arose and spread 
opportunities across different social classes: the Medici Family from merchants became 
bankers and from bankers Lords of Florence in few decades. Nevertheless the financial 
system wasn’t yet organised in a well-defined banking system since when Bank of Saint 
George - Banco di San Giorgio - was founded in 1407 as the bank of the Republic of 
Genoa - the oldest bank in Europe. From then on the relationship between sovereigns and 
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banks strengthened as long as the magnitude of the two blocks in the economy.  Their 
exposures were so interconnected that the overlap of their destiny was the natural 
outcome. Nonetheless, the idea of the financial institution set up in Genoa was “in the 
interests of the City and its citizens - an idea that, at a certain point in history, would be 
adopted by the European States” and that recently has been eroded to the point that 
nobody believes banks pursue their operations for its own country or own customers[6]. 
This point of no return culminated in the aftermath of the financial crisis where 
everybody started blaming bankers for their moral hazard behaviours. Since then it 
became clear that banks where not anymore able to pursue the noble role of allocating 
capitals efficiently throughout markets and the real economy. The virtuous cycle of a 
larger volume of trade, stronger economic growth, and more investments reverted in a 
negative spiral where profit maximization became the unique goal of bankers: a shift 
from a long-term view of business to parasitic short-term strategies[7]. The consequences 
of this change flew naturally into the financial crisis as clearly depicted by Alan Blinder’s 
book “After The Music Stopped”:  
A host of financial manipulations that ordinary people did not understand, and in which they played no 
part, cost million of them their livelihoods and their homes, bankrupted many businesses, destroyed trillion 
dollars' of wealth, brought the once-mighty U.S. economy to its knees, and left all level of government 
gasping for tax revenue. If people felt as though they were mugged, it's because they were [8]. 
Many researchers started to investigate the features of this linkage, newly so-called 
doom-loop, deadly embrace, or vicious cycle. The double better-off principle - positive 
correlation of banks’ profits with customer/sovereign gains - wasn’t taking place 
anymore.  Reinhart and Rogoff[9], Taylor et al[10] and Tirole[11] as many other 
researchers documented and investigated clearly the causes and the effects of this change 
of route. As a consequence regulators started to redesign the financial structure in order to 
preserve the allocating role of the banking system and the long-term market functioning. 
Plenty of new regulatory standards followed. Banks’ capital and liquidity requirements 
were drastically improved in order to make the banking system resilient at the expense of 
banks’ profits. Basel III and its implementation entered into force in January 2014[12]. 
This was only the beginning of the end of the golden age of the banking system. Double 
digit returns close to 20% that were experienced since the financial deregulation of the 
late 70s and due to the invention of derivative contracts is now only a vague memory. 
Banks are currently struggling to recover their cost of capital. Nevertheless this is only 
the beginning. From January 2015 the new resolution and recovery regime, the so-called 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), entered into force in the European 
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Union. This new set of rules together with Basel III is the most transformational 
regulatory change for the banking system in history. The new architecture is and will be 
affecting banks’ business strategies as well as investors’ risk perception and investment 
behaviours. Regulators have been trying in shaping a ‘New Normal’ in the banking 
system and financial industry. Many believe that restoring the good old values in the 
banking system might be impossible, nevertheless there is no harm in trying.  
According to this introduction, the paper will try to outline the current regulatory 
architecture in order to lead the reader pragmatically through this new landscape. The 
initial focus - chapter 2 - will be set upon the markets adaptation to the incoming 
implementation of the following regulatory initiatives: Total Loss Absorbing Capacity 
(TLAC)[13] and Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities 
(MREL)[14]. An empirical analysis - chapter 3 - dealing with Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
developments between senior and subordinated debt holders will be pursued in order to 
shed light on the change in the investors’ risk perception. Then in chapter 4 the 
investigation will try to assess if the new regulatory structure is effectively affecting 
banks’ business models and in turn lightening the link between banks and sovereigns’ 
probability of default. Ultimately concluding remarks will evaluate some policy 
implications as well as some open issues so as to depict the future possible sources of 
instability.  
2. A New Normal For Debt Holders And The Financial System 
The recent crisis has shown that the entire financial system needs to be reformed. 
Financial institutions are global, complex, and especially too onerous for governments to 
let them fail. Since then, resolution regimes became the cornerstone of the new regulatory 
architecture. Two different directions have been pursued on both sides of the Atlantic 
although EU and US share the very same goal: resolve failing financial institutions 
quickly without triggering systemic risk and avoiding government intervention. In fact 
the European Union Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive has almost nothing in 
common with the Dodd-Frank Act except the goal as we can see from table 1.  
Even the scope to which the resolution procedure is directed diverges remarkably. 
Concerning EU the directive covers all credit institutions and investment firms, while in 
the case of US only large and complex banks i.e., entities with consolidated assets greater 
than USD 50 bn. However given the systemic nature of the problem, i.e., strong negative 
cross-border externalities and high level of inter countries balance sheet correlation 
among financial institutions, a coordination mechanism between different regulatory 
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regimes has been set in place. In 2011 the G20 leaders and the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) developed a new international standard for effective resolution regimes[15]. The 
focus of this new set of rules is to make Global Systematically Important Financial 
Institutions (G-SIFIs) have enough liabilities with loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) to 
avoid a bailout and possible ‘domino effect’. Shareholders and debtholders will suffer the 
whole recapitalisation burden and banks won’t rely on public funds anymore. Taxpayers 
will be finally shielded from banks’ default. This is clearly emphasized by principle I of 
the FSB’ TLAC compendium: 
There must be sufficient loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity available in resolution to implement 
an orderly resolution that minimises any impact on financial stability, ensures the continuity of critical 
functions, and avoids exposing taxpayers (public funds) to loss with a high degree of confidence[16]. 
Table 1. Comparison between Resolution Regimes in EU and US 
 
Source: BBVA Research [17]. 
To this respect at any point in time G-SIFIs have to be able to write down instruments for 
an amount that doubles the capital and leverage requirements, respectively 16-20% of 
Risk Weighted Assets and 6 % of leverage as from January 2019[18]. This new 
prudential ratio has to guarantee the legality, feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness of 
the resolution plan, making the bail-in credible and reliable. It is straightforward that not 
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only the banking industry is going to face a transformational change but all the 
stakeholders involved, especially investors who have to deal with these new sources of 
risk, new profitability levels, and therefore new prices that these regulatory requirements 
imply. The uncertainty surrounding the country-specific minimum requirements as well 
as the idiosyncrasies among the different bailinable instruments are the main concern for 
investors, since higher requirements may lead to lower profitability and higher bail-in 
risk.  It is then crucial to highlight the main differences between TLAC and MREL 
requirements. To this respect the European Banking Association (EBA) aims at 
implementing MREL in a way that is consistent with TLAC. However differences such 
as type of entities involved - GSIFI vs all financial entities - time table for 
implementation - January 2019 vs January 2016 - and type of bailinable instruments - 
senior unsecured only up to 2,5% of RWA vs full compliance - will trigger price 
divergences from current market price.   
2.1 Minimum Requirements for Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions: 
TLAC 
Total Loss Absorbing Capacity has to comply with two pillars set by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which defines respectively the common and 
the bank specific minimum requirements. Pillar 1 establishes that if a bank is considered 
G-SIBs the minimum TLAC without capital buffers has to be equal or larger than Max 
(16-20% RWA; 6% leverage ratio denominator)[19]. On the other hand, given the score 
obtained in the measurement approach, which is used to assess if a bank is considered G-
SIBs, an additional loss absorbency capacity is required[20]. According to this 
measurement method the TLAC requirements may range between 17-21% up to 19,5-
23,5% of RWA without taking into account the conservation buffer that it is equal to 2,5 
% of RWA. Every November the FSB with BCBS updates the list of G-SIBs in order to 
let the banks on the list comply with the new bank specific loss absorbency capacity 
required. Last November 2015 the G-SIBs list has been updated by the FSB, table 1 in 
the appendix. Thirty banks are considered G-SIBs: 10 of them from USA, 8 from the 
Eurozone, 4 from China, 3 from Japan, 2 from UK, 2 from Switzerland, and 1 from 
Sweden. As you can see, the higher the score, the larger the additional RWA amount they 
have to comply with. Figure 1 summarizes concisely the capital requirement thresholds 
and its composition. In fact we can see that long-term unsecured debt, both senior and 
subordinated, together with Additional Tier 1 (AdT1), and Tier 2 (T2) will constitute at 
least 33% of the Total TLAC requirements[21].  
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Insert About Here Figure 1 
TLAC minimum requirement proposed by the FSB 
To this respect, it is important to stress that the instrument hierarchy for the bail-in 
scenario will be the principal factor affecting the price adjustment of the underlined 
assets. The subordination hierarchy according to the FSB will consist in making fully 
bailinable long-term unsecured subordinated debt, while long-term unsecured senior will 
count only partially, up to 2,5 % of RWA[22]. According to this hierarchy in case a 
resolution process would take place, equity and subordinated debt will cover the 
outstanding loss or the so called ‘bad assets’ through a resolution entity, while the senior 
debt will be written down as bridge bank’s new equities in order to preserve the core 
functions of the bank. All other liabilities not being written down during the resolution 
process will remain with the same status in the new entity, the bridge bank.  However 
since remarkable differences in banks’ organisational model exist between Europe and 
Anglo-Saxon countries, the QIS will be determinant to set the optimal pillar 1 in a way 
not to penalize one business structure[23]. The main difference is that a system based on 
a holding company, like the Anglo-Saxon one, covers the resolution requirements 
through the holding company debt and equity issuance which are subordinated - first to 
be bail in - to those of the subsidiaries. Since the holding company is a non-operative 
company, the additional threshold of RWA, also called the management buffer, necessary 
to avoid a break of the TLAC minimum requirement will be much lower than in a system 
without a holding company in which all the subsidiaries have to issue subordinated debt 
and build up the management buffer. To this respect the proposed timeline established by 
FSB to gradually make the financial system’s liability structure comply with TLAC 
minimum requirements is smooth. By looking at figure 2, two important deadlines have 
to be highlighted for the purpose of this analysis.  
Insert About Here Figure 2 
TLAC Timeline 
During the third quarter of 2015, the final recommendation requirements were finalized 
so as to allow, within January 2019, the G-SIBs to implement the mandatory structural 
changes to their liability structure. From now on, the G-SIBs will have almost three years 
to issue long-term unsecured debt as well as T2 and AdT1 instruments. During this 
phase-in period as long as banks will adjust their balance sheets, investors will re-price 
the intrinsic risk given the new probability of default and their expected loss in case of 
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bail-in.  In the next paragraph a deeper analysis on the European Union Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive and on its bail in tool - Minimum Requirement for Own Funds 
and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) - will provide a clear picture on how requirements may 
differ and, in turn, trigger price asymmetries within the same group of eligible debt 
instruments and among different types of banks, systemic and not.  
2.2 The European Union Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: MREL 
The BRRD entered into force in January 2015, nevertheless the cornerstone of its 
resolution tool, the MREL will only be binding from January 2016. For the purpose of 
our analysis, the focus will deal with four main points which table 2 outlines concisely.  
First of all, the directive covers all financial institutions in the European Union, not only 
the global systemically important banks. This implies a major change in the cost structure 
of the European financial system, which, in turn creates negative spill-over effects on the 
non-financial sectors. The real economy may enter into a transitional period of business 
model transformation where companies will gradually switch to more equity funding 
instead of relying exclusively on banks’ lending[24]. 
Table 2. Comparison between MREL and TLAC 
 
Source: BBVA Research[25]. 
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Second, the measurement method to appraise the minimum requirements is more 
discretionary than in the TLAC specification. The minimum threshold should be close to 
8% for all credit institutions, nevertheless higher requirements will be decided on a case 
by case basis given the size, the business model and the risk profile of the bank[26]. 
Moreover if losses exceed the MREL requirements a resolution fund will contribute up to 
5 % of the bank’s total liabilities[27]. In exceptional cases such as in the event of a 
systemic crisis, if these funds are not enough to cover all the losses, government 
stabilisation tools can be used to avoid destructive consequences on the financial system 
and real economy. The time-table for the phase-in period is much more stringent than the 
one for TLAC since MREL has become binding in January 2016 as required by Art. 45 of 
the BRRD. The natural consequence is that banks’ liability structure will have to adapt 
faster and thus investors. However the European Banking Association (EBA) and the 
European Commission (EC) may review in 2016 the MREL standards in order to make it 
comply with the TLAC general framework, which was finalized by FSB in November 
2015[28]. 
Lastly, the preventive and preparatory procedures and plans as well as the actions in case 
of MREL breach are more discretionary and complex than in the TLAC procedures. In 
fact as a complement to liquidity and capital plans, which are under banks’ own 
responsibility, recovery plans have to be carried out and submitted to the supervisor in 
case the situation deteriorates[29]. Moreover if the entity under stressed conditions is not 
able to restore its availability, then the resolution authority in cooperation with the 
supervisor and the institutions themselves may oblige the bank to enter the resolution 
procedure and therefore starts to develop a resolution plan. This assessment is completely 
at the discretion of the resolution authority, which is empowered to appraise the specific 
point of non-availability (PONV). This is a crucial step since a breach in the MREL does 
not automatically kick off the resolution procedure, while under TLAC, a breach of the 
minimum threshold is, as stated by principle 10 of the FSB’s final document, equivalent 
to “a breach of minimum capital requirement”[30]. For example “if maturing TLAC debt 
is not renewed, a bank will breach its capital buffer first and will suffer capital 
distribution penalties as long as the capital buffer is eroded”[31]. This implies that both 
shareholders and AdT1 investors will have to incorporate this risk in their evaluation 
schemes since even a small breach may trigger the cancellation of dividends and coupon 
payments. According to what has been highlighted up to now, differences between TLAC 
and MREL exist and they are reflected in the shortfalls banks experience for these two 
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indicators. In fact by looking at table 3 we can appraise the current shortfalls for a 
selected sample of European, Swiss and UK banks, out of which 15 also belong to the 
group of G-SIBs. 
Table 3. TLAC and MREL shortfalls 
 
Source: Scope Ratings[32]. 
Note: Data is from H1 2014 unless mentioned otherwise, if marked ‘*’ they refer to 2013. [1] Rating 
includes one notch up for UK government majority ownership. [2] We have calculated liabilities and own 
funds as total assets minus minority interests. [3] Banks’ outstanding senior unsecured liabilities are 
excluded from calculation.  
For this sub-group the MREL shortfall is two times higher than the TLAC shortfall, 
respectively an average of EUR 28.26 bn and EUR 14.88 bn per bank[33]. Moreover, as 
we can see, the credit ratings developed by Scope are almost all beyond the A threshold, 
though they assume no government bail-out. This is due to the trade-off between higher 
minimum requirements and the no government bail-out, where the former compensates 
the latter. However not all the rating agencies think the same way. Fitch rating has 
underlined that for 2015 it is expected to downgrade 30% of all the European financial 
institutions, whose 81% because of the changing view on government support[34]. 
According to them 44% of their ratings in the EU are currently lifted up by the bail-out 
option in case of default. Since regulators are taking away this option, banks will face 
debt downgrades. This event will be an additional factor triggering yield increase and 
price asymmetries among banks with different ratings. 
Bank
Issuer	Credit	
Strenght	Rating	
TLAC	
(%	of	RWA)
Shortfall	to	20% Shortfall	
(EUR	bn)
MREL	[2]	
(%	of	Liabilities	+	Own	Funds)
Shortfall	to	8%	 Shortfall	
(EUR	bn)
Barclays A 17.50% 2.50% 12.9 5.50% 2.50% 40.9
BBVA A 15.30% 4.70% 15.8 8.60% Above Above
BNP	Paribas A+ 13.30% 6.70% 41.6 4.30% 3.70% 69.8
Commerzbank BBB+ 5.80% 2.20% 12.9
Credit	Agricole* A 17.40% 2.60% 12.6 4.90% 3.10% 53.3
Credit	Mutuel* A 5.80% 2.20% 14.5
Credit	Suisse A+ 22.10% Above Above 7.10% 0.90% 6.7
Danske	Bank A- 5.40% 2.60% 11.6
Deutsche	Bank A- 18.90% 1.10% 4.2 4.60% 3.40% 57.2
DNB A+ 7.00% 1.00% 2.9
Groupe	BPCE* A+ 14.70% 5.30% 19.7 4.80% 3.20% 35.2
HSBC AA- 16.60% 3.40% 30.9 7.60% 0.40% 8.9
ING* A 17.40% 2.60% 7.4 6.20% 1.80% 13.9
Intesa* BBB+ 8.00% Above Above
KBC A- 6.80% 1.20% 2.9
Lloyds A 7.60% 0.40% 4.6
Nordea A+ 20.60% Above Above 4.90% 3.10% 19.6
Rabobank A+ 6.10% 1.90% 12.6
RBS BBB+	[1] 18.30% 1.70% 8.1 7.10% 0.90% 11.1
Santander A 14.30% 5.70% 31.8 6.80% 1.20% 14.2
SocGen A 14.90% 5.10% 17.8 4.00% 4.00% 53.2
Swedbank A- 5.30% 2.70% 6.1
UBS* A 19.00% 1% 1.9 4.30% 3.70% 31.1
Unicredit* BBB	 15.20% 4.80% 18.5 6.90% 1.10% 8.9
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Moreover not only the issuer but also the specific asset type can face a rating downgrade. 
In fact ceteris paribus, a subordinate debt will be affected by the probability of default of 
the bank itself but also on the amount of instruments that has been issued. The former 
category reflects the bank’s credit risk, while the latter reflects the priority of claims 
under resolution as well as the ‘real capital buffer’ among each category as depicted in 
table 4. In fact, if AdT1 instruments instead of covering 18,75% of the 8% minimum 
requirement cover only 10%, the remaining burden would be borne by T2 instruments 
which consequently become more risky and therefore costly - higher yields.  
Table 4. Hierarchy of Claims 
 
 Source: Scope Ratings[35]. 
On the one hand the shortfalls imply that an increasing amount of AdT1 and T2 as well as 
senior unsecured instruments will be issued by the banks facing the shortfall[36]. Already 
in 2014 the T1 and T2 issuances increased remarkably, almost EUR 15 bn per quarter, 
compare to an average of EUR 7.5 bn in 2013[37]. On the other hand, this means that 
possible price adjustments will be experienced for the new issuances. Moreover, senior 
unsecured instruments did not diverge from the path experienced in recent years.  
However, for the reason above explained and since covered bonds are excluded from the 
bailinable instruments category, a higher issuance amount of senior unsecured is expected 
during 2016[38]. Given the hierarchy of claims in case of resolution, it is likely that T2 
instruments will be the preferred instruments together with subordinated debt not 
classified as AdT1 or T2.  
In the end, before starting with the empirical analysis, a further theoretical point deserves 
attention: the extra insulation of senior unsecured debt given the new credit derivative 
definition.  
2.3 The New Credit Derivatives Definition 
On 22nd September 2014, the new 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions were 
implemented. The new definitions constitute a watershed in the credit derivatives market 
1.	Additional	Tier	1
2.	Tier	2	
3.	Other	Subordinated	Debt
4.	Senior	Unsecured	Debt	and	Non-Eligible	Deposits	(Wholesale	and	Institutional)
5.	Non-Covered	Eligible	Deposits	(Individual	and	SME)	--	Preferred
6.	Deposit	Guarantee	Scheme	(For	Covered	Deposits	-	Super	Preferred)
Bailin	Liability	Seniority	Waterfall	for	EU	Banks
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and address the issues arisen from the financial crisis regarding credit and succession 
events. To this respect several changes have been implemented, even if only two main 
points deserve attention for the purpose of this analysis: where financial reference entity 
terms are applied to a CDS for which the relevant reference obligation is a senior 
obligation, and a governmental intervention or restructuring credit event occurs in respect 
of subordinated debt, only the protection on the subordinated CDS will be triggered. For 
the protection on the senior CDS to be triggered a governmental intervention or 
restructuring credit event would need to occur in respect of the senior debt. 
There has been a further split of subordinated and senior CDS when determining 
successor reference entities for a financial reference entity. The subordinated CDS will 
follow the subordinated debt and the senior CDS will follow the senior debt such that if 
the senior debt and the subordinated debt are transferred to two different entities, the 
subordinated CDS and senior CDS will subsequently refer to different reference entities. 
As we can understand, the introductions of these two specifications create an additional 
‘contractual buffer’ to the senior debt so as to insulate senior debt holders from credit 
events which may trigger only subordinated debt restructuring. This line of reasoning 
works in theory, but as we can see in table 5 also in practice.  
Table 5. Senior and Subordinated 5-year CDS Spreads for selected European Banks 
 
 Source: BNP Paribas[39]. 
 
2003 2014 Increase 2003 2014 Increase 2003 2014
Credit	Agricole 60 62 3% 89 126 42% 1.5 2.0
Barclays 63 64 3% 97 155 60% 1.6 2.4
BBVASM 70 73 4% 92 175 90% 1.3 2.4
BNP	Paribas 58 60 3% 80 121 51% 1.4 2.0
Commerzbank 83 85 2% 135 255 89% 1.6 3.0
Deutsche	Bank 68 71 4% 92 157 71% 1.4 2.2
HSBC 50 51 4% 79 115 46% 1.6 2.2
Intesa 78 81 4% 105 180 71% 1.3 2.2
Lloyds 61 63 3% 97 145 49% 1.6 2.3
RBS 75 78 4% 105 190 81% 1.4 2.4
Santander 69 72 4% 93 167 80% 1.3 2.3
SocGen 71 74 4% 96 171 78% 1.4 2.3
Standard	Chartered 85 88 4% 109 177 62% 1.3 2.0
Unicredit 90 94 4% 132 245 86% 1.5 2.6
Bankia 125 130 4% 190 350 84% 1.5 2.7
Bank	of	Ireland 155 155 0% 223 450 102% 1.4 2.9
ING 56 57 2% 80 137 71% 1.4 2.4
Monte	dei	Paschi 215 225 5% 295 515 75% 1.4 2.3
Banco	Popular	Espanol 175 185 6% 220 430 95% 1.3 2.3
Rabobank 46 48 4% 69 113 64% 1.5 2.4
Banco	de	Sabadell 130 135 4% 185 345 86% 1.4 2.6
Average 89 92 4% 126 221 71% 1.4 2.4
Issuer
Senior	5Y Sub	5Y Sub	/	Senior	Ratio
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Subordinated premia spiked on the 20th September 2014, when the New Credit Derivative 
Definition came into force. To this respect table 5 shows the main developments since 
September 2014 between 5-year senior and subordinated CDS spread for 14 European 
banks. This is due to the implementation of the new Credit Derivative Definition, which 
clearly specifies the different treatments between senior and subordinate CDS contracts, 
making the latter category riskier than the former. The subordinate CDS premia increased 
by 71% on average compared to the senior one, which increased only by 4%.  This has 
remarkably affected the risk embodied in these instruments and therefore their price, 
creating a watershed among debtholders. 
In the following paragraph an historical analysis on the subordinated-senior CDS spread 
evolutions is developed in order to tackle the causes and the reasons why we are facing 
the current financial and in turn regulatory developments. 
3. The Impact of Regulations on Banks’ Default Probabilities 
The historical analysis, going back to the financial crisis of 2009, is essential to 
understand why we are facing the current regulatory transformation. This watershed, as 
we will see, affects dramatically investors’ risk perception, modifies market prices and 
identifies who will bear losses.  
By looking at figure 3 we can see that - on average - the CDS differentials increased 
about 80 basis points on 20th September 2014, with wider spikes for those banks less 
credit worthy such as Banco Comercial Portuguese and Monte dei Paschi. However this 
spike reverted to its downward sloping path originated on the 6th September 2012 when 
the ECB announced the implementation of the Outright Monetary Transaction 
programmes (OMTs)[40]. The recent trend inversion may be due to two main events. On 
the one hand, on 26th October 2014 the Asset Quality Review (AQR) and the 
Comprehensive Assessment results have been made public by the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), thereby reducing information asymmetries between banks and 
investors. Thanks to this, the consensus view seems to have reached a more balanced risk 
perception, leading to a decline in risk premia[41]. On the other hand, in January 2015 
the BRRD came into force whose implications, as already investigated, lead to a 
reduction of the banks’ default probabilities.  
However by looking at figure 4, which mirrors figure 3 except for depicting the ratio 
instead of the difference in risk premia, we realize that the threshold reached after the 
introduction of the New Credit Derivative Definition is the highest ever experienced. This 
is due to the fact that during the financial crisis of 2009 as well as during the European 
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Sovereign Crisis of 2010-2012 the premia increased quite proportionally among 
subordinated and senior CDS. The risk was widely systemic, driven on the one hand by 
the deterioration of banks’ rating, and on the other hand by the awareness that a default 
would have triggered not only the subordinated tranches, but also the senior ones - the 
waterfall effect.  Nevertheless this time the current regulatory framework has been set 
with the precise aim of avoiding the so called ‘waterfall effect’. The senior debt has been 
insulated in such a way that the risk is 2.5 times higher for subordinated debt holders than 
for senior debt holders. Since January 2009, that is, during the strongest market turmoil, 
the average subordinated-senior CDS ratio was close to 1.7, but never to the level we are 
currently experiencing. As we can see in figure 5, four periods have been highlighted, 
respectively two consecutive financial market turmoil, one of low risk premia, and period 
4 that can be considered the ‘New Normal’.  
Insert About Here Figure 3 
Evolutions in the differentials between European Banks’ Subordinate and Senior 5Y CDS 
Insert About Here Figure 4 
Developments in the ratio between the European Banks’ Subordinate and Senior 5Y CDS 
Period 1 represents the financial crisis of 2009, while period 2 represents the sovereign 
crisis. In both periods of financial market distress the average subordinated-senior CDS 
ratio was close to 1,7-1,8. However the causes triggering the increase in CDS premia 
were remarkably different. In fact in period 1, the risk was idiosyncratic, bank specific, 
though it became systemic due to the high level of banks’ balance sheets 
interconnectedness. So given the ‘too big to fail’ issue, the risk was transferred from the 
banking system to the sovereigns, a ‘reverse waterfall’, also defined as a bottom-up flow 
of risk. On the other hand, in period 2, the reverse took place; a top-down flow of risk 
was transferred from sovereigns to the banking system. Banks owing most of the 
sovereigns’ debt of their home country experienced a drastic depreciation of their high-
quality liquid assets, and at the same time were losing the bail-out insurance in case of a 
possible default since governments couldn’t afford any rescue. In period 3, a decrease of 
CDS premia took place with an average ratio of 1.53. This was due primarily to the 
implementation of non-standard monetary policy measures such as the Outright Monetary 
Transaction programme which was used by the ECB to signal financial markets that the 
Eurozone was ‘ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro’[42]. However this 
measure together with the international settlement of Basel III which was agreed in 2010-
2011 and whose implementation started in 2013 succeeded in stabilizing financial 
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markets on a theoretical basis since most of the new regulatory initiatives were still far to 
be implemented[43]. Moreover the ‘vicious cycle’ or the so-called ‘doom-loop’ between 
weak banks’ balance sheet and sovereign fragility worked bilaterally[44]. This implies 
that, in order to tackle in a permanent way this issue, a threefold programme was 
necessary. On the one hand, Basel III tackled the issue of weak bank balance sheets by 
enhancing minimum capital and liquidity standards. On the other hand, through the Fiscal 
Stability Treaty also called the ‘Fiscal Compact’, which entered into force in January 
2013, and through the ECB monetary policy role of safeguarding financial stability, 
European governments’ fundamentals were reassured. Nevertheless these two measures 
were not enough alone, since they only strengthened the resilience of the two financial 
blocks - banking system and sovereigns - without breaking the link between these two.  
At this stage the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive plays its key role. In fact as 
explained in section 2.2 breaking this link is its principal and ultimate objective:  
In the future, shareholders and creditors will have to bear the burden of bank failure, minimizing moral 
hazard and risks to taxpayers. Removing the implicit subsidy of large banks by governments will avoid the 
build-up of excessive risk and leverage within banks and the banking system as a whole… In this way 
MREL ensures sufficient loss absorbing capacity that should enable an orderly resolution, ensuring 
continuity of critical functions without recourse to public funds[45]. 
As we realize this is a complementary and a necessary feature in order to deal effectively 
with the so called ‘doom-loop’ effect, not only an increased resilience of the financial 
system but a mechanism able to self-balance detrimental diverging forces capable to 
destroy permanently market efficiency. This in turn may be able to restore long-term 
credibility of all the investors involved: shareholders, debtholders, governments, and 
taxpayers.  
This outcome comes from the new allocation of risk within the pool of investors. In fact 
previously, both regulatory opaqueness and the bailout of last resort didn’t allow to 
identify precisely the allocation of losses, which is an essential feature to establish the 
hierarchy of claims and in turn the price of the default risk. In an environment of 
asymmetric and limited information, risk, such as the probability of default of 
governments and banks, is amplified by the link instead of reduced.  Breaking the link, 
therefore, may lead to a double better-off: an absolute lower default premium for both 
parts, and a relative lower default premium in stress time for the counterparty not 
affected. On the other hand, the same line of reasoning can be used to explain the change 
in risk perception between senior and subordinated debt holders. Before the introduction 
of the New Credit Derivative Definition a precise adverse event that triggered a 
	 152	
subordinated debt contract default was at the same time involving senior debt holders.  
This link after being broken, led subordinated debt holders to bear a higher burden due to 
the different allocation of risk. However apart from that, since regulations have improved 
capital requirements such as Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1, not only senior debt holders, 
but also subordinated debt contracts has benefited from this insulation. Tier 1 for the 
major European banks passed from 6.5 % to 12.5 % between 2007 and 2014, almost 
doubled up, as well as the ratio of Risk Weighted Assets on total assets passed from 50% 
to 40%[46]. These effects are visible in figure 5 and 4 respectively. The burden on 
subordinated debt increased compared to senior debt, nevertheless the path is downward 
sloping leading to lower absolute premia. In the last chapter an empirical investigation 
will try to verify if the stylized facts till here presented and the theoretical reasoning upon 
developed have produced the expected outcomes regulators were aimed at.  
4. Breaking The Link: An Empirical Investigation 
In order to shed light on this crucial issue, it is necessary to investigate the link between 
banks and sovereigns’ probability of default, that is, the main objective the BRRD wants 
to achieve. By looking at figure 5 we can see that banks’ 5Y senior CDS move in 
complete synchrony with sovereign 5Y senior CDS. In addition we also see that for 
country with high debt to GDP ratio such as Italy and Spain the governments’ CDS 
premia are almost equal in magnitude to the country’s bank CDS premia. Contrary in the 
case of Germany and France, the sovereign premia are lower than the banks’ ones.  
Insert About Here Figure 5 
Main European Banks and Sovereigns 5Y Senior CDS Developments 
To assess the co-movement between the sovereign premia and the banks’ premia, a linear 
correlation coefficient is computed. Between the time period January 2009 and January 
2015 the average linear correlation between sovereign and banks was close to 0.8.  
However by looking at figure 6, we can appraise the evolution of the correlation 
coefficient throughout the four periods. As we can see, during period 1, 2 and 3 the 
coefficient almost approached the parity, that is, a perfect synchronic movement. But then 
starting from period 4 - the New Normal - it strongly decreased, passing from an average 
of 0.74 to 0.1. To this respect, it is important to underline that in fourth quarter 2014 the 
ECB has implemented its most powerful non-standard monetary policy tool, the Public 
Sector Purchase Program (PSPP-QE), which consists in buying on the secondary market 
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European government bonds in order to reduce their premia. In fact by looking at the 
period January 2015 - February 2016 we can see that the premia drastically decreased.  
Insert About Here Figure 6 
European Banks’ Correlation with Their Sovereigns 
To this respect it is important to explain through which channels the QE affects CDS 
premia, with a specific focus on the default risk channel. QE may lower risk premia by 
“stimulating the economy (therefore corporates’ probability of default will decrease), or 
since investor risk aversion falls as the economy recovers, or by increasing financial 
health/capital in the intermediary sector”[47]. Therefore one may argue that QE has 
affected asymmetrically sovereigns and banks’ premia, and for this reason the correlation 
coefficient changed its magnitude in period 4. Nevertheless many non-standard monetary 
tools have been already implemented in the last couples of years and especially during 
period 2 and 3. The most important are Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), Security Market Program (SMP), the ABS 
Purchase Programme, and the relaxation of collateral standards, and they, as documented 
by many researchers, influenced risk premia and risk aversion without affecting the 
intensity of the co-movement between sovereigns and banks’ default probabilities[48]. 
For this clear reason it is the BRRD that lays at the basis of this change, and not the 
Quantitative Easing. 
Moreover the BRRD and the wide spectrum of new regulatory standards - Basel 3 - as 
well as the New Supervisory and Resolution Entities - SSM and SRM - are only at the 
beginning of their course. Most of the approved changes have just recently started to be 
enforceable such as MREL, while other measures like TLAC will need almost three years 
to be fully effective. According to this transformational process, it is coherent to expect a 
gradual adaptation of financial markets towards the direction indicated by Regulators.  
Although it has been already analysed some of the developments in the financial markets, 
to puzzle out the ‘big picture’ regulators aimed to achieve, the following stylized facts 
deserve attention.  
The implementation of these standards has produced a gradual shift in banks’ 
performance. The return on equity (RoE) decreased sharply from the peak reached 
between the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 2000s. During those years the 
average RoE was close to 20-25%, an astonishingly return given the average experienced 
between the 20s and the 70s - around 7%[49]. Looking at table 6 we can see how the RoE 
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for some selected European G-SIB Banks evolved since the years before the last financial 
crisis.  
Table 6. Historical Evolutions of Tier1, Return on Equity, and Risk Taking for Selected 
G-SIB 
 
Source: Public Consolidated Financial Statements, Own Calculations. 
Note: RoE is calculated as Profit after-tax divided by total equity excluding non-controlling 
interests. Profits after-tax have been depurated from goodwill depreciation. 
As it is clear, RoE passed from 20% in 2006 to almost 2% in 2008, and then it averaged 
around 5%[50]. As expected after the crisis RoE has improved from the bottom reached 
in 2008, however it didn’t recover to the pre-crisis level. Especially what we see is the 
downward trend started in 2010.  
Is it a coincidence that just in 2010 and during the following years the regulatory 
standards here highlighted were implemented and became binding? One may think that 
the recession following the financial crisis takes all credit.  
Likely the recession affected the magnitude of the banks’ RoE, nevertheless the trend is a 
clear symptom of the regulatory change. If this is not the case, why did RoE reach 8.7% 
in 2010, and then started to slow down? If recession accounts for the whole decrease, 
then we would expect a reverse trend, that’s is, lower RoE in 2009 and 2010, and higher 
RoE from 2011 onwards, when the harshest times were close to an end. However the data 
show a downward trend beginning in 2011. Moreover the counterfactual is pretty clear. If 
we look at the correlation between average tier 1 and average RoE, the coefficient is 
strongly negative, -0.7. This means the higher the banks’ capital - tier 1 - the lower the 
return on equity.  This is clear-cut since a higher denominator for the computation of the 
RoE, ceteris paribus, leads to lower values. In addition, if we look at the correlation 
between RoE and the Risk Taking proxy - RWAs - as well as between RoE and the 
Leverage proxy - LR - the coefficient is 0.6 in both cases[51]. This implies that lower 
‘risk taking’ and lower ‘leverage’ levels lead to a lower RoE. Though this is only a 
correlation coefficient, logically we are pretty confident on the direction of the causality.  
A compact summary of what has been depicted up to here is drawn in figure 8, which 
summarizes the evolution of banks’ business strategies. In order to maximize return on 
equity, in 2006, a bank could have exploited leverage or could have increased the risk of 
its assets pool, therefore the ratio of RWAs over total assets. Therefore, a bank could 
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decide to locate itself in the South-East region - lower leverage but higher risk per unit of 
asset - or in the North-West region - higher leverage but lower risk per unit of asset. Both 
strategies nonetheless have the same outcomes and the same objective: “the gains risk 
being privatized and the losses socialised”[52]. Both strategies bring extremely high 
returns in good times, while heavy losses in bad times. Given the high levels of risk-
taking and leverage, losses are amplified so that governments need to intervene in order 
to avoid a complete collapse of the financial system. Through this mechanism, banks 
succeeded in amplifying and privatizing all the profits in good times, while, during bad 
times, they were able to socialise most of the losses. This is the perfect solution to the 
banks’ payoff maximization problem. Moral hazard behaviours were the natural banks’ 
best response to the lack of binding regulations, and to the ‘too-big to fail’ problem.  
Insert About Here Figure 7 
Leverage, Risk Taking and Return on Equity for Selected G-SIB Banks  
To this respect, as we see in figure 7, regulators have tried to work the ‘regulatory 
loophole’ out. Since 2010 banks started to locate themselves closer to the imaginary 45-
degree line, although there are still evidences that banks prefer corner solutions within the 
regulatory constraints in place. During this period the barycentre shifted down, and at the 
same time the RoE, represented by the size of the bubbles, decreased more than 
proportionally than the shift. Nevertheless all that glitters isn’t gold. Since the leverage 
ratio given the new regulatory standards is binding at 33%, the banks’ tendency is to find 
some margins in risk taking positions. RWAs decreased but only marginally compare to 
the big shift in leverage. In fact if Basel 3 and CRD4-CRR has improved the minimum 
capital requirements, what has been left far unresolved is the denominator, that is, the 
calculation of RWAs. Inconsistencies among EU countries as well as discrepancies might 
have boosted the capital ratio beyond their real values[53]. This can be the possible future 
source of risk, as it was already one of the triggering factors in the 2009 financial crisis.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
What we have seen so far is the mutation of the regulatory landscape banks have been 
facing since the aftermath of the financial crisis. These new standards have affected 
banks’ business strategies, which struggle to find higher returns. On the other hand, banks 
have always survived bad times. New creative solutions were shaped, profits were 
boosted, and the good old times cyclically surged. Most of them are the longest-lasting 
corporations in the world, and there is a reason for that. Adaptation, especially in finance 
is much easier to be implemented than in the old-fashion manufacturing sector. At the 
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same time investors’ risk perception is changing. Financial markets are ruling the New 
Normal for the banking industry. Not only the CDS correlation between Banks and 
Sovereigns has changed remarkably, but as investigated in Ambrosini and CovI, after 26th 
October 2014 - the Comprehensive Assessment result announcement - also the 
correlation between CDS and equity prices broke down. These two complementary 
analyses embody the same view on the growth prospects of the banking sector for the 
incoming years: lower structural profits but higher profit sustainability as well as lower 
probability of default but higher privatization of losses, the New Normal. Given the data 
analysis, the new banking regulation seems to effectively tackle the issues arose. One 
may wonder how much efficiently, but the answer goes well beyond the capabilities and 
the scope of this paper. To this respect there will be always winners and losers. For the 
last 40 years the banking industry has been a sure bet for investors, now not anymore. 
Nevertheless there are still plenty of things to improve on a theoretical and technical 
basis. On the latter point, regulators can always improve risk-valuation techniques such 
as risk weighted assets computation, network modelling, as well as probability of fat-tails 
events, but in the end, they will always enjoy unfavourable positions since, for their own 
nature, they are followers, and not market-makers. Bounded rationality obliges policy 
makers to work optimally ex post - hopefully - but sub optimally ex ante. For this reason 
the former point necessitates further investigation. Incentives will push banks to find new 
ways to boost profits, though the new landscape in place. They - for sure - won’t accept 
the New Normal like it is. They will exploit one of the possible regulatory discrepancies 
to come back on track. These are the natural consequences incentives create. 
Paradoxically the current Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in a worst-case 
scenario, given the level of losses, may bail-in a bank by resetting shareholder equity and 
at the same time by converting debt holders, and by drying up non-covered deposits. This 
is a fundamental step to “breaking the link” and avoid the doom loop with sovereigns. 
However this may not change banks’ incentives. Actually one may think that 
shareholders, though they are the first to bear losses, may feel “less guilty” since the 
directive now attaches the negligence also to the debtholders and depositors for their 
investment choices. The burden will be still socialised, just in different way than before. 
Shareholders will lose their capitals, but no more than that. To this respect, Haldane 
emphasizes that “the rational response by market participants is to double up their 
bets”[54]. Therefore, to solve this issue substantially, we need to change definitively 
bankers’ incentives. Banking Regulation needs to put in place a payoff function that 
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allows bankers to stick to a balance growth path, not shape them as risk/profit-
seekers[55]. The burden should be rightly proportional to the losses occurred ex-post, not 
limited to the ex-ante calculations of a pre-determined level of capital over a metrics - 
RWAs - that can be doubly biased, internally by moral hazard as well as externally by the 
unpredictability of the events. Instead of setting a maximum threshold of losses, therefore 
a bounded range between 0 and tier 1, regulators should set a minimum threshold, that is 
from tier 1 up to infinity, in order to communicate the clear message that if the losses are 
greater than the shareholders’ capital, those paying won’t be government, tax payers or 
other firms, but still them.  
The rules of the game now in place soften instability by setting upward constraints to the 
banking system’s performance so as to achieve a lower but stable profit growth. 
Nevertheless this will not prevent the system from being unstable, from seeking profits, 
from escaping the next financial crisis. The only way to try to tackle effectively the 
endogenous instability of a capitalist system is a change of incentives:  an increase in 
shareholders’ liability through the implementation of ‘unlimited liability’ in the banking 
industry. Perhaps by attaching full responsibility to individual agents, micromotives will 
lead to more stable and farsighted macro behaviours, and finally to a humane economy.  
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Figure 3. Evolutions in the differentials between European Banks’ Subordinate and Senior 5Y 
CDS 
Source: Bloomberg, author’s own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Developments in the ratio between the European Banks’ Subordinate and Senior 5Y 
CDS 
Source: Bloomberg, author’s own calculations. 
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Figure 5. Main European Banks and Sovereigns 5Y Senior CDS Developments 
Source: Bloomberg, author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. European Banks’ Correlation with Their Sovereigns 
Source: Bloomberg, author’s calculations 
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Figure 7. Leverage, Risk Taking and Return on Equity for Selected G-SIB Banks 
Source: Public Consolidated Financial Statements, Own Calculations. Note: The size of the 
bubbles represents the Return on Equity of the Banks 
 
Appendix 
	
  Table 1. G-SIBs as of November 2015 
 
  Source: Financial Stability Board. 
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Table 2. Basel III phase-in arrangements 
 
 
Source: Bank of International Settlement. 
	
Phases 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Leverage0Ratio
Minimum0Common0Equity0Capital0Ratio 3,5% 4% 4,5%
Capital0Conservation0Buffer 0,625% 1,25% 1,875% 2,5%
Minimum0Common0Equity0plus0Capital0
Conservation0Buffer
3,5% 4% 4,5% 5,125% 5,75% 6,375% 7,0%
PhaseFin0of0deductions0from0CET1* 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100%
Minimum0Tier010Capital 4,5% 5,5% 6,0%
Minimum0Total0Capital 8,0%
Minimum0Total0Capital0plus0Conservation0Buffer 8,625% 9,25% 9,875% 10,5%
Capital0Instruments0that0no0longer0qualify0as0
nonFcore0Tier010capital0or0Tier020capital
Introduce0
Minimum0
Standard
60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ca
pi
ta
l
Li
qu
id
ity
Liquidity0Coverage0Ratio0F0Minimum0Requirement
Net0Stable0Funding0Ratio
4,50%
6,0%
8,0%
8,00%
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
End of the Sovereign-Bank Doom Loop in 
the European Union? 
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the relationship between the default risk of banks and 
sovereigns, i.e. the ‘doom-loop’. Specifically, we try to assess the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the new recovery and resolution framework in the European Union. 
We use a panel with daily data on European banks and sovereigns ranging from 2012 to 
2016 in order to test the effects of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive on the 
two-way feedback process. We find that there was a pronounced feedback loop between 
banks and sovereigns from 2012 to 2014. However, after the implementation of the 
European Banking Union, in 2015/2016, the magnitude of the doom-loop decreased and 
the spillovers became statistically not significant. Furthermore, our results suggest that 
the implementation of the new resolution framework is a suitable candidate to explain 
this finding. Overall, the results are robust across several specifications.  
 
Keywords: Financial Stability, Sovereign Bail-out, Bail-in Tool, Doom Loop, European 
Banking Union, Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. 
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Over the course of the past 800 years, the terms of trade between the 
state and the banks have first swung decisively one way and then the 
other. For the majority of this period, the state was reliant on the 
deep pockets of the banks to finance periodic fiscal crises. But for at 
least the past century the pendulum has swung back, with the state 
often needing to dig deep to keep crisis-prone banks afloat. Events 
of the past two years have tested even the deep pockets of many 
states. In so doing, they have added momentum to the century-long 
pendulum swing. Reversing direction will not be easy. It is likely to 
require a financial sector reform effort every bit as radical as 
followed the Great Depression. It is an open question whether 
reform efforts to date, while slowing the swing, can bring about that 
change of direction. (Haldane 2009: 11). 
 
1. Introduction 
In the wake of the financial crisis the relationship between the default risk of 
governments and banks has become one of the major challenges in stabilizing the 
financial system. On the one hand the European banks are one of the major creditors for 
European sovereigns. This implies that a decrease in the prices of government bonds can 
induce a deterioration of the banks’ balance sheet. On the other hand, with the emergence 
of the financial crisis in 2007/2008 it became evident that in times of financial turmoil 
governments ultimately have to bail-out national banks. Such bail-outs go hand in hand 
with large increases in government debt that directly affect the solvency of national 
governments. Hence, if the bail-outs are large the value of government bonds decrease 
which in turn affects the portfolio of the national banks and finally creates a feedback 
process between the default risk of banks and sovereigns. This risk connection, evolving 
from the aforementioned interdependence is often called the ‘doom loop’ or the ‘vicious 
cycle’. The connection between a fragile banking system and deteriorated government 
fiscal positions magnified the difficulties to reestablish a stable macroeconomic 
environment in the euro area. In order to achieve financial stability, European policy-
makers have decided to introduce a common framework for bank supervision and 
resolution: The European Banking Union (EBU).  
Two sets of regulatory measures have been implemented in the European Union in order 
to tackle respectively the fragility of national governments and of the banking system. On 
the one hand, the European Fiscal Compact (EFC) updated the Stability and Growth Pact 
with stricter criteria on fiscal provision, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
provided financial assistance programs to the member states in financial distress. The 
former entered fully into force on 1st May 2013, while the latter became effective on 1st 
January 2014. On the other hand, three macroprudential measures were undertaken to 
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make the banking system more resilient. The Basel III Accord was implemented in the 
European Union on 26th June 2013 through the Capital Requirements Regulation and 
Directive - CRD IV - which strengthens banks’ balance sheet by enhancing minimum 
capital and liquidity standards as well as by imposing a leverage ratio. The European 
Parliament initiated the European Banking Union by creating the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), which on 4th November 2014 transferred the responsibility of 
financial supervision to the European Central Bank (ECB). And, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) was enacted through the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD), which defines a common resolution framework for banks. It entered fully into 
force on 1st January 2016. The banking union aims to ensure the safety and soundness of 
the European banking system, to increase financial integration and stability and to create 
a consistent and homogenous supervisory and resolution framework across its member 
states. 
So far several studies have focused on the risk transfer from banks to sovereigns through 
bank bail-outs, Sgherri and Zoli (2009) find that concerns about the solvency of the 
banking system have led to increases in sovereign bond risk premiums in several 
European countries. Further evidence in favor of this channel is provided by Ejsing and 
Lemke (2011) and Stanga (2011). Dieckman and Plank (2011) document that this risk 
transfer is stronger the lager a country’s financial system is. While confirming the 
presence of risk transfers from banks to sovereigns in the bail-out period Acharya et al. 
(2014) also show that there is a risk transfer from sovereigns to banks. The presence of a 
two-way feedback process is confirmed by Alter and Beyer (2014) who construct 
spillover indices which capture the average interdependence between sovereigns and 
banks. They find an intensification of the feedback process in the euro area between 2010 
and 2012. Alter and Schueler (2012) find heterogeneous effects of the feedback process 
across European countries but not within. Fratzscher and Rieth (2015) document that the 
risk link from sovereigns to banks is stronger than vice versa. Singh et al. (2016) point 
out that before the financial crisis risk spillovers mainly went from sovereigns to banks, 
however the outbreak of the financial crisis marked a turning point in this relationship. 
We contribute to this literature by providing further evidence for the presence of the 
doom-loop in the euro area and by assessing whether the new regulatory standards, 
implemented trough the EBU, are sufficient to break or weaken the link between 
sovereign and bank default risk. Specifically, we evaluate empirically if the correlation of 
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risks decreases through the implementation of the new recovery and resolution 
framework. 
In order to identify the two-way feedback process, we estimate two specifications to 
evaluate the risk spillovers from sovereigns to banks and from banks to sovereigns. To 
this respect, we need to overcome an omitted variables problem. Both bank and sovereign 
credit risk are affected by macroeconomic factors that could induce co-movements 
between them, even in absence of a direct link. This problem is addressed by 
implementing a fixed effect estimation approach. First we control for bank-country 
specific effects and time fixed effects, additionally we include measures of volatility, 
foreign exposure of banks and the CDS market index. 
We find that there was a pronounced two-way feedback process between bank and 
government CDS in the European Union from 2012 to 2014. On the one hand, an 
increase in sovereign CDS of 10% translates into 0.2-0.3% increase in bank CDS. On the 
other hand, an increase in the country’s banking system CDS of 10% translates into a 2-
3% increase in sovereign CDS. However, our results indicate that since the 
implementation of the banking union, and especially after the introduction of the BRRD, 
this risk-link weakened in both directions. While we find a highly significant coefficient 
on government CDS before the implementation, its significance decreased in 2015 and it 
finally became statistically not significant in 2016. In the same way, the coefficient of 
banking sector distress was economically and statistically significant during the period 
2012-2014 and turned statistically not significant between January 2015 and March 2016. 
These findings are robust across several different specifications. Furthermore, by 
implementing interaction terms we find that the implementation had a significant 
negative effect on the risk link. According to our results the implementation decreased 
the magnitude of the spillovers from sovereigns to banks by around 0.28% and spillovers 
from banks to sovereigns by 3.9%. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly recaps the 
discussion on the link between sovereign and bank risk and provides an overview of 
regulatory changes implemented in the European union. Section 3 presents the data, the 
estimation strategy and results of both specifications. Section 4 discusses the relevance of 
our findings and concludes. 
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2. The Risk Link and The European Banking Union 
The Euro crisis can be viewed as a phenomenon of multiple dimensions. The first 
dimension is a banking crisis in which undercapitalized banks face liquidity problems. 
The second dimension is a sovereign debt crisis in which sovereigns face increasing bond 
yields and might have challenges to fund the government activity. According to 
Shambough (2012) and Mody and Sandri (2012) those events are mutually reinforcing 
and are further exacerbated by the overall weak growth in the euro area. 
Those dimensions taken together constitute the so-called ‘vicious cycle’ or ‘doom loop’. 
This terminology clearly indicates that the problem is a two-way feedback process. In the 
absence of a supranational resolution mechanism, sovereigns are solely in the 
responsibility to bail-out the national banks. Such a bank bail-out has a direct impact on 
the debt level of the sovereign and an indirect impact on the yields the sovereign has to 
pay when issuing debt[1]. Domestic banks hold a large share of the debt issued by their 
corresponding sovereign on their balance sheets. The bail-out event triggers a fall in the 
price of sovereign bonds, which in turn leads to a deterioration of the bank’s balance 
sheet. Hence, a bank bail-out can start a downward spiral from government debt to bank 
balance sheets and vice versa[2]. As argued by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and 
Breton et al. (2012) this feedback process is particularly pronounced in the euro area and 
adversely affects its financial stability.  
Many authors such as Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and Breton et al. (2012) suggest to 
move the supervision of large banks and the responsibility to rescue them to a 
supranational level. A supranational resolution mechanism could weaken the feedback 
process by reducing the potential cost of a bail-out for the national governments. As 
suggested by Breton et al. (2012) a bail-in mechanism, that is designed to clearly define 
the legal responsibility in the case of a default, could as well reduce the intensity of the 
feedback process. The aim of the bail-in mechanism is to induce investors and creditors 
of banks and sovereigns to price in the risk of a default correctly.   
In order to address the issue of financial stability in the euro area, the European 
Parliament in accordance with the European Council decided to establish the EBU. As of 
2016, the EBU consists of two pillars: The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
accompanied by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The third pillar which should 
be implemented in the near future is the harmonization of deposit guarantee schemes 
across countries. Those pillars were legislated through the so-called Single Rulebook, 
which governs the legal framework of the EBU. The legislation took place through three 
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directives. Overall, the main goals of the reforms were to establish a harmonized legal 
framework across Europe, to reduce the degree of financial vulnerability and to alleviate 
the connection between the banking and sovereign risk (European Parliament, 2014).  
In October 2013, the council of the European Union announced the implementation of the 
SSM. From November 2014, onwards the European Central Bank (ECB) has overtaken 
the task to supervise the European banking sector, according to the rules stated in the 
SSM. Therefore, the ECB is directly supervising the most ‘significant’ banks within 
Europe[3]. National supervisory boards are supporting the ECB by providing information 
on the significant banks and by supervising the remaining banks in their home countries. 
The SSM should ensure a common and coordinated supervision of banks, which in case 
of a failure could threaten the financial stability of the euro area (European Parliament, 
2010). In April 2014 the member states agreed upon the Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Directive (DGSD) which should harmonize deposit insurance across member states. 
However, so far there is no clear consensus on a harmonized deposit scheme thus the 
DGSD is not yet effective. 
In May 2014, the second pillar - the SRM - has been implemented through the BRRD, 
subsequently it entered into force in August 2014. Finally, the majority of participating 
states has ratified the new directives in November 2015. The new resolution framework 
established through the SRM then entered fully into force on 1 January 2016. From then 
on, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) makes all decisions regarding the resolution of 
banks, under the supervision of the ECB. Under the new recovery and resolution 
framework banks are required to prepare recovery plans that are solely private law 
arrangements and do not involve institutional interventions. Furthermore, detailed 
resolution plans in accordance with the supervising authorities have to be prepared. 
Finally, the new framework provides the SRB with a set of tools applicable in the case of 
a default. Specifically, those tools are; sales of business, bridge institutions, asset 
separation and a bail-in tool (European Parliament, 2014, Article 37). This new legal 
framework applies to all banks within the EMU and other European banks that can 
choose to participate voluntarily[4]. 
The main novelty is the implementation of the bail-in tool. The bail-in tool works through 
a so-called liability cascade that defines a stepwise bail-in, in case of a bank resolution. 
This means that in case of default not only equity, but also debt instruments, issued by the 
defaulting institute, can be written-down or converted into equity. If these measures are 
still insufficient to recapitalize the bank, also subordinated liabilities and finally deposits 
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that are not covered by the deposit guarantee schemes can be accessed. The bail-in 
therefore works like a firewall that should increase the loss absorbing capacity of banks 
before the governments have to recapitalize the banks. In order for this new resolution 
mechanism to be effective, banks need to ensure that they have enough liabilities that 
could be bailed-in. Therefore, the BRRD defines a minimum requirement for eligible 
liabilities, the so-called ‘Minimum Required Eligible Liabilities’ (MREL). The resolution 
authority sets the MREL on a case-by-case basis (European Parliament, 2014, Article 45). 
The Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is set up by the European banks, completes the 
new resolution framework. Starting in 2015 the fund should be fully in operations in 2023 
with a total amount of 55 billion euros. The SRF constitutes the last step in the resolution 
mechanism and clearly addresses the risk link between banks and sovereigns by imposing 
a firewall that should prevent spillovers from banks to sovereigns.  
In June 2013 the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRD IV) was 
implemented, it legislates the conversion of the Basel III capital and liquidity 
requirements into EU law. Therefore, from January 2014 onwards banks have to adjust 
gradually to the new capital requirements stated in Basel III. Furthermore, Basel III 
defines a minimum leverage ratio and new liquidity requirements. Those measures should 
increase the loss absorbing capacity of banks and enhance liquidity of the banking sector 
in times of turmoil (European Parliament, 2013). 
Furthermore, there have been two regulations that directly target the solvency of 
sovereigns. The European Fiscal Compact (EFC) defines stricter rules regarding 
sovereign budgets. Overall, it should increase fiscal discipline across European 
sovereigns and by this targets the sovereign side of the relationship. The European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) allows sovereigns to apply for financial support if they are in 
financial difficulty or if their financial sector is in need of recapitalization. Hence, it 
targets the sovereign side of the feedback process as well as the connection that goes 
from banks to governments.  
Figure 1 depicts the doom-loop relationship and shows the reforms that have been taken 
in order to resolve this source of instability. Here, channel 1 labels risk spillovers from 
sovereigns to banks, while channel 2 denominates spillovers from banks to sovereigns. 
Insert About Here Figure 1 
The Doom-Loop. 
Overall, one might categorize the measures taken into three broad categories. First, 
measures which aim at stabilizing the solvency of sovereigns, i.e. the EFC and the ESM. 
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The EFC, by enhancing fiscal discipline across countries, should affect expectations 
about the sustainability of government activity. In addition, the ESM, by providing access 
to emergency funds, works like a lender of last resort for sovereigns.  
The second category comprises measures which aim at stabilizing the banking systems, 
i.e. CRD IV, the SSM and the SRM. The adjustment of the Basel accord should improve 
the resilience of the banking system by enhancing equity standards and by defining 
liquidity ratios. These measures strengthen the loss absorbing capacity of the banking 
sector and thus reduce the default probability of banks. Furthermore, within this new 
framework, the SSM addresses the problem of asymmetric information and regulatory 
arbitrage. By moving the supervision of banks to a supranational level coordination, 
problems between national authorities should be reduced and hence a sound supervision 
should be possible. Overall, this should reduce problems which result from cross-border 
activity of banks and thus strengthen confidence in the banking system. 
Finally, the SRM falls into the second category by increasing the loss absorbing capacity 
of banks in case of a default. However, it also constitutes the third category, namely 
measures which target the spillovers between sovereigns and banks. By imposing a new 
resolution framework that consists of the bail-in cascade and the SRF the financial 
responsibility of governments in case of a bank default should be reduced. If market 
participants consider this new resolution mechanism to be effective, the risk link could be 
weakened (Covi, 2016).  
Moreover, the new resolution framework interdicts a direct recapitalization of banks 
through governments. According to the new resolution framework government 
interventions are only allowed after the bail-in cascade has proceeded. This exerts 
ambiguous effects on the risk link. On the one hand, the ban of a direct intervention could 
reduce the risk spillovers from banks to sovereigns. On the other hand, it also reduces 
implicit public guarantees for banks, which in turn weakens the balance sheet position of 
banks and thus might increase the default probability of banks[5]. 
Two major issues cast doubt on the efficacy of the BRRD.  A more general critique along 
the line of Haldane (2012) is that, as long as the Basel II regulations could not prevent the 
Great Financial Crisis of 2008/2009, then the additional requirements stated in Basel III 
might not be the right way to stabilize the financial system. This perspective can be 
connected to the idea that the financial system is over-regulated, and too complex to be 
effectively supervised. In the same line of reasoning Chen (2015) points out, that the 
weakness of the assessment procedure concerning recovery and resolution plans together 
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with the complexity of the banks’ balance sheet and the lack of coordination between 
National Competent Authorities (NCAs) and SSM can undermine the credibility of the 
BRRD, and in turn its effectiveness[6]. The second issue, a more technical point, 
concerns the capability of a resolution authority to bail-in bank assets located abroad or 
issued in a foreign country where the law of the home country does not apply. In this 
situation, cross-border claims, which enter the MREL calculation, may not be legally 
sizeable in case of a bail-in, in turn, this may undermine the effectiveness of the 
resolution plan. Thus as clearly emphasized by Lehmann (2016) measures by the 
resolution state can have effects only to the extent permitted by the law of the target state, 
thereby making private international law collide with the banking resolution plan. 
Throughout this regulatory landscape, the final judgment is left to the markets 
participants, who have to deal with these additional requirements and evaluate the 
likelihood of a bank or government default. Their judgment finally depends on the 
remaining likelihood of government interventions and ultimately determines the cost for a 
default protection, the credit default swap price. Hence, we formulate the following 
research hypotheses: 
Research Hypothesis: The implementation of the BRRD has weakened the two-way 
feedback process in the European Union due to restrictions on government interventions 
and by increasing the loss absorbing capacity of banks in case of a default.  
According to the regulatory timetable, we should see a decrease in the explanatory power 
of the sovereign CDS on bank CDS and vice versa during the implementation period, that 
is, between January 2015 and January 2016. Furthermore, we might expect a further 
decrease or even a breakdown of the bank to sovereign channel after the bail-in tool 
became fully effective across all the EMU member states[7]. In the next section, we 
evaluate how market participants have responded to the BRRD implementation by 
conducting a panel data analysis. 
3. The Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data and Summary Statistics 
In order to assess the impact of the BRRD implementation, we have to identify those 
countries which have complied with the regulatory requirements. According to the third 
ISDA monitor, which keeps track of the implementation in national law of the BBRD, as 
of 7th January 2016 all the members of the European Union with the exception of Poland 
have implemented it (ISDA 2016)[8]. Moreover, the United Kingdom although it has 
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implemented the bail-in tool in January 2015, it lacks the complementary measure - 
MREL - that ensures the effectiveness of the bail-in tool. For this reason, banks 
headquartered in the UK will be omitted from the sample[9].  
As a proxy for credit risk we use the CDS prices of banks and sovereigns, and each bank 
is matched with the corresponding sovereign. We use Datastream to determine whether a 
bank has publicly traded 5-year senior CDS. We identify 47 banks with publicly traded 
CDS. However, in order to ensure the availability of control variables we restrict the 
sample to include only banks with publicly traded equity and available sovereign CDS 
data over the entire period. To this respect, Greece is omitted from the sample since 
sovereign CDS are not quoted during the period of the analysis. According to these 
criteria, we identify 30 banks.  
In the next step, we construct a measure of foreign exposure for each country’s financial 
sector following the procedure described in Archarya et al. (2014) and Kallestrup et al. 
(2016).  This variable should account for the fact that changes in banks’ credit risk may 
be driven by changes in the sovereign credit risk of other countries. The Bank for 
International Settlement provides quarterly data on total claims which the domestic 
banking system owns vis-à-vis the private and public entities of foreign countries. This 
allows us to construct a foreign exposure index as the weighted average of the other 
countries’ sovereign CDS rates, where the weights are determined according to country-
specific exposures up to 85% of the total banking system’s foreign claims[10]. As 
additional control variables we use the VDAX, to capture changes in aggregate volatility, 
and the iTraxx Europe, to control for common movements in CDS markets. Both 
variables are important factors in pricing credit risk. In order to analyse the spillovers 
from banks to sovereigns we construct a measure of financial distress. Financial sector 
distress is defined as the weighted average of banks’ CDS by country. For this measure 
Table 1 reports the list of banks by country of origin and total assets.  
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Table 1. List of banks by country and total assets.  
 
 
The dataset ranges from January 2012 to end of March 2016. In order to avoid stale data 
we drop observations with two consecutive zero changes in bank CDS and sovereign 
CDS[11]. Therefore, the N by T dimension of the dataset equals 30 banks and 955 trading 
days, respectively. This yields a total of 28.236 observations. Moreover, to identify the 
evolution of the ‘doom-loop’ from the aftermath of the Euro crisis to the BRRD 
implementation, we divide the time span in four sub-periods of equal length, and a fifth 
period with one quarter of data[12]. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for bank CDS 
and sovereign CDS, foreign exposure, and stock prices for the full sample, and the 
subsamples in levels and percentage points.  
 
 
 
 
	 178	
Table 2   Summary Statistics of Bank and Sovereign CDS 
 
Period 1 starts in January 1st, 2012, and ends in December 2012. This period captures the 
peak of the Euro crisis as well as the “whatever it takes” Draghi’s speech on 26th July 
2012, which defined the initial decrease in sovereign and bank default risk. Throughout 
this period the average bank CDS and sovereign CDS is at its highest, respectively 411 
bps and 213 bps. Moreover, the CDS volatility is extremely high respectively 257 bps for 
banks’ CDS, while 201 bps for sovereign CDS.  
During period 2, which starts in January 2013 and ends in December 2013, the average 
bank and sovereign CDS and their volatility almost halved. This trend continues in the 
following periods. Both series reach their lowest level in period 4 (the BRRD phase-in 
period), with average bank and sovereign CDS of 128 bps and 54 bps, respectively.  
Ultimately, in period 5 which starts in January 2016 and ends in March 2016, although 
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the bail-in tool becomes enforceable, the average bank and sovereign CDS increase 
compared to period 4. The average bank CDS increases by almost 100 basis points, while 
the sovereign CDS increases by 10 bps. Remarkably, banks’ CDS volatility spikes to the 
level experienced between 2013 and 2014, while sovereigns’ CDS volatility increased by 
just 7 bps compared to the average of the previous year. In this context, it is important to 
emphasize that an increase/decrease of the co-movement between the two time series 
may be triggered by a common factor, and not by a strengthening or weakening of the 
sovereign-bank channel. This specific point is going to be analysed in the following 
section. 
This countertrend might reflect the financial market distress started in January 2016, 
during which Eurostox600 and the Eurostox600banks lost respectively 30% and 40% of 
their market value compared to December 2015. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of both 
indexes. To this respect, the market turmoil, taking place between January and March 
2016, represents an ideal robustness check. In fact, an increase in the co-movement 
without a strengthening of the feedback-loop between sovereign and bank CDS may give 
the first evidence that the link between the two has weakened.  
Insert About Here Figure 2 
Stock Market Performance January 2012 - March 2016. 
3.2 Stylized Facts 
In order to frame the co-movement of bank and sovereign CDS from its inception - the 
Sovereign Crisis of 2012 - figure 3 shows the scatterplot of monthly averages of bank and 
sovereign CDS between January 2012 and March 2016.  
Clearly, after the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis - in the end of 2009 - 
bank and sovereign CDS started to commove strongly. Concerns regarding the solvability 
of the banking system, which owned a significant part of the sovereign debt created the 
feedback loop. The co-movement kept on intensifying during the period 2011- 2012, the 
peak of the crisis. In 2013, bank and sovereign CDS faced an evident decrease in absolute 
terms, but the positive correlation between both remained. Only from 2014 onwards, the 
slope flattened remarkably, and almost became horizontal during 2015. Contrary in the 
beginning of 2016 the trend reversed, and the line steepened again due to the January 
stock market turmoil, which revived the co-movement between both time series.  
For this reason, as clearly pointed out by Acharya et al. (2014), a key problem in 
quantifying the direct feedback loop between sovereign and financial sector credit risk is 
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that both series can co-move due to factors which are potentially unobservable. In the 
case at hand, shocks to macroeconomic fundamentals may trigger an increase in 
sovereign CDS, and at the same time through a different channel, affect the profitability 
of a bank. Such a factor can lead to increases or decreases in the co-movement between 
both time series even if the doom-loop is inactive. Thus, changes in macroeconomic and 
financial conditions may generate a correlation between sovereign and bank credit risk 
even in the absence of a direct feedback mechanism. 
Insert About Here Figure 3 
Co-movement of sovereign CDS and bank CDS between 2012 and 2016. 
3.3 Channel 1: The Risk Transfer from Sovereigns to Banks 
In order to quantify the risk transfer from sovereigns to banks - channel 1 - we need to 
address the problem of co-movement between the CDS of banks and sovereigns. To this 
end, we employ a fixed effects estimation strategy. Bank fixed effects should control for 
all bank specific characteristics, while time fixed effects should take into account market 
wide common effects. On top of that, a set of control variables is included to capture 
additional confounding factors. This approach closely resembles the one implemented by 
Acharya et al. (2014)[13]. 
3.3.1 Benchmark Specification Ch. 1 
We estimate the following OLS benchmark regression - equation (1) - in order to 
quantify and verify whether the effect of sovereign CDS on bank CDS - the 𝛽 coefficient 
- has changed between before and after the BRRD implementation. According to our 
research hypothesis, we expect β to be positive and statistically significant before the 
implementation of the BRRD, while less statistically significant and smaller afterwards. 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙  1− 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠: 
∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"#= 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" + 𝜔∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! +  𝛾∆ log 𝐹𝑋!" … + 𝜑∆ log 𝑆𝑃!" + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!"#                                                                                                          1  
Equation (1) is presented as follows: i is the subscript identifying the bank, j indicates the 
residence country of the bank, and t indicates time. ∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"#  is the change in 
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the natural logarithm of the bank CDS from day t to t+1, and  ∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"  is the 
daily change in the natural logarithm of sovereign CDS, the variable of interest in this 
specification. Moreover, the benchmark specification controls for endogeneity arising 
from the relation between bank and sovereign CDS and its dynamic nature by adding the 
lagged value of the dependent variable - ∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! . In this way, we control for 
the possibility that current changes in the dependent variable may depend on past changes 
of itself[14]. Next, ∆ log 𝐹𝑋!"  is the daily change in the natural logarithm of the foreign 
exposure index, ∆ log 𝑆𝑃!"  is the daily change in the natural logarithm of banks’ stock 
prices, and ∆ 𝑋!  is the change in the global factors - VDAX and iTraxx Europe. Lastly, 𝛼! are bank fixed effects capturing idiosyncratic characteristics of banks, while 𝜁! are day 
fixed effects, which capture the additional sources of variability across time. We cluster 
the standard errors at the bank level to allow for correlation of error terms within banks. 
In order to address potential non-normalities of the errors, standard errors are 
bootstrapped with 200 replications. Table 3 presents the results of the benchmark model. 
We include results for the period before, during, and after the BRRD implementation.  
Table 3    Bank CDS and Changes in Sovereign CDS Explanatory Power: Time and Bank Fixed Effects. 
This table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk before, during and after the 
implementation of the BRRD. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and bootstrapped. ***, **, and 
* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The regression specification 
is given by: ∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"# =  𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" + 𝜔∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! +𝛾∆ log 𝐹𝑋!" + 𝜑∆ log 𝑆𝑃!" + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!"# 
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Column (1) reports estimates for the entire period, columns (2) to (4) for the period 
preceding the BRRD implementation, while columns (5) to (6) for the implementation 
period. First of all, 𝛽 the coefficient on sovereign CDS is positive and statistically 
significant in the period preceding the BRRD implementation. A 10% increase in 
sovereign CDS corresponds to 0.34%, 0.24%, and 0.31% increase in bank CDS 
respectively during 2012, 2013 and 2014. This brings additional evidence in support of 
the direct risk transfer from sovereigns to banks investigated in the doom loop literature.  
Nevertheless, regarding our research hypothesis, we find that during the BRRD phase-in 
period and full implementation, the 𝛽  coefficient experiences a strong reduction in 
magnitude and becomes statistically not significant. Overall, the model specification 
seems to perform relatively well since the control variables are statistically significant 
and with the expected sign. Altogether, the variables explain on average 40% of the 
variation in daily changes in bank CDS. These values are in line with the previous 
studies. 
 The decrease in magnitude and the drop in statistical significance show that a structural 
break in the relationship between sovereign and bank credit risk has occurred in 2015. 
Since this coincides with the BRRD implementation, this might indicate a connection 
between both. Overall, it justifies further investigations of the two events[15]. 
To further investigate the connection, and to ensure that the results are not driven by ad-
hoc sample splitting, we estimate the benchmark specification with a one-year rolling 
window. Figure 4 reports the evolution of the 𝛽 coefficient. It is evident that the 𝛽 
coefficient reduces in magnitude between April 2015 and March 2016. Furthermore, the 
estimates during this time window are not significant anymore which is indicated by the 
widening of the confidence intervals. As highlighted, this shift in the coefficient takes 
place in the period during which most EU members ratified the BRRD. Overall, this 
approach verifies the sample splitting and justifies the period of interest[16]. 
Insert About Here Figure 4 
Sovereign CDS Coefficient Dynamics: One-Year Rolling-estimation Window. 
Furthermore, the vertical lines indicate the announcement and introduction of the ECB’s 
Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP), commonly called QE. It is apparent that the 𝛽 
coefficient reacted neither to the former nor to the latter[17]. This initial claim will be 
further corroborated in the following section. 
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3.3.2 BRRD Dummy Specification Ch. 1 
In order to test whether there is a direct effect of the introduction of the BRRD on the risk 
spillovers from sovereigns to banks we create a BRRD dummy. 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! takes on the 
value J= 0 before the full implementation of the BRRD, while it takes on the value J = 1, 
when the BRRD was ratified and applies[18]. Furthermore, in order to see the effect of 
the implementation on the 𝛽 coefficient, we include an interaction term between the 
BRRD dummy and sovereign CDS, [ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! ∗ ∆log (𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆 ]. To this respect, we 
expect the coefficient of the BRRD dummy - Θ! - and the coefficient of the BRRD 
interaction term - Θ! - to be negative and statistically significant[19]. Furthermore, we 
include the same set of control variables as in the benchmark specification. This yields 
the following estimation equation:  
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙  1− 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠: 
∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"#= 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐶𝐷𝑆!" + 𝜔∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! + 𝛾∆ log 𝐹𝑋!" … 
+ 𝜑∆ log 𝑆𝑃!" + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + Θ!𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! + Θ! 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! ∗ ∆log (𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" + 𝜀!"              2  
 Estimates of Θ - the parameters of interest in this specification - are reported in table 4. 
Column (1) reports the estimates of the benchmark specification for the purpose of 
comparison, column (2) reports the results with the BRRD Dummy, while column (3) 
includes both, the BRRD dummy and the BRRD interaction term. The same specification 
is repeated for columns (4) to (6) at monthly frequency and reported with the inclusion of 
the ECB’s PSPP[20].  
The coefficient of the BRRD dummy Θ! is negative and statistically significant at 1%. 
This corroborates the intuition that throughout this period the BRRD and its bail-in tool 
have induced a structural break in the risk-relationship previously highlighted by the 
dynamics of the 𝛽 coefficient in figure 4. Moreover, the results reported in column (3) 
show that Θ! is negative and statistically significant at 5%. This indicates that banks in 
countries which have implemented the BRRD experienced a strong decrease in the risk 
connection to their sovereigns.  Furthermore, the difference between 𝛽 and Θ! is in line 
with the estimate of the 𝛽 coefficient reported in table 3. The foreign exposure measure 
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and stock prices possess the expected sign and also behave consistently with the reported 
estimates of the benchmark specification. Overall the specification explains 40% of the 
variation in bank CDS.  
Ultimately, we want to verify whether these results are sensitive to changes in the data 
frequency, to this end we estimate equation 2 with monthly data. Performing the analysis 
with monthly data allows us to include data on the ECB’s PSPP. This should enable us to 
verify whether some of the variation captured by the BRRD interaction term comes from 
the contemporaneous implementation of the QE.  
Columns (4) to (6) show that the coefficient of ∆ log 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑃  is negative but not 
statistically significant. This robustness check confirms the initial descriptive evidence of 
figure 4, in which the QE implementation seemed to have no effect on the risk 
connection. According to the ECB, the QE aims at reducing the level of the sovereign 
bond yields, and therefore it targets only one side of the relationship, and not the risk-
transfer between the two.  
Columns (5) and (6) reports the estimates for Θ! and Θ!. To this respect, the BRRD 
dummy and the BRRD interaction term are negative and statistically significant 
respectively at 1% and 10% of confidence level. Across the three specifications the PSPP 
remains statistically not significant. Moreover the coefficient of Θ! indicates that the full 
implementation of the BRRD, i.e., the bail-in tool almost halved the risk-transfer from 
sovereign to banks. Again we find a significant shift of the slope for banks in countries 
which have fully implemented the BRRD. This strengthens the results provided at daily 
frequency. Overall, these findings support our research hypothesis. 
Table 4 Banks CDS: BRRD Dummy and Sovereign CDS Interaction Term. This table examines 
the robustness of our main results by reporting the coefficients after having included the BRRD 
dummy and the interaction term between the BRRD dummy and sovereign CDS, columns (2) and 
(3), respectively. The same specification is performed at monthly frequency columns (4) to (6), 
and the public sector purchase program of the ECB is added as further control variable. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level and bootstrapped. ***, **, and * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The regression specification is given by: ∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"# = 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" + 𝜔∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! + 𝛾∆ log 𝐹𝑋!" +𝜑∆ log 𝑆𝑃!" + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + Θ!𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! + Θ! 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! ∗ ∆log (𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" + 𝜀!" 
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3.4 Channel 2: Risk Transfer from Banks to Sovereigns 
In order to investigate the second channel - the feedback loop from banks to sovereigns - 
we create a financial sector distress variable (FSD) following the approach of Acharya et 
al. (2014). In order to address possible confounding factors we employ a fixed effects 
estimation strategy with country and time fixed effects as employed in Dieckmann and 
Plank (2012) and Kallestrup et al. (2016). Country fixed effects - 𝛼! - should control for 
all country specific characteristics, while time fixed effects - 𝜁! - should take into account 
market wide common effects. Furthermore, we control for the endogeneity arising from 
the relation between bank and sovereign CDS by adding the lagged dependent variable - ∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!!  - and changes in global factors by adding the VDAX and iTraxx 
Europe - ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! . Apart from the FSD variable and the banks’ specific factors, the 
channel 2’s benchmark specification is the mirror image of the one presented for channel 
1.  
3.4.1 Benchmark Specification Ch. 2 
The model specification we are going to estimate is given by equation (3). The coefficient 
of interest 𝛽  is expected to be positive and statistically significant before the 
implementation of the BRRD, while smaller and not statistically significant after. 
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𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 2− 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∶  
∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" = 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑆𝐷!" + 𝜔∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!"   (3) 
Table 5 presents the estimates of this model specification. Column (1) shows the 
estimates for the benchmark specification during the entire period, columns (2) to (4) 
present the results before the BRRD implementation, while columns (5) to (6) reports the 
estimates after. The 𝛽  coefficient of financial sector distress (FSD) is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% during the period preceding the BRRD implementation. 
Contrary, after the implementation it strongly decreases and becomes statistically not 
significant. During the period 2012-2014 a 10% increase in FSD corresponded to 2-3% 
increase in sovereign CDS. Overall, the variables explain 30% of the variation in daily 
changes in bank CDS across the entire period. These findings complement the previous 
investigation and confirm the structural break in the risk-relationship between banks and 
sovereigns from 2015 onwards.  Nevertheless, further evidences is necessary to assess the 
effect of the BRRD implementation on the second channel. 
Table 5   Sovereign CDS and Financial Sector Distress: Country and Time Fixed Effects. This 
table shows the effect of banks’ credit risk on sovereign credit risk before and after the 
implementation of the BRRD. Standard errors are clustered at country level and bootstrapped by 
200 replications. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. The regression specification is given by: 
 ∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"  = 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑆𝐷!" +  𝜔∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!" 
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3.4.2 BRRD Dummy Specification Ch. 2 
In the same vein as for channel 1, we construct an interaction term between the BRRD 
dummy - 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷!  - and the financial sector distress variable - ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑆𝐷!"  which is 
denoted [ 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! ∗ ∆log (𝐹𝑆𝐷 ]. This enables us to quantify the direct effect of the 
implementation on the risk transfer from banks to sovereigns. Furthermore, we include 
the same set of control variables as in the benchmark specification. This yields the 
following estimation equation: 
𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 2− 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 ∶  
  ∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" = 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑆𝐷!" + 𝜔∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! + 𝜏!𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! +⋯ + 𝜏! 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! ∗ ∆log (𝐹𝑆𝐷!" +  𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!"                                                                              (4) 
Our interest lies in the coefficients of the BRRD dummy and the BRRD interaction term, 
respectively 𝜏! and 𝜏!. We expect both 𝜏 to be negative and statistically significant.  
Table 6, which retains the same structure of table 4, reports the estimates for the 
benchmark specification in column (1), for the BRRD dummy in column (2), and for the 
BRRD interaction term in column (3). Then, the same specification is repeated for 
columns (4) to (6) at monthly frequency and reported with the inclusion of the ECB’s 
PSPP. In addition, we include the debt to GDP ratio to further control for country specific 
debt dynamics as commonly employed in the literature[21]. 
The coefficient of the BRRD dummy 𝜏! is negative and statistically significant at 5%. 
Moreover, the results reported in column (3) show that 𝜏! is negative and statistically 
significant at 1%. Both results suggest that those countries implementing the resolution 
framework experienced a strong decrease in the risk transfers.  
Next, we perform the analysis with monthly data to control for the data frequency, the 
ECB’s PSPP, and the country’s ratio of debt to GDP. To this respect, the coefficient of 
the PSPP is positive and statistically not significant. Clearly it does not affect the 𝛽 
coefficient. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the BRRD dummy and interaction terms, 
though with the expected sign and a consistent magnitude, are both statistically 
insignificant. By looking at table 7 in the appendix, we can see that the breakdown is also 
present at monthly frequency[22]. This result is overall satisfying since the sign and 
magnitude are consistent, while the lack of statistical significance might be driven by the 
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few data points available[23]. All the variables explain 55% of the variation in monthly 
changes in sovereign CDS across the entire period. These evidences further corroborate 
the findings provided for channel 1, emphasizing that the BRRD and thus the EBU seem 
to have a symmetric effect on both channels[24].  
Table 6 Sovereign CDS: BRRD Dummy and Financial Sector Distress Interaction Term. This 
table examines the robustness of our main results by reporting the coefficients after having 
included the BRRD dummy, and the interaction term between the BRRD dummy and financial 
sector distress, columns (2) and (3), respectively. The same specification is performed at monthly 
frequency columns (4) to (6), and further control variables are added: debt to GDP ratio column 
and the ECB’s PSPP. Standard errors are clustered at country level and bootstrapped by 200 
replications. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
The regression specification is given by ∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"  = 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑆𝐷!" +𝜔∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"!! + 𝜏!𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! + 𝜏! 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐷! ∗ ∆log (𝐹𝑆𝐷!" + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!" 
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
The results of the benchmark specifications reported in table 3 and 6, and in table 5 
respectively for the daily and monthly analysis have shown that a breakdown of the risk-
transfer from sovereigns to banks - channel 1 - and from banks to sovereigns - channel 2 - 
has taken place from 2015 onwards. This structural break has been further investigated to 
assess whether the BRRD implementation was the source of this phenomenon. On the 
one hand, by constructing a dummy, which replicates the heterogeneous cross-country 
implementation of the BRRD’s bail-in tool, we have been able to verify that the BRRD 
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implementation period was the one capturing the source of variation. On the other hand, 
by interacting the BRRD dummy with the main variable of interest - sovereign CDS for 
channel 1 - and the financial sector distress for channel 2 - we have quantified the direct 
effect of the regulation on 𝛽, the coefficient capturing the estimates of the structural break 
reported respectively in table 3 and 6. These results are consistent and robust across 
different specifications. 
According to these findings, the research hypothesis seems to be confirmed. The 
implementation of the resolution mechanism as defined by the BRRD and comprehended 
into the broader framework of the EBU was effective in tackling the risk spillovers 
between the banking system and the fragile sovereign fiscal position, the so called doom 
loop. These results have important implications, not only for the stakeholders directly 
involved as here documented, i.e., banks and sovereigns, but also for taxpayers, 
macroprudential policy regulators, and European institutions.  
On the one hand, the effective implementation of the EBU and a more transparent 
mechanism of losses allocation in case of an entity default have increased the efficiency 
in the allocation of capital - equity and debt - in the banking sector. On the other hand, it 
has also contributed to the reduction in the cost of debt-refinancing by governments. 
Now, the burden of a bank failure has shifted from taxpayers to a well-defined hierarchy 
of investors, so that the price of a capital asset can properly reflect the risk-return trade-
off assigned to the class of bail-in-able instruments.  
Moreover, this new set of macroprudential measures represents an alternative to higher 
equity requirements, which, above certain threshold, may have detrimental effect on the 
functioning of the lending channel by increasing the rate of interest, and in turn reducing 
the quantity lent. This factor is especially important if we consider that in the European 
Union private investment is more tied to bank-loans than equity-financed.   
Ultimately, the SSM, SRM, and SRB represent the different faces of the EBU, which 
strengthen the Euro Area’s integration process and allow for common supervisory and 
resolution criteria to take place across the heterogeneous spectrum of the European 
banking-financial system. A common regulatory footprint enhances the accountability of 
European supranational authorities, restores confidence in the financial system, and 
reduces the idiosyncratic risk of coordination failure at national level.  
Overall, the macroprudential domain - policy and regulation - can be viewed as the 
complement and the alternative in stabilizing the financial system when the other policy 
domains - monetary and fiscal - are likely to fail.  
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4. Concluding Remarks 
Our investigations of the bank sovereign feedback loop have shown that after the 
financial crisis and throughout the Euro crisis, a pronounced feedback process between 
banks and sovereigns was at work. However, our results indicate that with the 
introduction of the European banking union this relationship has weakened or even 
disappeared. An important factor in the effectiveness of the EBU seems to be the recent 
implementation of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime. Countries that have 
implemented the new resolution and recovery framework saw a strong decrease in the 
risk link between banks and governments. This may indicate that market participants 
have assessed the banking system’s loss absorbing capacity and the shift in responsibility 
to be sufficient to avoid state intervention in case of banks’ default, thereby making the 
bail-in mechanism credible and effective. This outcome, in turn should have an 
economically positive impact on the cost of debt refinancing by banks and states. 
Nevertheless, this current change of direction - to use Haldane’s words - may just be 
temporary, as it was before the Great Financial Crisis, and only an extreme event may 
definitely test its effectiveness. To this respect, further research should address changes in 
systemic risk introduced through EBU and shed light on the overall financial stability in 
Europe. To date, regulators’ objective seems to have been achieved; anyway, the Basel 
II’s failure and the subsequent financial meltdown have to remind us that regulation by 
itself does not prevent such events.  
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Footnotes 
[1] Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012: 204) argue that if market participants perceive that there is the 
risk of a bail-out, yields of government bonds are already affected. 
[2] Sgherri and Zoli (2009: 17) verify that the deterioration in fiscal positions led to an increase in 
the risk premiums of government bonds for most European countries. In particular, they argue 
that increases in debt levels of sovereigns and concerns about the solvency of national banking 
systems have caused this increase. 
[3] The EBA assesses the importance of banks according to several criteria, important are: size of 
the balance sheet, the ratio of the size of the balance sheet to the economic activity in the home 
country and whether the bank has applied for financial support from other European mechanisms.  
[4] For instance, Denmark, Switzerland and UK decided to opt-in and apply the reforms stated in 
the new legislations. 
[5] See Toader (2015) for a discussion of the relationship between implicit government 
guarantees and the introduction of the new bank resolution framework. 
[6] Lybeck (2016) provides a critical appraisal of the future of banks’ bail-out in the European 
Union under the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Bank Recovery Resolution Directive. 
[7] See figure A1 in the online appendix for a timeline of the European Banking Union.   
[8] Although Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, it has implemented a regime 
with similar characteristics to the BRRD. Nevertheless, this regime was implemented in different 
steps between 2012 and 2016, and its bail-in tool entered into force in January 2012. For this 
reason, UBS and Credit Suisse will not be considered for the analysis.  
[9] The MREL is only in the phase-in process, and it will be fully operational in January 2020 
(ISDA 2016: 37). 
[10] We include foreign exposures of a country's banks until we have reached 85% of the total 
foreign exposure, as this eliminates the need to deal with countries for which a time series of CDS 
premiums is not available for the sovereign or the largest banks. Then the index is normalized to 
100%. 
[11] The data selection and cleaning procedure is implemented following Acharya et al. (2014: 
2712). 
[12] This subdivision is useful in presenting the results and makes them comparable before and 
after the BRRD implementation. This selection does not drive our results; to this respect we 
provide estimates for a 1-year rolling window over the entire period. This results justify to split 
the sample into yearly intervals. 
[13] The results of the common residual and time series diagnostics justify our exact estimation 
specification and can be found in the statistical appendix for the sake of space.  
[14] Since we have a large T dimension and a small N the criticism of Nickell (1981), who points 
out possible biases, does not pose a problem for our estimation. 
[15] Results do not change after the inclusion of two interactions terms between bank fixed 
effects and the CDS market index as well as between bank fixed effects and the volatility index. 
This technique should be able to take into account the heterogeneity in bank characteristics. 
Results are provided in the online appendix, table A1.  
[16] This finding does not change by using recursive and reversed recursive estimation methods. 
Furthermore, it is robust to changes in the length of the selected rolling window to 3 and 6 
months. 
[17] Clearly, the bond purchase program aims at lowering the sovereign yields, that is, it affects 
the variable in level not in log-changes.  
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[18] It is important to remark that the timetable for the implementation is different across 
countries, although the common deadline is 1st January 2016. To this respect, the dummy variable 
captures the effect of the heterogeneous implementation across countries within the period 
January 2015-March 2016. See figure 4 for the timetable of the BRRD full-implementation across 
countries. 
[19] As investigated by Toader (2015: 141) the decreasing value of public guarantees might work 
against our hypothesis. To this end, we want to recall that governments’ interventions are still 
possible under the BRRD resolution framework, but take place after all bail-in-able instruments 
are converted into new equity. This strongly reduces the likelihood and the amount of government 
capital injections. “This finding leads us to the conclusion that investors expect lower public 
support for banks from countries where efforts to implement a resolution mechanism are made. 
Moreover, results indicate that potential interactions between the sovereign rating and the 
introduction of resolution mechanism reduce significantly the expectations of public support” 
(Toader 2015: 142). 
[20] Data on the PSPP by country is available only at monthly frequency from the ECB’s website. 
Since Sweden and Denmark do not belong to the Euro Area, the inclusion of the PSPP omits 
them from the sample.  
[21] Data on debt to GDP are collected from the ECB’s statistical data warehouse. 
[22] For the sake of space and for a better comparison and interpretation of the results at monthly 
frequency between the two channels, results are place in the appendix. 
[23] Data at monthly frequency for channel 2 is only one third (428) of the data available for 
channel 1 (1256). This is due to the reduction of the cross-sectional data: N - the number of 
countries - is 9, while N - the number of banks - is 26.   
[24] Moreover, results are not driven by the economic recovery. Table A2 in the online appendix 
report the estimates for both channels at daily frequency. This robustness check verifies that those 
countries experiencing an economic recovery before the BRRD introduction were still prone to 
the doom loop, a positive and statically significant 𝛽 coefficient. 
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List of Figures 
 
Figure. 1   The Doom-Loop.  
Note: This figure shows the doom-loop relationship and the regulations stabilizing the European 
financial system, i.e. the sovereign side, the banking system and their inter-linkages. The 
regulatory changes affecting the sovereigns are the European Fiscal Compact (EFC), and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESB). On the other hand, those targeting the banking system are 
the Basel III requirements (CRD IV), and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Ultimately 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) aims directly at breaking the 
interconnections between the two, i.e. the feedback loop from sovereigns to banks - channel 1 - as 
well as the feedback loop from banks to sovereigns - channel 2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stock Market Performance January 2012 - March 2016.  
Note: this figure shows the evolution of two broad Equity market indexes respectively STOXX 
Europe 600 banks (LHS) and STOXX Europe 600 (RHS). 
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Figure 3. Co-movement of sovereign CDS and bank CDS between 2012 and 2016.  
Note: this figure shows a scatterplot of average bank CDS and sovereign CDS by month and 
country. The sample comprehends the four largest European countries: France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain. 
 
 
 
Figure. 4   Sovereign CDS Coefficient Dynamics: One-Year Rolling-estimation Window.  
Note: this figure shows the evolution of the sovereign CDS coefficient according to one-year 
rolling-estimation window with bank and time fixed effects. The regression specification 
replicates table 3 model’s set-up. Results are consistent if we consider a rolling window of three 
and six month length. 
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Appendix 
Table 7 Bank CDS and Sovereign CDS Explanatory Power: Time and Bank/Country Fixed Effects. This 
table shows the effect of sovereign credit risk on bank credit risk and vice versa at monthly frequency, 
before and after the implementation of the BRRD. Standard errors are clustered at the bank/country level 
and bootstrapped. ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
The regression specification of columns (1) to (3) is given by ∆ log 𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"# = 𝛼! + 𝜁! +𝛽∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" + 𝛾∆ log 𝐹𝑋!" + 𝜑∆ log 𝑆𝑃!" + 𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!"#.  
The regression specification of columns (4) to (6) is given by ∆ log 𝑆𝑂𝑉 𝐶𝐷𝑆!"  = 𝛼! + 𝜁! + 𝛽∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐹𝑆𝐷!" +  𝛿∆𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑋! + 𝜀!" 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis has used the Misnky-Kaleckian theory as a guideline to investigate the 
sources of economic and financial fragility in the Euro Area. It was an attempt to 
capture the essence of the European Monetary Union, i.e., the most important 
achievement in modern economic and political history. The EMU has been - first of all 
- the outcome of political decisions, which exogenously imposed a process of 
convergence to the European countries. Nevertheless, the European institutional-
macroeconomic system was not devised to pursue that aim. The endogenous economic 
forces were not aligned to the political ones, but they were left flowing with business 
cycle fluctuations. Although, this choice may work when a set of homogenous 
countries is pooled together, it doesn’t when a high degree of heterogeneity exists 
among members of a monetary union. In the latter case, counterbalancing mechanisms 
are necessary to keep and realign countries on a convergence growth path. A fiscal 
union could embody the transfer mechanism able to offset trade imbalances and 
asymmetric shocks, and to sustain aggregate demand in time of regional crises. But, it 
wasn’t, and still is not a politically feasible option, since the EMU is based on the 
principle of subsidiarity which guarantees the protection of political diversity and 
fiscal decentralization. Therefore, fiscal and political independence is a founding 
feature of the EMU, and any macro reform needs to comply with it. Nonetheless, the 
2008 Great Financial Crisis revealed the flaws of the European architecture, 
underlining that the current macro system is fine-tuned neither to achieve convergence 
in tranquil time, nor to restore it during periods of crisis. The willingness in creating 
convergence among Euro Area members remained exclusively a national duty and was 
bound by a fixed set of rules, which did not make it economically viable. Within this 
context, the Euro was created, evolved, and lately changed its nature. The theoretical 
convergence became actual divergence in the aftermath of the crisis. Two opposing 
growth models were allowed to endogenously develop within the Euro Area, but no 
question was addressed to policy makers on the long-term sustainability of such a 
process, and its macroeconomic impact. The European sovereign and banking crisis 
gave a clear answer to this question on their behalf. Economic heterogeneity tends to 
foster economic divergence when the burden of adjustment is left to national member 
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states. And asymmetric fiscal policies may be useful temporary remedies, but they do 
not represent the long-term solution to the regional imbalances and differentials. 
Actually, if fiscal policy is constantly used to offset detrimental regional shocks, 
sustainability of national public finances will be at risk, weakening further the 
country’s capability to respond to regional shocks. Different economic structures and 
financial conditions, asymmetric sources and magnitudes of shocks make divergence a 
self-reinforcing process. To tackle this structural flaw of the system, social and 
economic cohesion and solidarity among member states need to be strengthened. As 
Minsky emphasizes a humane economy is the first step toward a human society. In 
achieving this, economic coordination in terms of wage and trade policies must be the 
priority of the EMU. Trade imbalances are at the basis of regional shocks, and the 
absence of regional exchange rates make asymmetric wage policies crucial 
determinants of regional boom and bust cycles. At the same time, a high degree of 
labour mobility will still play an important role in smoothing asymmetric shocks, but 
this should not lead to a regionalization of production and employment. The EMU was 
created for the convergence in economic performance of its members, and the free 
movements of goods and people. A regionalization of the production process makes 
them lose part of their freedom. They are obliged to move, not anymore free to move. 
Although the creation of the European Banking Union is the right step in the right 
direction since an unregulated financial sector is conducive to instability, and 
additional financial integration will follow, it can not represent the only shared field of 
coordination. Economic systems are complex set of uncertain micro-relationships, and 
solid and affective institutions ensure that their aggregation into macro-behaviours 
leads to an equitable and sustainable long-term growth path. Pragmatically, we need to 
enlarge the EU budget to allow the European Commission play an active pro-
convergence role at the Union level. Next, within the EMU, we need to create a Euro 
Treasury to implement countercyclical-investment policies, and thus allowing the 
rebalancing of regional asymmetries in productivity. This would alleviate the pressure 
on national governments, and thus enable the fall in national public debt. Lastly, we 
need a common vision of the macro-strategy tackling the problem of unemployment, 
inequalities and sustainable growth: a wage-led full-employment growth model as the 
alternative solution to the current individualistic profit-led system. This would 
incentivize and ease the integration process of the EU-28 toward a full-fledged 
European monetary union, and set the basis for a global Europe. 
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